GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18550, 7 November 1923, Page 6

GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

CHURCHILL MEMOIES. FISHER'S CHANGE OF VIEW. LEAVES THE WAR COUNCIL. BY THE BT. HON. "WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. (Copyright.) Mr. Churchill deals with the technical gunnery questions involved in. the proposed naval attack on the forts defending the Dardanelles, and proceeds:— I now called for definite plans and orders to be worked out by the staff, and I outlined the fleet that was evidently available for the operation. Secretary, First Sea Lord, Chief of Staff. ._ January 12. (1) The forcing of the Dardanelles as proposed, and the arrival of a squadron strong enough to defeat the Turkish fleet in the Sea of Marmora, would be a victory of first importance, and change to our advantage the whoie situation of the war in the East. (2) It would appear possible to provide the force required by Admiral Carden without weakening the margins necessary in home waters, as follows: — Ocean, Swiftsure and Triumph (already in or assigned to this theatre). Vengeance, Canopus (from the Atlantic). Albion (from the Cape). Caesar and Prince George (from Gibraltar). Victorious, Mars, Magnificent, Hannibal (already ordered to be dismantled at home). Queen Elizabeth (detailed for gunnery preparation at Gibraltar). Inflexible (ordered to Mediterranean to relieve Indefatigable). Indefatigable (already on the spot). Thus no capital ship would bo ordered from [home waters, except four already ordered to be dismantled. % (3) The above takes no account of four French battiest on the spot, and six others reported available. ... (4) Operations could begin on February 1, by long-range fire from Queen Elizabeth on forts at the entrance. It is not necessary to develop the full attack until the effect of the first stage of the operation has become apparent. All arrangements should be secretly concerted for carrying the plan through the sea planes and. ancillary craft being provided Admiral Carden to command. . . Definite plans should be worked out accordingly. , W.S.G. Lord Fisher approved this minute., and himself at a later date. (February 9) added to the proposed fleet the two quasi-Dread-nought battleships, the Lord Nelson and the Agamemnon. This was a great reinforcement, and involved a diminution to that extent in the margin of the . Grand Fleet. . '■:; '■■■■^■■'■■ ; ; ■ Resolution by War Council; On January 13 I 'brought the project before the War Council. I circulated Admiral Garden's telegram twenty-four hours beforehand to ite principal members, including, of course, the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener. V Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson were both present. Neither made any remark, and I certainly thought that they agreed. The decision of the council was unanimous, and was recorded in the following curious form:— M,-'-:"" .-ft-'i' ■" That the Admiralty ; - should t-i consider promptly the possibility of effective action in the Adriatic ' at Cattaro or elsewhere —with a view (inter alia) of - bringing pressure on Italy. "*■ '";■. -» , , That the Admiralty should also prepare for a naval expedition in. February to bombard and take the Gallipoli k Peninsula f with i ConstantinOf-e ; as objective. . 1 had. now become ~ deeply interested in the Gallipoli enterprise, and noth.ig but new. facts,. and reasons .the ■ merit of which might convince me, would turn me from pressing it forward. "--, '■..' , At the same tune, while giving decided orders and allowing no doubt > or ; uncertainty to appear in the Admiralty attitude, I was careful to preserve the means of breaking off the operation, if ?i began to : miscarry. - .. » i « First liord to Lord Kitchener, t ■ , - . January 20, 1915. Until the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts has actually begun,: we cannot tell ::. how things will go. , : We must guard against the 'appearance of • a serious rebuff; and we shall: therefore at the outset only use the battleships .needed for the initial stage, keeping the rest of the fleet spread between Malta, Alexandria, and Alexandretta, whence i they can concentrate very quickly. It is ;also very desirable , that the Alexandretta operation should be so timed as >i to ' be practically simultaneous with .the- attack on the Dardanelles, so that if we are checked at the Dardanelles we can represent that operation as a mere demonstration (I to cover the seizure of Alexandretta. CI bet lieve that aspect is ; important , from an J Oriental -point of view. • ; '^ 'Could you therefore arrange this and let me have your Alexandretta dates ? - We are aiming . at February 13 ; : for i opening fire on the Dardanelles. ; "' ' . V'P.S.— am sending a -copy ■ of V this to : the Prime ■ Minister to keep him informed. - I Wholly Professional Scheme. e It will be seen that the genesis of this plan and its elaboration were purely naval and professional in their character.* \- It was Admiral Carden and his staff gunnery officers who proposed > the gradual method of piecemeal reduction i by longrange bombardment. It was Sir, Henry Jackson and the Admiralty Staff who embraced this idea and studied and approved its detail. Right or wrong, it was a Service plan. Similarly the Admiralty orders were prepared exclusively by the Chief of the Staff and his assistants. I outlined the resources at our disposal in the old battleships. But . it was the Staff who proposed the addition of the Queen Elizabeth, with all the possibilities that that ship opened out. ? It was the First Sea Lord "who added the other two most ■, powerful vessels, the Lord Nelson and the Agamemnon; to "the Dardanelles fleet. At no point did lay or . civilian interference mingle with or mar the integrity of a professional conception. ■ • I write this not in the slightest degree to minimise or shift my own responsibility. But this was not where it lay. I did not and I could, not make the plan. Bus when it had been made by : the naval authorities, a—l fashioned and endorsed by high technical- authorities - and approved by the: First Sea Lord, I seized upon it and set it on the path of action: and thereafter espoused it with all my resource?. When others weakened or changed *' eir opinion without adducing new reasons, I held them strongly to their previous decisions; and so, in view of the general interest of the Allies, thrust the business steadily forward into actual experiment. Lord Fisher Becomes Anxious. Up to about January 20 there seemed to be ' unanimous agreement in favour of the naval enterprise against the Dardanelles; War Office, Foreign Office, AdI miralty .seemed - by ■- their representatives to bo equally in earnest. The War Council had taken its decision. Meanwhile the possibilities of a British naval offensive or of amphibious % action in Northern waters were becoming continually Z more remote. This made me only ; the more anxious to act in the Mediterranean. It was the only direction. in which we had a practical plan, -properly worked out by the staff,! and supported by a powerful consensus of naval- and political opinion. As soon, however, as the Conomander-in-Chief realised that the Queen 'Elizabeth, a battle-cruiser, and -: other powerful ships were to; be. assigned %$&) the Mediterranean theatre, he began to dwell again upon : the weakness of his fleet and the: insufficiency of his margins. And now for the first time he S found a ready v listener in -? the First Sea Lord. .'Lord Fisher's sodden dislike of the Dardanelles project seemed

to_ arise at this time lusth :^'^WsM ■ pranarily fro™ his wluct£* JJ*J%»V take the bombardment and block?,, J***- 1 Zeebrugge. > .This operation Sflfe* the more necessary now that -SKMfe had abandoned their intention ,*•*'■■■ coastal advance,} It waV .♦£? i of by the War CounSl, by"^a^KifiH Staff, and especially by Sir~A^^S son. The First S J lid fiJfc *1entirely alone on tho quests ß &** very much disturbed, His disl^Si Zeebrugge operation was extend 1 *•- ©my to the Dardanelles rim^^fr&& plans of naval attack on host £* which were not combined with 2&S& forces, and ultimately he #S? {^%1 opinions which seemed opposed T^^*M form of naval intervention in an* J? 0 ? ter. This was a great ge M J t <£*- ance both with his earlier and lJ», *5* tudes, and I was concerned to ofirtJSl Silence or Jfcesignation. ■*. ■ The First Sea Lord could not in v' : ' ' heart feel at all anxious about tho r J"! Fleet margin. He knew that i "££&■ real convictions about it He dM ■ ' attempt to continue the di«cna&SgS| false basis, out he expressed an in*«£'*s' of not attending the War Countif wfeu was fixed for the next day-thoSSI* This was, of course, impossible. sisted that he should be present ani ln " ranged for a private meeting for S*S§tl us with the Prime Minister bafowtu'Council. To this Lord Fisher cou^fe We repaired accordingly to "fcrrAsquith's room 20 minute* " before ft' War Council was to meet! No writf record of this discussion has beehhSl served but there is no dispute about; &1; Lord Fisher indicated very briefly w objections to both the Zeebrugge iind Ik ''' : daneLles schemes, and indicate! his -2 ference for a great operation in the BM I tic or for a general advance of the Arm* ; - along the Belgian coast, with strong S? support Lord Fisher, say the DarS nelles Commissioners, "did not'wiJ^? the attack on the GalHpoli PeniiS^l its own merits. Neither did he -tnentW^ to the Prime Minister that he hadtoP thought of resigning if his opinions *Z overrulled." This is quite true I £? tended that both Zeebrugge and the C" danelles schemes should be undertaken" but that if either were to be dropped it would be Zeebrugge, to wtt<&t£g£gSi Sea Lord seemed more particularly v '■"'•* posed. The Prime Minister, after hearin? both sides, expressed his concurrent-1 with my views, and decided that Zeebrugge should be dropped, but that th» Dardanelles should go forward. JiJJojjl* Fisher seemed on the whole contest, and ff I went downstairs with him under mm impression that all was well. -I&sms Tho Council was already waitinr Colonel Hankey's record of the discussoa which followed has already 1 public in tho Report of the Dardanelles Commission. ~, ;^*g^l A Famous Incident. This record does not, however, !/oan?i| plete the story. During the Council an incident occurred which has subsequently obtained much publicity. Here is Fisher's own account: . Ninth Meeting of War Council, Januanr 28, 1915, 11.30 a.m. ,%j!p (Note. —Before this meeting the Pna» Minister discussed with Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher the proposed Dardanelles operations, and decided in favour of considering the project in opposition to Lord Fisher's opinion.) ; '■ Mr. Churchill asked if the War Council attached importance to the proposed Dardanelles •-' operations, which ' undoubtedly involved risks. I' *£$0&^ Lord Fisher s?id that ,he had understood that this Question '::wasS"nottepp • raised at this meeting.S. The, PJriKe Minister knew his (Lord Fisher's) vim on the subject. iy ' ,' : l The Prime Minister said thatjfinVvwwM of what had already/-. been done, ths ' question could not be left in abeyance. (Note.— Thereupon Lord Fisher left the Council table., He was - f followed 'itonßgl : Kitchener, who asked him what he <hp|| tended to do. Lord Fisher .rap lied to Lord Kitchener i that \ho -would i not return to the Council table, and would : resign his \ office ;as First Sea Lord.; Lord .5 Kitchener : then pointed out to, Lord Fisher that h» (Lord Fisher) was : the only dissentient, and ■ that the; Dardanelles operations had been : decided ' upon :.by: the Prime Minister; and he .urged on Lord. Fisher that his duty to his country was to go on Carrying out the duties* of First Sea LordAfter further talk * Lord I Fisher reluctantly gave in' - to Lord Kitchener, and went back to the Council table.) \ .'.""V'Jf^H It; must : be ; emphasised here, as well as in regard to Lord Kitchener's statement to:. the . War Council dated May 14, 1915, that; Lord : Fisher considered that it would be both r improper and boseemly for him to enter into an alter* cation either at > the War Council or elsewhere, with his >' chief, Mr. Churchill, the First Lord. Silence or resignation was the right course. [Lord fSsher'f' note.] (To be continued daily.) /