THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18346, 12 March 1923, Page 4

THE CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

INNER HISTORY OF THE WAR

BY THE BT. HON. WINSTON S. OHUBCHILL.

(COPYRIGHT).

XIV. THE FALKLANDS BATTLE.

We had now to meet the new situa- \ tion. Our combinations, such as they were, were completely ruptured, and Admiral von Spce, now in temporary command of South American waters, possessed a wide choice of alternatives. He might turn back into the Pacific, and repeat the mystery tactics which had been so baffling to us. Ho might steam northward up the west coast of South America and make for the Panama Canal. In this case he would run a chance of , being brought to battle by the Anglo-Japanese Squadron which was moving southward. But, of course, he might not fall in with them, or, if he did, he could avoid battle owing to his superior speed. He might come round to the east coast and interrupt the main trade route. If he did this he must bo prepared to fight Admiral Stoddart; but this would be a very hazardous combat. Lastly, he might cross the Atlantic, possibly raiding the Falkland Islands on his way, and arrive unexpectedly on the South African' coast. Here he would find the Union Government's expedition against the German colony in full progress and his arrival would have been,most unwelcome. General Botha and General Smuts, having sup pressed the rebellion, were about to resume in a critical atmosphere their attack upon German South-West Africa, and a stream of transports would soon be flowing with the expedition and its supplies from Capetown to Luderitz Bay. Subsequently, or alternatively to this intrusion, Admiral von Spee might steam up the African coast and strike at the whole of the shipping of the expedition to the Cameroons which was quite without means of defending itself against him. All these unpleasant possibilities had to bo faced by us. We had to prepare again at each of many point* against a sudden blow; and, great as were our resources, the strain upon them became enormous. The first step was to restore the situation in South American waters. Tins would certainly take a month. My minute of inquiry to the Chief of the Staff, written an hour after I had read the first news of the disaster, will show the possibilities which existed. In this grave need my mind immediately turned to wresting a battle-cruiser from the Grand Fleet which, joined with the Defence, Carnarvon, Cornwall, and Kent, would give Admiral Stoddart an overwhelming superiority. DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS DIVISION. 1. How far is it. and how long would it take Dartmouth and Weymouth to reach Punta Arenas. Rio, or Abrolhos respectively, if they started this afternoon with all dis--1 patch? 2. How long would it take— (a) Kent to reach Rio and Abrolhos? <b) Australia (1) without, and (2) with, Montcalm to reach Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also Idsumo and Newcastle to reach them? (c) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to replace Australia at Fiji? (d) Defence, Carnarvon, and Cornwall respectively to reach Punta Arenas? (e) Invincible to reach Abrolhos, Rio, Punta Arenas? (D Hizen and Asama to reach Galapagos or Esauimalt? men November 4, 1914. But I found Lord Fisher in a bolder mood. He would take two battlecruisers from the Grand Fleet for the South American station. More* than that, and much more questionable, he would take a third— Princess Royal —for Halifax and later fbr the West Indies in case Von Spee came through the Panama Canal. We measured up our strength in home waters anxiously, observing that the Tiger was about to join the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, and that the new battleships Benbow, Empress of India, and Queen Elizabeth were practically ready. We sent forthwith the following order to the Commander-in-Chief: November 4, 1914. Order Invincible and Inflexible to fill up with coal at once and proceed with all despatch to Berehiven. They are urgently needed for foreign service. Tiger has been ordered to join you with all despatch. Give her necessary orders. I abo telegraphed to Sir John Jellicoe as follows: November 5, 12.5 a.m. We fear from all reports received through German sources that Cradock has been caught or has engaged with only Good Hope and Monmouth armoured ships against Soliumhortt and Gneisenau. Both British vessels probably sunk. Fate of Glasgow and Otranto uncertain, and position of Canopus critical. Proximity of concentrated German squadron of five good ships will threaten gravely main trade route Rio to London. Essential recover control. First Sea Lord requires Inflexible and Invincible for this purpose. Sturdee goes Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific. Apparently we had not at this stage decided finally to send the Princess 4toyaJ. Sir John Jellicoe rose to the occasion and parted with his two battle-cruisers without a word. They were ordered to steam by the west coast to Devonport to fit themselves for their southern voyage. Our plans for the second clutch at Von Spee were now conceived, as follows: (1) Should he breajt across the Pacific he would be dealt with by the very superioi Japanese Ist Southern Squadron based on Suva to cover Australia and New Zealand, and composed as follows:—Kurama (battleship), Taukube and Ikoma (battle.cruisers). At Suva also were Montcalm and Encounter. Another strong Japanese squadron (four ships) was based on the Caroline Islands. (2) To meet him should he proceed up ' the west coast of South America an Anglo- | Japanese squadron comprising Australia j (from Fiji), Hizen. Idzuino, Newcastle, was ' to be formed off the North American coast. (3) Should he coma round on to the east | coast. Defence. Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kern ! were ordered to concentrate off Monte Video, | together with fcjanopus, Glasgow and Bristol, and not seek action till joined by Invincible and Inflexible, thereafter sending the ' Defence to South Africa. (4) Should he approach the Cape Station, ' he would be awaited by Defence and also | Minotaur, released from the Australian convoy (after we knew of Von Spee's arrival iin South American waters), with the old j battleship Albion and Weymouth, Dartmouth and Hyacinth, light cruisers; the Union expedition being postponed for fourteen days. (5) Should he come through the Panama j Canal, h'e would meet the Princess Royal as well as the Berwick and Lancaster, oi the West Indies Squadron.

(6) Cameroons were warned to be ready to take their shipping up the river. (7) Should he endeavour to work homewards across the South Atlantic, he would come into the area of a new squadron under Admiral de Robeck to be formed near the Cape de Verde Islands, comprising the very strong armoured cruisers Warrior and Black Prince and the Donegal, Highflier, I and later Cumberland. % Thus to compass the destruction of five warships, only two of which were armoiued, it was necessary to employ nearly tnirty, including twenty-one armoured, ships, the most part ol superior metal, and this took no account of the Japanese squadrons or of French ships, or of armed merchantcruisers, the latter effective for -coming.

The strain upon the British naval resources abroad was now at its maximum. One hundred and two ships of air classes were employed in the outer seas. We literally could not lay our hands on another vessel which could be made to play any useful part. But we were soon to have relief. Already on October 30 news had reached us that the Konigeberg had been discovered hiding in the Rnfigi River in German East Africa, and it was instantly possible "to mark her down with two ships ,of equal value and liberate the others. On November 9 far finer news arrived. The reader will remember for what purposes the Sydney and Melbourne had been attached to the great Australian convoy which was now crossing the Indian Ocean. On the Bth the Sydney, cruising ahead of the convoy, took in a message from the wireless station at Cocos Island that a strange ship was entering the bay. Thereafter, silence from Cocos Island. Thereupon the large Japanese cruiser Ibuki increased her speed, displayed the war flag of Japan, and demanded permission from the British officer in command of the convoy to pursue and attack the enemy. But the convoy could not divest itself of this powerful protection, and the coveted task was accorded to the Sydney. At 9 o'clock she sighted the Emden, and the first sea fight in the history of the Australian Navy began. It could have only one ending. In a hundred minutes the Emden was stranded, a mass of flaming, twisted metal, and the' whole of the Indian Ocean was absolutely safe and free. The clearance of the Indian Ocean liberated all those vessels which had been searching for the Emden and the Konigsberg. Nothing could now harm the Australian convoy. Most of its escort vanished. The Emden and the Konigsberg were accounted for, and Von Spee was on the other side of the globe. The Minotaur had already been ordered with full speed to the Cape. All the other vessels went through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean where their presence was very welcome in view of the impending Turkish invasion of Egypt. Meanwhile the Invincible and Inflexible had reached Devonport. We had decided that Admiral Sturdee, on vacating the position of Chief of the Staff, should hoist his flag in the Invincible, should take general command on the South American Station. and should assume general control of all the operations against Von Spee. We were in the highest impatience to get him and his ships away. Once vessels fall into dockyard hands a hundred needs manifest themselves. On November 9, when Lord Fisher was in my room, .the following message was put on my table: — The Admiral Superintendent. Devonport. reports that the earliest possible date for completion of Invincible and Inflexible is midnight, November 13. I immediately expressed great discontent with the dockyard delays, and asked, "Shall 1 give them a shove?" or words to that effect. Fisher took up the telegram. As soon as he saw it he exclaimed, "Friday, the thirteenth! What a day to choose!" I then wrote and signed the following order, which was the direct cause of the Battle of the Falklands :— Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Devon- " port:—(Nov. 10. Sent 12.5 a.m.) Inflexible and Invincible are to sail Wednesday, November 11. They are needed for war service, and Dockyard arrangements must be made to conform. if necessary Dockyard men should be sent away in the ships, to return as opportunity offers. You axe held responsible for the speedy despatch of these ships in a thoroughly efficient condition. Acknowledge. The ships sailed accordingly, and in the nick of time. They coaled on November 26 at Abrolhos, where they joined and absorbed Admiral StoddarVft squadron Car. narvon, Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow, Bristol, and Orama, and despatched Defence to the Cape, and without ever coming in sight of land or using their wireless they reached Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, on the night of December 7. Hero they found the Canopus in the lagoon, prepared to defend herself and the colony in accordance with the Admiralty instructions. They immediately began to coal. After his victory at Coronel, Admiral von Spee comported himself with "the dignity of a brave gentleman. He put aside the fervent acclamations of the German colony of Valparaiso, and spoke no wprd of triumph over the dead. He was under no delusion as to his own danger. He said of the flowers which were presented to him, "They will do for my funeral." Generally, his behavior would lead us to suppose that the inability of the Germans to pick up any British survivors was not due to want of humanity; and this view has been accepted by the British Navy. After a few days at Valparaiso he and his ships vanished again into the blue. We do not know what were the reasons which led him to raid the Falkland Islands, nor what his further plans would have been in the event of success. Presumably he hoped to destroy this unfortified British coalnig base and so make his own position in South American waters less precarious. At any rate, at noon-on December 6he set off from the Straits of Magellan with his five ships to the eastward; and at about 8 o'clock on December 8 his leading ship (the Gneisenau) was in sight of the main harbour of the Falklands. A few minutes later a terrible apparition broke upon German eyes. Rising from behind the promontory, sharply visible in the clear air, were a pair of tripod masts. One glance was enough. They meant certain death. The day was beautifully fine, and from the tops the horizon extended thirty or forty miles in every direction. There was no hope for victory. . There was no chance of escape. A month before, another Admiral and his sailors had suffered a similar experience. At 5 o'clock that afternoon I was working in my room at the Admiralty when Admiral Oliver entered with the following telegram. It was from the Governor ol the Falkland Islands, and ran as follows : — "Admiral Spee arrived at. daylight this morning with all his shirs, and is now in actior with Admiral Sturdee's whole fleet, which was coaling." We had had so many unpleasant surprises "that these last words sent a shiver up my spine. Had we been taken by surprise, and, in spite of all our superiority, mauled, unready, at anchor. "Can it mean that?" I said to the Chief of the Staff. "I hope not," was all he said. I could see that my suggestion, though I hardly meant it seriously, had disquieted him. Two hours later, however, the door opened again, and this time the countenance of the stern and I sombre Oliver wore something which closely resembled a grin. "It's all right, sir; they are all at the bottom." And with one exception, so they were. •Only Dreadnoughts had torpedo. (To be continued daily.)