THE New Zealand Herald THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1923 NAVAL CONTROVERSIES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18533, 18 October 1923, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald THURSDAY, O CTOBER 16, 1923 NAVAL CONTROVERSIES.

' A first-class naval controversy, ■ divisible into two sections, greeted ! the announcement that a great base . for the British battle fleet was to be | established at Singapore. The suitability of the port for the purpose, and the strategic value of the position were both attacked instantly. Ever since the war ended, indeed

even before that time, naval experts of differing calibre have been.hotly engaged in assailing and defending the merits of the capital ship in the light of aerial and submarine developments. It was inevitable that those who were chanting the doom of the battleship should declare against the Singapore scheme. It has been designed avowedly to provide harbourage, docking facilities, and supply bases for the heavy striking arm of the British Navy, the battle fleet, should its presence in Eastern or Pacific waters be required. If, therefore, the capital ship is really an obsolete weapon, if it must be relegated to the scrap heap in favour of submarines and aircraft, the chief reason for prosecuting the elaborate Singapore plan to its conclusion disappears. Two distinguished naval officers have just been informing an Australian gathering in London that the Singapore project is a delusion and a sham because the day of the capital ship is done. Coast defence by submarines, aircraft, and torpedo boats is declared the real and effective scheme for Australia and New Zealand. In this instance there is no criticism of Singapore as a port or a strategic point. The whole case rests on the theory that the battleship should be abandoned as a unit of the fighting fleet.

If the opinions of Sir Percy Scott and Admiral Mark Kerr are to be accepted and believed implicitly, the position is one of great interest for Australia and New Zealand, Each of them is deeply,, vitally, interested in naval defence and efficiency. If it is really true that heavily armed and heavily armoured capital ships are not needed in the Pacific, that safety can be assured without them, the difficulty and cost oil naval defence will at once sink to proportions making it easily possible for both countries to contribute substantially toward it, ; without straining their finances to ! the degree involved so long as there is talk of ships of the line. A ■ modern battleship costs between J £8,000,000 and £10,000,000 to build. 'arm, and equip. This sum would provide a regular fleet of the other I units suggested in the alternative. Lest too much expectation should be aroused by the views of these two admirals and their following, it must be remembered that in answer to them, there can be quoted other naval men of experience " and authority who are just as emphatic that the capital ship is more necessary to-day than' ever it was. Two of them whose names come to mind naturally are Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wemyss. They do not deny the potentialities of the submarine, but insist that it can be countered if effective measures are taken. The chief arguments used on this side are that during the war the German submarines did not stop the British Navy from patrolling the seas, and that, despite its critics, the British Grand Fleet did force the German Navy to keep to its ports. It is contended that the failure of the submarine is proved by its inability to prevent the transport of troops and munitions. One disputant entering the controversy remarks that 15,000,000 British troops and 2,000,000 American troops were transported to France without the lose of a single man, except in hospital ships."

Among the general body of naval men speaking with the authority of experience and expert knowledge, there is a distinct cleavage of opinion on the future role of the capital ship on the one side, and the submarine and airship or aeroplane on the other. It is, in fact, a controversy to determine whether the heavy gun or the bomb and the torpedo will be the weapon of destruction at sea. War is war, and means of defence must be assessed ir. terms of destructiveness, not moral effect. To the layman there is one line of argument advanced m the controversy which is easily comprehended. The history of naval development is one of move and SS fcere - .. Armour-plate was ZlT ere A d >. the armour-piercing shell. As the iron-clad became more

and , more heavily protected, the penetrating ■ power" and explosive force of the shell was increased progressively. No v sooner was a new long-range gun constructed than work was begun on another which would outrange it. As submarines and aircraft increase in size and efficiency, so may ■ the means of countering them be devised, not only protective but offensive measures. The British Admiralty has refused to be stampeded into an abandonment of ships of the line, though in accordance with the Washington Treaty it has voluntarily restricted the size and tonnage to be maintained. It must be concluded, therefore, that sound reasons exist for this policy, and for the decision to establish «a base at Singapore. Views such as those expressed by Sir Percy Scott and Admiral Kerr are full of possibilities, but they must convince the Admiralty before such controversialists make much headway with the nonexpert public.