MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL'S MEMOIRS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18334, 26 February 1923, Page 4

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL'S MEMOIRS.

ll.— War.

[COPYRIGHT.]

At the Calinet on Saturday, August 1, I demanded the immediate calling out of the Fleet Reserves and the completion of our naval preparations. I based this claim on the fact that the German Navy was mobilising, and that wo must do tho same. The Cabinet, who were by no means ill-informed on matters of naval organisation, took the view, after a sharp discussion, that this step was not necessary to our safety, us mobilisation only affected the oldest ships in tho Fleet, and that our main naval power was already in full preparedness for war and the Fleet in its war station. I replied that though this was true wo needed the Third Fleet ships, particularly the older cruisers, to fulfil the roles assigned to them in our war plan. However, I did not succeed in procuring their assent. On Saturday evening! dined alone at the Admiralty. The foreign telegrams came in at short intervals in red boxes which already bore the special ' label " Sub-Committee," denoting the precautionary period. The flow was quite continuous, and the impression produced on my mind after reading for nearly an hour was that there was still a chance of peace. I wondered whether armies and fleets could remain mobilised for a space without fighting and then demobilise. I had hardly achieved this thought when another Foreign Office box came in. I opened it and read, "Germany has declared war on Russia." There was no more to to said. I walked across the Horse Guards' Parade and entered 10, Downing Street by v the garden gate. I found the Prime Minister upstairs in his drawing room; with him were Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey, and Lord Crewe; there may have been other Ministers. I eaid that I intended instantly to mobilise the Fleet notwithstanding the Cabinet decision, and that I would take full personal responsibility to the Cabinet the next morning!' This action was ratified by the Cabinet on Sunday morning, and the Royal Proclamation was issued some hours later.

Another decision and a painful one "was required. Sir George Callaghan's command of the Home Fleets had been ' extended by a 'year and was now due to end on October 1. It had been an- j pounced that ha would then be succeeded by Sir John. Jellicoe. Further, our ar- ; rangements prescribed that Sir John Jellicoe should act as second-in-command in the event of war. The First Sea Lord and I had a conference with Sir George Callaghan on his way through London to tho North on the 30th. As the result of this conference we decided that if war tame it would be necessary -to appoint Sir John Jellicoe immediately to the chief command. „We were doubtful as to Sir George Callaghan's health and physical strength leing equal to the immense strain that would be cast upon him; and in the crash of Europe it was no time to consider individuals. Sir John Jellicoe left London for the Fleet with sealed instructions, of the purpose of which he was quite unaware, directing him on the seals being broken to take over .the. command. On the night of August 2, when we considered wsr certain, we telegraphed to both Admirals apprising them of the Admiralty decision. It ■was naturally a cruel blow to Sir George Callaghan to* lay down his charge At such a moment, and his protects were re-echoed by practically all the principal Admirals who had served under him, and by Sir John Jellicoe himself. It was also a grave matter to make a change in the command of the Fleets at this juncture. However, we did what we thought right, and that without an hour's delay. Sir John Jellicoe assumed command on the evening of August 3, and received almost immediately an order from the Admiralty to proceed' to sea , at daylight on the |»th. The Cabinet sat almost continuously throughout the Sunday, and up till lun-cheon-time it looked as if the majority would resign. Meanwhile, however, events were influencing opinion hour by hour. When we met in the morning we were in presence of the violation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg by the German troops. In the afternoon the violation of the Belgian frontier had taken place. In the evening the German ultimatum to Belgium was delivered. Next day arrived the appeal of the King of the Belgians that the guaranteeing Powers should uphold the sanctity of the Treaty regarding the neutrality of Belgium. This last .was decisive.

When the Cabinet separated on Monday morning formal sanction had been given to the already completed mobilisation of the Fleet and" to the immediate mobilisation of the Army. No decision bad been taken to send an ultimatum to Germany or to declare war upon Germany, still less to send £3 army to France. These supreme decisions were never taken At any Cabinet. They were compelled by tho force of events. We repaired to the House of Commons to hear the statement of the Foreign Secretary.

Meanwhile in tho Mediterranean a Idrama of intense interest, and, as it ultimately proved, of fateful consequence was being enacted. The event which would dominate all others if war broke out was the main shock of battle between the French and German armies. We knew that the French were counting on placing in the lino a whole army corps of their best troops from North Africa, and that every man was needed. We understood also that they intended to transport these troops across the Mediterranean as fast as ships could be loaded under the genera] protection of the French Fleet, but without any individual escort or system of convoys. The French General Staff calcuftited that, whatever happened, most of the troops would get across. The French Fleet disposed between this stream of transports. and the Austrian Fleet afforded a good guarantee. But there was one ship in the Mediterranean which far outstripped in speed every vessel in the French Navy. She was the Goeben. The only heavy ships in the Mediterranean that could attempt to compete with the Goeben in speed were the three British .battle-cruisers. It seemed that the Goeben, being free to choose any point on a front, of "three or four hundred miles, would easily be able to avoid the French Battle Squadron, and, brushing aside or outstripping their cruisers, break in opon the transports and sink one after another of these vessels crammed with soldiers. It occurred to me at this time that perhaps that was the task she had been sent to the Mediterranean to perform. On July 30 I discussed the Mediterranean command fully with the First Sea Lord. It seemed necessary to give the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean fleet some more specific information ant' directions. The following is an extract of a message sent from tho Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet on July 30, 19J4 ;- r

It now seems probable, should war break out and England and France engage in it. that Italy will remain neutral and that Greece can be made an ally. The attitude of Italy, however, is uncertain, and it is especially important , that your squadron should not be seriously engaged with Austrian chips before we know what Italy will do. I had, with the concurrence of the First Sea Lord, sent a telegram to Sir Berkeley Milne from which the following is an extract — To aid the French in tho transportation of their African army by covering *»<»»■ possible bringing to action individual fast German ships. particularly G f™?' which may interfere with that transposition, should be your first *"*; You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French admiral. Except in combination with the French as part of a general battle, do not at this stage be brought to action- against superior forces. The speed of your.squadrons is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. You must husband your force at the outset, and we shall hope later to reinforce the Mediterranean. Sir Berkeley Milne accordingly awaited permission to consult with the French admiral. This permission could not be given him till August 2, at 7.6 p.m., when I telegraphed as follows to our commanders-in-chief all over the world : — Situation very critical. Be prepared, to meet surprise attacks. Yon can enter into communication with the French eemor officer on your station for combined action in case Great Britain should decide to become ally of France against Germany. Earlv on the morning of August 4 we were delighted by the following news from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to the Admiralty: Indomitable, Indefatigable. shadowing Goeben and Breslau, 37.44 north. 7.56 cast We replied:— Very good. Hold her. War imminent. (This to go now.) Goeben is to be prevented by force from interfering with French transports. (This to await early confirmation.) The Cabinet, however,, adhered formally to the view that no act of war should be committed by us before the expiration of the ultimatum. The moral integrity of the British Empire must not be compromised at this awful juncture for the sake of sinking a single ship. The Goeben, of course, did not attack the French transports. In fact, though this we did not know at the time, she was steaming away from tho French transport routes when sighted by the Indomitable and Indefatigable. Even if, however, she had attacked transports, the decision of the British Cabinet would have prevented our battle-cruisers from interfering. This decision obviously carried with it the still more imperative veto against opening fire on the Goeben if she did not attack French transports during the hours when we had her in our power. I cannot impeach the decision. It is right that the world should know it; But little did we imagine how much that act of honourable restraint was to cost us. and all the world.

So, during this long summer afternoon, these three great ships, hunted and hunters, were cleaving the clear waters of the Mediterranean in tense and oppressive calm. At any moment the Goeben could have been smitten by 15 12in. guns firing nearly treble her own weight of metal. At the Admiralty we suffered the tortures of Tantalus. At about 5 o'clock Prince Louis observed that there was still time to sink the Goeben before dark. In the face of the Cabinet decision I was unable to utter a word. Nothing less than the vital safety of Great Britain could have justified so complete an overriding of the authority of the Cabinet.* We hoped to sink her the next day. Where could she go? Pola seemed her only refuge throughout the Mediterranean. According to international law, nothing but internment awaited her elsewhere. The Turks had kept their secret of their alliance with Germany well. As the shadows of night fell over the Mediterranean, the Goeben increased her speed to 24 knots, which was the utmost that our two battlecruisers " could steam. She increased her speed still further. We have since learned that she was capable for a very short time of an exceptional speed, rising even to 26 or 27 knots.' Aided by this, she shook off her unwelcome companions, and vanished gradually in the gathering gloom. Now, after all the stress and convulsion of the preceding 10 days, there came to us at the Admiralty a* strange interlude of calm. All the decisions had been taken. The ultimatum to Germany had gone; it must certainly be rejected. War would be declared at midnight. As far as we had been able to foresee the event all our preparations were made. Mobilisation was complete. Every ship was in its station ; every man at his post. All over the world every British captain and admiral was on guard. It only remained to give the signal. In the War Room of the Admiralty, where I sat waiting, one could hear the clock tick. From Parliament Street came the murmurs of the crowd; but they sounded distant and the world seemed very still. One could i only wait; but for what a result! Al- j though the special duties of my office made it imperative that I of all others should be vigilant and forward in all that related to preparation for war, I claim, as these pages show, that in my subordinate station I had in these years before the war done nothing wittingly or willingly to impair the chances of a peacable solution, and had tried my best as opportunity offered to make good relations possible between England and Germany. I thank God that I could feel also in that hour that our country was guiltless of all intended purpose of war. Even if we had made some mistakes in the handling of this awful crisis, though I do not know them, from the bottom of our hearts we could say that we had not willed it. Germany, it seemed, had rushed with head down and settled resolve to her own undoing. And if this were what she had meant all along, if this was the danger which had really menaced us hour by hour during the last five years, and would have hung over us hour by hour until the crash eventually came, was it not better that it should happen now—now that siio had put herself so hopelessly in tho wrong, now that we were ready beyond the reach of surprise, now that, France and Russia and Great Britain were all in the line together? The First Sea Lord and the Chief of Staff came in with French admirals, who had hurried over to concert in detail arrangements for the co-operation of tho two fleets in the Channel and in the Mediterranean. They were fine figures in uniform, and very grave. One felt in actual contact with these French officers how truly the crisis was life or death for France. They spoke of basing the French fleet on Malta that same Malta for which we had fought Napoleon for so many years, which was indeed the very pretext of the renewal of the war in 1803. Little did Napoleon of St. Helena dream that in her most desperate need France would have at her disposal the great Mediterranean base which his strategic instinct had deemed vital. I said to the admirals, "Use Malta as if it were Toulon." The minutes passed slowly.

It was 11 o'clock at night— by German —when h the ultimatum I expired. The war telegram, which meant "Commence hostilities against Germany," was flashed to the ships and establishments under the Whito Ensign all over the world. I walked across the Horse Guards' Parade to the Cabinet room and reported to the Prime Minister and the - Ministers who were assembled there that the deed was done. , s - When I next went to the Cabinet, after the declaration of war, I found myself with new companions. During the previous seven years Lord Morley had always sat on the left of the Prime Minister, and 1 had always sat next to Lord Morley. Many a wise and witty admonition had I received pencilled in scholarly phrase from my veteran neighbour, and many a charming courtesy such as he excelled in had graced the toilsome path of business. He had said to me on the Sunday of Resolve. "If it has to be, I am not the man to do it. I should only hamper those like you who have to bear tho burden." Now he was gone. In his place sat Lord Kitchener. On my left also there was a fresh figure—the now Minister of Agriculture Lord Lucas. I had known him since South African war days, when he lost his leg, and to know him. was to delight in him. His open, gay, responsive nature, his witty, ironical, .but never unchivalrous tongue, his pleasing presence, his compulsive smile, made him much courted by his friends, of whom he had many, and of whom I was one. Young for the Cabinet, heir to splendid possessions, happy in all that surrounded him, ho seemed to have captivated Fortune with the rest.

Both these two men were marked for death at the hands of the enemy, the young Minister grappling with his adversary in the high air, the old field marshal choking in the icy sea. I wonder what the 20 politicians round the table would have felt if they had been told that the prosaic British Cabinet was itself to be decimated in the war they had just declared. I think they would have felt a sense of pride and of relief in sharing to some extent the perils to which they were to send their - countrymen, their friends, their sons. On the afternoon of August 5 the Prime Minister convened an Extraordinary Council of War at Downing Street. I do not remember any gathering like it. It consisted of the Ministers most prominently associated with the policy of our entering the war, the chiefs of the navy and the army, all the high military commanders, and in addition Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts. Decision was required upon the question: How should we wage the war that had just begun ? • Those who spoke for the War Office knew their own minds, and were united. The whole British Army should be sent at once ( to France,' according to what may justly be called the Haldane Plan. Everything in that Minister's 'eight years' tenure of the War Office had led up to this, and had been sacrificed for thjs. To place an army of four or six division.'} of infantry thoroughly equipped, with their necessary cavalry, on the left of the French line within 12 or 14 days of the order to mobilise, and to guard the home island meanwhile by the 14 Territorial divisions he had organised, was the scheme upon which, aided by Field-Marshals Nicholson and French, he had concentrated all his efforts and his stinted resources. It was a simple plan, but it was a practical plan. It had been persistently pursued, and laboriously and minutely studied. It represented approximately the maximum war effort that the* voluntary system would yield applied in the most effective and daring manner to the decisive spot. If this plan were adopted there would be nothing to argue about, nothing to haggle over. The French knew exactly what help they were going to get if Britain decided to come in, and exactly when and where they .were going to get it, and mobilisation schemes, railway graphics, timetables, bases, depots, supply arrangements, etc., filling many volumes, regulated and ensured a thorough and concerted execution. A commander whose whole life led up to this point ltd been chosen. All that remained to be done was to take tho decision and give the signal.

At fcliis point I reported on behalf of the Admiralty that, our mobilisation being in every respect complete, and all our ships in their war stations, we would waive the-claim we had hitherto made in all the discussions of the Committee of Imperial Defence that two Regular Divisions should be retained in Great Britain as a safeguard against invasion, and that so far as the Admiralty was concerned, not four but the whole six divisions could go 'at once; that we would provide for their transportation and for the security of the island in their absence. This considerable undertaking was made good by the Royal Navy. Discussion then turned upon the place to which they should be despatched. Lord Roberts inquired whether it was not possible to base the British Army on Antwerp so as to strike, in conjunction with the Belgian armies, at the flank and rear of the invading German hosts. We were not able from an Admiralty point of view to guarantee the sea communications of so large a force on the enemy side of the Straits of Dover, but only inside the Anglo-French flotilla cordon which had already. taken up its station. Moreover, no plans had been worked out by the War Office for such a contingency. They had concentrated all their thought upon integral co-operation with the French left wherever it might be. It was that or nothing.

Another discussion took place upon how far forward the British Expeditionary Force should be concentrated. Some high authorities were for concentrating it around Amiens for intervention after the first shock of battle had been taken. Both Lord Kitchener and Sir Douglas Haie seemed inclined to this view. But in the end Sir John French and the forward school had their way, and it was felt that we must help France in the way the French staff thought would be most effective.

At this Great Council of WUr, Lord Kitchener had not yet become Secretary of State for War, but I knew that his appointment was impending. The Prime Minister could not possibly be burdened with the continuous flow of inter-depart-mental work proceeding between the War Office and the Admiralty and requiring to be transacted between Ministers. He therefore invited Lord Kitchener to undertake Ministerial charge of the War Office, and the Field Marshal, who had certainly not sought this post in any way, had no choice but to accept.

Lord Kitchener now came forward to the Cabinet, on almost the first occasion after he joined us, and in soldierly sentences proclaimed a series of inspiring and prophetic truths. Everyone expected that the war would be short; but wars took unexpected courses, and we must now prepare for a long struggle. Such a conflict could not be ended on the sea or by sea power alone. It could be ended only by great battles on the Continent. In these the British Empire must bear its part on a scale proportionate to its magnitude and power. We must be prepared to put armies of millions in the field and maintain them for several years. In no other way could we discharge our duty to our Allies or to the world.

These words were received by the Cabinet in silent assent,' and it is my belief that had Lord Kitchener proceeded to demand universal national service, to be applied as it might be required, his request would have been acceded to. He, however, proposed to content himself with calling for volunteers, and in the first ' instance to form six new regular divisions. (We now ask the reader to turn back in this narrative'to the earlier chapters, in which Mr. Churchill .successively deals with the principal naval figures of his day. with the striking changes in the design of ships in the years immediately before the war, and with the altered requirements of the strategic situation entailed by the change of Germany for France as the most probable antagonist. (To bo continued daily.)