GENESIS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18520, 3 October 1923, Page 6

GENESIS OF THE WAR

FRUITLESS MEDIATION.

(BY THE BT. HON. H. H. ASQTIIT2.

(Copyright.) '.-;.'. '• .//■ No. XXI. The idea of a conference on the g trian ultimatum to, Serbia ff norarily kept, in reserve while ,an ~ effort--poraruy *-?* , Q who urged ■■■ encouraged by bir n. ,V?«W» ...... , p-, :<{ that Austria should not meantime pre cipitate military a%fion-was maoeto,p o, mote direct negotiations between Austna and Russia.;:: Austria would accept_no discussion with the Powers on*•-*«£, of the dispute between herself Seibm, and in this uncompromising attitude she was, to -y the least, not Germany's apologetic manner of trans fitting Grey's -d -nv^ng her views on Sazoaof s desire tor m gotiation. "If we WJ.eotev.ery «*£- cry movement," said the Chancellor ma Tschirschy, "it will haveUe Mi of making impossible our positiong the country where we must appear nr the light of having the war forced on:^:; It seemed for a moment as : though direct conversations with might be less disagreeable -to" Austria than European intervention, but. the proposal came to nothing. The suggestion ;of the Russian Government that the means of settLng the conflict should. be discussed Sazonof and .Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg was, in fact, declined by Vienna on the 28th. .Austria, refused to delay her military action. *gj war on Serbia on the same day (the 28th, ; and immediately, thereafter began , ,0 bombard Belgrade. s Her despatch of troops to the front was followed by mobilisation by Russia in her four southern conscriptions. ; - Information -. of this partial mobilisation was given in pacific and frank terms to Germany. It was directed only against Austria and was intended, as the Tsar's representative at . Vienna informed Sir M. do Bunsen. as , a. . clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Serbia.. ,-' Proposals for mediation by v the four Powers were therefore at once, resumed by Sir E Grey, and pressed in every, available quarter with the utmost urgency. .-, He was ready, as lie formed . Berlin on the 28th, to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines :. on which fhe principle of .mediationshould be applied. " The whole idea of mediation or mediating .influence, 'he taid in a telegram ; to i our' Ambassador on, the 29th, " was ready to be put into f opera- ■ tion by -any method that Germany could : suggest, if mine was hot acceptable.";. In fact, mediation was ready to come into ■ operation' " bv any method that Germany thought possible ;if only Germany would ' press- the button ' in the interests of peace." His offers, suggestions and appeals, fully supported by France, were fruitless. \ Kaiser and Chancellor.'! . A remarkable letter, published after the war in the . " Deutsche •: Politik," was; addressed by the Kaiser, to ; BethmannHollweg on the 28th. ,;, The Kaiser practically admitted ; that, with -the - Serbian capitulation, every reason for war fell to the ground but he went on to say that; in order that the fine promises and under- ;■ takings of the Serbs v might be made good," it would be necessary for Austria to exeri cise a douce violence 1' by V a'/ temporary I military occupation of /a' part of ; their • j country. This, he held, was also / neces- | sary in order to affords army ;an exI ternal satisfaction d'honneur which he Dei clared to be ;"a preliminary .'condition, of ;-' j my mediation." -/:; This was the man who ./ has subsequently represented .himself as a'; mediator whose efforts 5 had ; been ; frustrated. , . 'i :.":■;The sentiment expressed by Kaiser ' I was shared; by the "..German Chancellor. j On the 29th he informed Sir. Edward ; Gos- «; | chen that ; he had despatched a message 1 to I Vienna, in which "■ he-'explained: 1 that, although a certain desire had. in his opinion, been: shown in the; Serbian : reply 1 ; to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without .some/''sure/ guarantees that Serbia would ; carry out in ■} their entirety the ; demands made ; upon her, the . Austrd-Hungarian;; Government could not rest satisfied in view;'; of their past experience." v: He advised them, ho*y> ever, to speak openly in the sense, already / conveyed to ; Russia, that i they /had • no territorial; designs. ; On ; this point Sir -El. r Grey's comment, tot the Austrian': Ambassador, that it would be quite pos;sible, without nominally^ interfering witlji the independence of Serbia or taking : away ';•' any of her territory, to turn her into i» sort of vessel State.. _ • . / ' " "; » ;:" It had, of ; course," as 'Uchhowsky; subsequently wrote, " heeded but a;hint '?: from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to be satisfied with , a diplomatic *;' success. ■.-..;. But this hint was not given. On the con-.; trary, the war was hurried oh.',',. (It was urged on ;by the advice of the Kaiser; and : the Chancellor with regard to the necessity of guarantees. ) Lichnowsky recordeS • that " the impression is becoming; more and more firmly...:, established l that we wanted ; the •: war ;;.iriW any circumstances. No other : interpretation could :.;';■ be placed upon our attitude in a question "k that did not concern us directly at all. The earnestpleadings and definite declarations of M. Sazonot,;later on the ; positively humble telegrams of the Tsar, Sir Edward Grey's repeated proposals, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano.and Signor Bollati, my urgent advice— were useless." -

Russia and Austria Mobilise. The attempt personally.; to influence the Tsar was, according to BethmannHollweg's, book, the consequence -i of the ■ Kaiser's own initiative ;in ; : his telegram : ot; the 29th. J( It has been : shown, , however)";; that before the Kaiser's telegram— although prepared two ■■ or three ' hours earlierwas despatched ; from -Berlin Nearly in the morning of the 29th, - a • telegram had arrivedw from the --Tsar),/ imploring : < William, : in the name of their ; .friend- v ship) to prevent his ally;: from going - : ;too' far.

The. Kaiser's telegram was to the effect that if ■: Russia mobilised' -against, Austria, his position as mediator would become impossible. Nicholas replied that the' military measures" "put" /into•■operation byRussia were taken solely by way of de- ; fence against Austria's preparations. He suggested thV submission of the 'AuslroSerbian dispute to the Hague Conference, but the ; Chancellor r telegranhed: ; to the German Ambassador ithat;that: would ; ; be out of the question. - From the exchange of, telegrams, as the French Ambassador ; at ; . St. Petersburg stated; r the Tsar had received the impression that Germany did not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace, r; On the 30th there were symptoms of , a momentary detente, and Germany seemed at last to be disposed to tender conciliatory : advice: Perhaps she;; was influenced by the warning, given by Sir E. Grev to Lichnowsky, that •; Germany . must ' hot count upon Great Britain standing; aside in all circumstances. 1 Faced with : fi , conflagration in which England might go against them, and, arcord<'n<r to all indications, Italy and "Rumania , not . with them,.',. German Government represented to Vienna the danger of the refusal of any interchange of opinion with ?,St. Petersburg. | , The Austrian .Cabinet, while. refraining I from going, into the" merits of the Enplish ! proposal; decided;; to "show complaisance in the form.of.Usreplv:!', .-Another telegram from Bethtnann-Hollwetr--was 'sent off on the evening: of the- 30th un»entr> j recommending Austria to accept^; Grey"? [proposal ; otherwise it would be •.hardly |.. possible any longer to ! shift; the emit' of the conflagration on to Russia. This telegram was, however, cancelled. . There were, as this momentary : waver-' ing' shows, two "currents of ; influence ;' at i Berlin, the .political and the '/ military. "Two conflicting tendencies,"'says Kau'tsky; "were .•ngbtinq: v foT ■'. the 'decision which depended on the 'instable:" Kaiser." As :th ■ Under-Secretary of ■ State i informed ian ambassador, the military authorities were > very anxious : that mobilisation should be ordered, because delay made Germany lose some ; of her advantages. . Early,on the morning of the 30th ' the German Ambassador at ,St Petersburg | had an interview with the Foreign-Minis-ter, and " completely broke ; down on seeing that war, was ;; inevitable." Ha ' ap*

pealed to M. Sazonof to make son* so*. |. ? lotion-which he could telegraph. to his - ,;* tiovernmentas ■/.*->' tot-,??!»>, and M, Saronof draw, up a concilatoiy .formula a* , v - follows:— r :'. k . i . ' "If Austria, recognising that, her com ,3 flict with Serbia has assumed-the. charac- : Iter of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate, from her ;, 'ultimatum points , which violate,;;prmciplo % ■ of sovereignty IW -Serbia, ■ Russia engages to stop all military preparations. . v , - _ -~.', ' ■ ■ The same day Sir .E. ' Grey suggested ■ ';,' that if the Austrian advance were stopped i after the occupation of. Be grade, ha ;;. . thought the Russian Minister s formula , might be changed to mm that the ' Powers -; would : examine ; how Serbia could ,- * ! fully; satisfy Austria [:\:. without v impairing u - Serbian - sovereign right; or: independence. . '-3 The formula was -amended m . accordance ,-; with this proposal. < , _ : ; ; On July 31 Russia and Austria mobil. ' ised against- each other., Conflicting state- ~' A •■I ments were issued as to which Power took 1 the first' step xin substituting general for ■' M-partial mobilisation. ,-•:;; Austria, according jto her intimation, , was .«compelled to re- >:; I'spon" to: Russian' action. On the other •;,-'.; ■ :[' hand, the 'Russian ■ order was described at • , St. Petersburg as a result of the general .'mobilisation , ; of Austria and of . the ,-.r* ' measures -a for mobilisation 'taken .secretly, '■;.;/.■ -but continuously, by Germany for the last ■ .'- : six days."'! Bethmann-Hollweg has as- V'., : : serted that the statement regarding Ger- ;■ I man measures was an invention. Secret ; mobilisation, he says, was out of the ques- • f > tion in Germany. ■ Art extra edition of the ■"••_ '.' 1 Berlin -;/ '' Lokalanzeiger "•; on the 30th i■' falsely " reported :; v that , ■ 'the ; German .J .£ I army had been mobilised. :'' So far as ;>:. could be.ascertained from the. official in- ' . ' quiry : that was at once instituted, it api peared ; that employees; of this paper had ':-'■;■ ■ been instigated aby quite unconscionable ■■.. excess of professional zeal." A curious _ explanation !•--.'- ; ; :._\ , , >'■*, / Gern.:ny's Ultimatum to' Russia. , Oa the eve of the war the tension be. ;. 'tween Russia and Germany was much j: greater than between "Austria and Russia. \ s i;.' As between the; latter," wrote our I Ambassador at Vienna, " an arrangement - ;; seemed almost in sight! ";.',: On the even- :' ;> ing of the 31st the Austrian Ambassador ;S ' in Paris announced that, his Government % had officially ' advised Russia 1 that it had -' !no territorial ambition and that it would -; not touch the sovereignty,, the State of <■..?.-; ■ Serbia. i'; Discussions, as.- Sir .' E.'; Grey .learned ;; , with great, satisfactioni; were; being •• resumed between Vienna- and St. .Peters- : , burg. He '■■. still believed "that" \ it might ~.■;.j. be possible to secure peace if: only a little ,: respite in time can-be-gained .before.any. ..> : • great Power begins war. - : :- _ Aus'tria, at 0 any rate, was.; apparently, anxious . to ; re- ;-: • move the impression that she had banged '■• the door on compromise' or pn conversa- ;;;. tions. Unfortunately," as Sir .. M. de '.' Bunsen wrote, " these conversations .at . : ';'; St. -Petersburg^ and Vienna were cat phort ;, ; .by the transfer ; of the dispute to the mora ,: dangerous ground of \ a direct conflict be- : r tween* Germany and Russia. Germany in<tervened by means of .■: her double, ultima- .: ■j tums to St. Petersburg'and Paris.', j ■i-:i Meantime there was a final exchange " of telegrams between the - Tsar and the , Kaiser. " In a telegram on the .31st ■-;■ the ■■?,'.■ Tsar gave his solemn word that as long.is!.. the negotiations continued ■; his . tro ips ' ■ , would undertake no provocative V action. - : : This message crossed one from the Kaiser, who said it rested in the hands of the Tsar \ , by;;; discontinuing - military ; preparation -to ; j avert the misfortune which .threatened the 1 entire civilised world. • : Germany intimated the same. day, that :' I " the state of danger of 'war, whioh ( she ' had then declared, would be followed by , j general mobilisation if Russia did not - undertake within 12 hours ; t.o ; demobilise.- : It was'remarkable that, just wTTen Ruasia ; j and Austria:were ready to converse, the j German? Government should, have . fire- • | sented this ultimatum. ; The; compiler of •;-: the German White .: Book ■ states ■'■■ that,'•: _ ; ' although no reply to ff was.'ever received ; in Berlin, two hours after, the ; expiration\ >of the time limit on 1 -igust 1 the,; .Tsar : 'telegraphed to the • Kaiser recognising . Germany's right to mobilise, but request- ' •! ing from him /the same 'guarantee which/- ; '■■.'■, he himself had -.given'-, to William—that the" ~,mobilisation measures did not mean war. The Kaiser, in reply, declined -to enter ; ;?; upon that . subject, but asked the Tsar ; without , delay to order ; his. troops. not ltd .' ? 1 ; commit under any circumstances " the : slightest violation of our frontiers." This telegram did not reach the Tsar ". till after v y the;note declaring ;war;, had ; been handed - - 'by the ! German - Ambassador to thV •I Russian ,_ Government. ' 1 The reason of the haste has been cor'- ' fessedi Bethmann-Hollweg writes '>'-' - : ;';'.: I" We were not ;in complete agreement : among ourselves: as to how we were -to ''■':■< proceed .'officially;- 1 The War- Minister, j General von Falkenhayn,-thought. was -.a mistake to declare war on Russia, be- ''. , cause he feared that the political effect would be prejudicial to us. The Chief of the -General Staff, General ": von Moltlce, ' " ; was, onthe other hand, in favour of de- - ' claring war.' .v because'our hope of sac- • cess .-. . was dependent on' the 1 extreme rapidity ;pf our moyements. I myself agreed, with the view' of General you' - j Moltke." . -The' appropriate comment was made by ;; Sir fits deßunsen- in \> his survey of the : negotiations at Vienna. ~ "A '- few -• davs* ' ' :^ delay might in ;; all probability," he said/ , ; have saved Europe -from one V,of; tho greatest calamities in history! " ..'. ' - To he continued daily. ~;;;;;■;;:..;;;" • '■„""'''- ■■ : '"-- * , ' , -, ; ; ■ ■■'-<^ ~ ';-.\:v •'-:-■';-,, ■y./