GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18553, 10 November 1923, Page 8

GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

CHUECHILL MEMOIRS.

RESOLVE AND RECOIL.

29TH DIVISION DISPUTE.

BY THE BT. HON. WINSTON S.

(Copyright.)

February 16 was a Day of Resolve. At a meeting of the principal Ministers on the War Council, including the Prime Minister, Lord Kitchener, and myself, the following decisions eventually incorporated in the Decisions of the War Council were .taken :— (1) The 29th Division to be despatch*l to Lemnos at the earliest possible date, preferably within nine or ten days. (2) Arrangements to be made to send a force from Egypt, if required. (3) The whole of the above forces, with the Royal Marine battalions already despatched, to be available in case of necesity to support the naval attack on the Dardanelles. The decision of February 16 is the foundation of the military attack upon the Dardanelles. On this day Admiral Garden was informed that Mudros Harbour could be used by him as a base, and RearAdmiral Wemyss was appointed as senior naval officer there. . In the evening of the 16th, in pursuance of the decisions which had been taken, I directed Admiral Oliver, Chief of tho War Staff, to have transports collected with the utmost speed for the 29th Division, and he issued orders to this effect on the same day. The resolve Co concentrate an army undoubtedly carried with it acceptance of the possibility of using it in certain eventualities. But these were not as yet defined. During the 17th it appeared that great pressure was being put upon Lord Kitchener from General Headquarters not to divert the 29th Division from France. In fact, as has been justly observed by the Official Naval Historian, the use of the 29th Division became a cardinal issue between what were beginning to be called in our secret circles "The Western" and "The Eastern" policies. Lord Kitchener became the prey of. these contending opinions and forces, and he was plunged into a state of mosC painful indecision between them. Lord Kitchener's Attitude. So far, not a shot had been fired at the Dardanelles, but we were on the eve of the attack on the outer forts. When we met in council again on the 19th, it became clear that) Lord Kitchener had changed his mind. Ke informed us that he could not consent to the despatch, of the 29th Division to the East. He gave as his reason th .'■ dangerous weakness of Russia and his fear lest large masses of German troops should be brought back from the Russian front to attack our troops in France. I cannot believe that this argument had really weighed with him. He must have known that, apart from all other improbabilities, it was physically impossible for the Germans to transport great armies from Russia to the French front under two or three mouths at the very least, and that tho 29th Division —one single division- not affect the issue appreciably if they did, so. He used the argument to fortify a decision which he had arrived aC after a most painful heart-searching on other and general grounds. < The Council bowed to Lord Kitchener's will, though its wishes and opinions were unaltered. It was decided to postpone the departure of the 29th Division, but the Admiralty was instructed nevertheless to continue the preparation of transports for it and other troops. On the 20th I minuted to the Director of Transports: "All preparations are to be made to embark the 29th Division with' the least possible delay. The despatch of this division is not, however, finally decided." Transports Dispersed. The 20th was a Day of Recoil. Lord Kitchener had refused to send the 29th Division. He even seemed opposed to any large concentration of Creeps in the East. He deprecated my gathering transports at Alexandria for 40,000 men as a precautionary measure, to which he had previously assented. He went further. Hb sent his aide-de-camp, the brave and accomplished Colonel Fitzgerald, over to the First Sea Lord an?! Che Admiralty Transport Department to say that the 29th Division was not to go. The First Sea Lord and the Director of Naval Transport thereupon assumed that Che question had been finally settled by agreement between Lord Kitchener and me. The orders for the collection and fitting of the transports for this division, which had been operative since the 16Ch, were accordingly cancelled, and the whole fleet of twenty vessels was released for other duties and dispersed, without my being informed. The discussion was resumed on February 24 and 26, but we no'ir met under the impression of the actual attack on the Dardanelles. The bombardment of Che outer forte had begun on February 19, and although the operations had been interrupted by bad weather, a favourable impression had been sustained. Moreover, open action had now been taken. If the 16th had been,a Dav of Resolve, and the 20th a Dry of Recoil, the.24th and 26th were days of Compromise and Half-meas-ures. On the 24th Lord Kitchener said that he "felt that if the fleet acould not get through tbe Straife unaided, the army ought to see the business through. The effect of a defeat in the Orient would be very serious. There could be no going back." Thus at a stroke, the idea of discarding the naval attack, if it proved too difficult, and turning to some other objective, was abandoned, and the possibility of a great military enterprise seemed to be accepted. On this I again argued strenously, both on the 24th and on the 26th, for the despatch of the 29th Division, and I used to the full the hopes and interest which Che naval attack was increasingly exciting. Lord Kitchener, notwithstanding his pronouncement, adhered to his.refusal. Responsibility Disclaimed. All these half-measures, which nevertheless were assuming serious proportions and marked a change in the whole character of the operation, appeared so perilous to me that at, the Council on the 26th I formally disclaimed responsibility for the consequences of any military operations that might arise: My disclaimer was entered in th& records. Then the Prime Minister, making a rare intervention, appealed most strongly to Lord Kitchener not to allow the force available in the East to be deprived of the one regular division so necessary to its effective composition. It wan useless. After the Council I waited behind. I knew the Prime Minister agreed with me, and indeed Che whole Council with the exception of Lord Kitchener were of one nrindT I urged the Prime Minister to make his au>-t-hority effective and to insist upon the despatch of the 29th Dirision to Lemnos or Alexandria. I felt at that moment, in an intense* way, a foreboding of disaster. I knew it was a turning-point in the struggle, so surely as I know it now that the consequences are graven on the monuments of history. The Prime Minister did not feel that anything more could be done. He had done his best to persuade Lord Kitchener. He could not overrule him or face his resignation upon a question like this, for the whole military opinion of tbe General Staff and of the French authorities would be upon his side. On February 25 I prepared! an appreciation of the general situation, and bad used this to argue from in the War Council of the 26th. It was now printed, and circulated to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Balfour. I reprint it now, as jt explains my position more clearly than any other document of this period. Appreciation;. 1. Russia.—We must not expect Russia to invade Germany successfully for many months to come. ', But though the Russian offensive is paralysed, we may count on her not only maintaining a successful defensive, but effectively containing and retaining very large German forces on her front. .... 2. -The Anglo-French lines in the West are very strong, and cannot be turned, . . The issue in the West in tha next three

months oaght not to cause anxiety B»* anyhow it is not , *m issue which could £ " decisively affected by four or five Bri'iS divisions. . ™ ' 3. For as the decisive point, sad ih * '') only point where the initiative can Kseized and maintained, is in th« R.tw " Peninsula. With proper naval co-operation, and with forces whiAare available, we can make certain of taJT ing Constantinople by the end of March* and capturing or destroying all TurlrhA forces in Europe (except those in Adrian ople}. This blow can be struck beW ■'■* the fate of Serbia is decided. Its efk*? on the whole of the Balkans will bedT cisive. It will eliminate Turkey a* * military factor. * • * The following military forces (at leasfcl are available immediately :— ' In England (29th Division, ** another Territorial Division) 36 000 Under orders for Lemnos: ' R.N. Division .. ~ 12000 From Egypt: two Australian Divisions . . . . , . 33 qyi French Division . M (sty) 20000 Russian Brigade .. (say) 8000 Total - ■ • « . ~lis^ooo 5. All these troops are capable of being concentrated within striking distance of the Bulair Isthmus by March 21 if orders are given now. If the naval operations have not suceeded by then, they can be used to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula and make sure that the fleet gets through. As soon as the Dardanelles are open, they can either (a) operate from Constantinople to extirpate any Turkish forces in Europe • or (b) if Bulgaria comes in at our invitation to occult up to the Enos-Midia line, they can proceed through Bulgaria to the aid of Serbia; or (c) if Bulgaria is merely confirmed in a friendly neutrality, but Greece comes in, they can proceed throuch Salonika to Che aid of Serbia. February 25, 1915. ' S " °" And on the 27th I wrote :— "I must now put on record -my opinion that the military force provided—viz two Australian divisions supported by the nine naval battalions and the French division, is not large enough for the work it may have to do; and that the absent* of any British regular troops will, if fighting occurs, expose the naval battalions and the Australians to undue risk.. "Even if the Navy succeed unaided in forcing the passage, Che weakness of th« military force may compel us to forego a large part of the advantages which would otherwise follow." (To be continued daily.)