GENESIS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18519, 2 October 1923, Page 4

GENESIS OF THE WAR

PROOF OF GERMAN GUILT.

(BY THE RT. HON. H. H. ASQTJITH.)

(Copyright.)

No. XX;

What did Germany know of the terms of the Note to Serbia before it was delivered ? On July 24 M. ■ Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, after Heir von Jagow had admitted that he approved of the Note, asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they. were communicated to Belgrade, " and" as he told me that was so, I showed ■ him my surprise at seeing him undertake 10 support claims of whose limit and scope he was ignorant." Next day the British Charge d'Affaires received so clear a reply in the negative to a similar question that ho was not able to carry tho. matter further; but, like his French colleague, ho could "not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria. On tho 25th Lich nowskv read to Sir Edward Grey a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his. Government had not known beforehand, and had., had no more than other Powers to do with tho stiff terms of the Note. ■ _ "■.'"' Sir Edward Grey, like other Foreign Ministers, did not receive a copy of the Note till the 24th. On that day the Buckingham Palace Conference broke up, unable to agree as to the boundaries of the area to be excluded from the compulsory operation of tho Homo Rule Bill. Herr Kautsky states that not only did the German Government know how the ultimatum was to be framed, but that it was in their possession before it was delivered. Tschirscky in Vienna received a copy on the 21st, and this being transmitted by letter, it reached the Foreign Office, in Berlin, on the afternoon of the 22nd. According to the private information of our Ambassador at Vienna, Tschirscky also telegraphed it to the Kaiser. Bethmann-Hollweg himself admits: "We did ascertain through Herr,. von Tschirscky the general lines of the demands that Austria was making on Serbia, Nor did we consider that we could disapprove them m principle.," On tho other hand, ho denies that they .had cognisance of the document at a .time when they could have modified it either IP form or in tenor. As M. Poincan, however, points out, there would still have been timo after it reached Berlin on the afternoon of the 22nd for the German Government to have telegraphed to Vienna before the final step was taken at, Belgrade, which was not till the ovening of the, 23rd. Five years after the ev-3nt Bethmann-Hollweg wrote that the Secretary of Stato communicated to nun the text of the ultimatum with -tho t observation that he considered it too severe and that he himself said the" same to the Austrian Ambassador. This was in flat contradiction with what was said officially to the other Powers at tho time. In a Note communicated by the German Ambassador to Sir Edward, Grey on .July 24 it was stated that " the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hmv-garian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate.", The truth undoubtedly is that instead of attempting to hold Austria back Germany incited and encouraged her to hurry forward. The Austrian Ambassador telegraphed from Berlin on the 25th: " We are advised in the most pressing manner to proceed immediately and place the world in the presence of an accomplished fact." There was no longer any delay. On-the 25 th. although the reply made by Serbia, on the 24th to her Note was on all essential points an acceptance of her demands, Austria broke off diplomatic relations, and on the 28th she declared war. Bethmann-Hollweg draws a distinction between the motives of the various Powers. Russia was, he says, "acting for its expansion," whereas Austria-Hunrrarv made war on' Serbia in order to ensure its own survival, and Germany "covered its ally" for the same reason. .. Determined on War.

To fix the ultimate responsibility for the war a study of the officially published diplomatic correspondence is in itself still sufficient. The despatches reveal with a dramatic interest rarely attained by such papers the motives, emotions and designs of the Central Powers which were sweeping them, .in spite of all the : efforts of all the peacs-makers; towards the catastrophe of which Sir Edward Grey warned the world. : . , Considerable additions have, since; come to light to the Notes and despatches which rushed so rapidly across Europe and have filled in the pictures with fresh lights and shades.. But they have left even less doubt than existed before as to the true apportionment of responsibility. Sir Edward Grey, as soon as he, learnt the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, initiated mediatory negotiations. To maintain peace was the object on which ho "Concentrated his unswerving and unflagging efforts. He pursued it from first to last with unsurpassed patience and assiduity. ■■>. /-./*. " Complaint was made that the British Minister did ■ nothing to localise the conflict. '. - ' . ■

Bethmann-Hollweg has since alleged thai; Germany earnestly advocated in Vienna the acceptance of the mediation desired by Grey, and in spite of the strongest pressure failed." Kautsky, after his examination of the documents in the Berlin Foreign Office, asserts that " Austria rejected all mediation proposals that' were made, none of which emanated from Germany. The latter was satisfied with simply transmitting the proposals of others, or else refusing them at the very outset as-incompatible with Austria's independence. Even the'most urgent questioning could not lure a proposal from her, whilst England and Russia vied with each other in trying to find a way out of the muddle." '

Szogyeny, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphs to Berchtold: " State Secretary declared to me explicitly in strict confidence that England's proposals for mediation would , very shortly be brought to the cognisance of Your Excellency by the German Government. The German Government , most explicitly states that it in no way identifies itself with these proposals, is even decidedly against their consideration, and transmits them only in deference to the request of England." - Once more the : aged -Ambassador, at a later date, and. .when the war was -in progress, was given the lie. BethmannHolnveg and Jagow both, declared to a commission that his despatch could not possibly be correct. This is on a oar with their repudiation of his account of .the Kaiser's reply to ~ the Emperor Francis Joseph's letter on. July 5. Whatever may have been his age and "his infirmities, their repudiation of his account of the incapable of . understanding what was said to him on the most vital affairs, still, less that he was , capable Of inventing what was deliberately untrue. . - Somebody Lied.

The negotiations, so familiar to rnost readers, require only a brief outline., On July 24, the day after the Austrian ultimatum was delivered, Sir Edward Grey put forward the suggestion that the four Powers Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain— of which had direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of., peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg. - On the 26' th, after the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade, and our Ambassador at Vienna had reported that- war was thought to be imminent, ; Sir E. Grey went a step farther, and proposed •■ that the representatives of the. four Powers should meet in London immediately for the purpose of devising means for preventing further complication. . France and Italy promptly agreed, and Sazonoff., on behalf of Russia, intimated- that, if direct explanations with Vienna were to prove impossible, he was ready to accept this or any other method that would bring about a peaceable solution. -. The German Ambasador assured Sir E Grey on the 27th that his Government accepted "in principle" mediation be-

tweeri.Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of ;,course, ; their right as an ally to help Austria ,if . attacked. Either >- he was misinformed :as to the real attitude of the German Government, that the fdur Powers .' should undertake negotiation between Russia and Austria, or a sudden change came over the atmosphere in Berlin. For the same day Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador there, telegraphed to Grey: Secretary of; State ] says that conference you suggest would I practically amount to a ; court of arbi- ] tration, and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of j Austria and Russia. ij He . could not, therefore, fall in with your, suggestion, desir ous though he was to .'co-operate for the maintenance of peace." ' , ' ' I Bethmann-Hollweg . writes in his book : I " The French take the view that after the j Kaiser s return . (on' Monday, tha 7 th) - there was a change for the'• worse in. tone. I saw nothing of the kind, though I was in constant, personal touch with the Kaiser! Quite the reverse. He would not hear of any step being omitted that might be conducive to peace. ; Our strong pressure on Vienna corresponded with' his innermost conviction." < | This presentation of the Kaiser s attitude is completely at variance with the contemporary / documents. On Lichnowsky's report of Sir,E. Grey's suggestion that the four Powers should undertake negotiation between Russia and Austria, the Emperor wrote: "This is superfluous, as Austria has already made matters clear to Russia, and Grey can propose nothing j else. I am not intervening—only if Ausj tria expressly asks mo to, which is not probable. One does not consult others matters of honour and vital questions." According to Bethmann-Hollweg s own argument, the proposal for an Ambassadors' Conference was " an attempt of the Triple Entente to bring the dispute before the tribunal of Europe or rather before that of the Entente?' Every possible endeavour was made by Sir E. Grey to dispel any such misapprehension or misrepresentation of the proposal and to commend it to Austria's ally, whose cooperation he considered essential. The conference, he explained, " would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to bo acceptable, to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective Allies." '■.'-■.:"'-'.•■'. . :"■"," , ~ ■ > To be continued daily.