MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL'S MEMOIRS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18333, 24 February 1923, Page 6

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL'S MEMOIRS.

I.—The Crisis. . [COPYRIGHT.]

Like many others, I often summon up in my memory the impression of those July days in 1914. The world on the verge of its - catastrophe was very brilliant. - Nations and Empires crowned ■with princes and potentates rose majestically on every side, lapped in the accumulated . treasures of tho long peace. All wore fitted and fastened— seemed securely —into an immense cantilever. The two mighty European systems faced .each othor glittering and clanking in their panoply, but with a tranquil gaze. A polite, discreet, pacific, and on the whole sincere diplomacy spread its web of connections ' over both. A sentence in a despatch, an observation by an ambassador, a cryptic phrase in a Parliament seemed sufficient to adjust from day to day the balance of the prodigious structure. Words counted, and even whispers. A nod could be made to tell. Were we after all to achieve world security and universal peace by a marvellous system of combinations in equipoise and of armaments, in equation, of checks and counter-checks on violent action, ever more complex and more delicate ? Would Europe thus marshalled, thus divided, thus re lated, unite into one universal and glorious organism capable of receiving and enjoying in undreamed of abundance the bounty which nature and. science stood hand in hand to give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see.

In tho autumn of 1913, when I was revolving the next year's Admiralty policy in the light of the coming Estimates, I had sent th«i following minute to the First Sea Lord t —

Wo have now had manoeuvres in the North Sea on the largest scale for two years running, and we have obtained a great deal of valuable data which re-' quires to be studied. It does not therefore seem necessary to supplement the ordinary tactical exercises of tho year 1914-15 by grand manoeuvres. A saving of : nearly £200,000 could apparently be effected in coal and oil consumption and a certain measure of relief would be accorded to the Estimates in the"exceptionally heavy year.

In these circumstances I am drawn to the conclusion that it would be better to have no grand manoeuvres

in 1914-15, but to substitute instead a mobilisation of the Third Fleet. The whole of the Royal Fleet Reserve and the whole of the reserve officers could be mobilised and trained together for a week or ten days. The Third Fleet ships would bo given the exact complements they would have in war, and the whole mobilisation system would be subjected to a real test. The balance fleet reservists could be carefully tested as to quality, and trained either afloat or ashore. I should anticipate that this would not cost more than £100,000, in which case there would still be a saving on the 'fuel of the manoeuvres. While the Third Fleet ships were mobilised, the First Fleet ships would rest and thus plenty of officers would be available for the training of the reservists on shore, and possibly, if need be, for their peace training afloat. This last would, of course, reveal what shortage exists. A very large staff would be employed at all the mobilising centres to report upon the whole workings of the mobilisation. The schools of training establishments would be closed temporarily according to the mobilisation orders, and the whole process of putting the navy on a war footing, so far as the Third Fleet was concerned, would be carried out. I should not promise to complete the Second . Fleet, as we know all about that.

At another time in the year I should desire to see mobilised the whole of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and • put '.hem afloat on First Fleet ships for a week ae additional to complements. ■vy ; '

Plea-sa put ; forward, definite pro- < posals, with estimates, for carrying out the above policy, and at the same time let me have your opinion upon it. October 22, 1913. W.S.C. Prince Louis agreed. The necessary measures were taken, and the project was mentioned to Parliament on March 18, 1914. In pursuance of these orders and without connection of any kind with the European situation,* the test mobilisation began on July 15. Although there was no legal authority to compel the reservists to come up the response was general, upwards of 20,000 men presenting themselves at the naval depots. The whole of our mobilisation arrangements were thus subjected for the first time in naval history to a practical test ' and thorough overhaul. Officers specially detached from the Admiralty, watched the process of mobilisation at every/ port in order that every defect, shortage, or hitch in the system might be reported and remedied. Prince Louis and I personally inspected the process at Chatham. All the reservists drew their kits and proceeded to their assigned ship's. All the Third Fleet ships coaled and raised steam and sailed for general concentration at Spithead. Here, on July 17 and; 18, was held tho grand review of the navy. It constituted incomparably the greatest

The earlier chapters of Mr. Churchill's first volume carry the story of home and foreign politics from the Naval Estimates of 1909, which first moved Mm to a close study of English and Gorman sea power through his appointment to the Admiralty by Mr. Asquith in October, 1909i to the summer of 1914.

assemblage of naval power ever witnessed in the history of the world. His Majesty himself was present, and inspected ships of every class. On the morning of the 19th the whole fleet put to sea for exercises of various kinds. It took more than six hours for this armada, every ship decked with flags and crowded with bluejackets and marines, to pass, with bands playing and at 15 knots, before the Royal Yacht, while overhead the naval seaplanes and aeaoplanes circl'ed continuously. Yet it is probable that th© uppermost* thought in the minds both of the Sovereign and those of his Ministers there present was not the imposing spectacle defiling before their eyes of British power and might, but the haggard, squalid, tragic Irish quarrel, which threatened to divide tho British nation into two hostile camps. One after another the ships melted out of sight beyond the Nab. They were going on a longer voyage than any of us could know.

The Cabinet, on Friday afternoon, July 24, sat long revolving the Irish problem. The Buckingham Palace Conference had broken down. The disagreements and antagonisms seemed as fierce and as hopeless as ever, yet the margin in "dispute upon which such fateful issues hung was incon- y ceivably petty. The discussion, which turned principally upon the boundaries of Fermanagh and Tyrone, had reached its inconclusive end, and the Cabinet was about to separate when the quiet grave tones of Sir Edward Grey's were heard reading a document which had just been brought to him from the Foreign Office. It was the Austrian Note to Serbia. Ee had been reading or speak- 1 ing for several minutes before I could disengage my mind from the tedious and bewildering debate which had just closed. Wo were all very tired, but gradually aa the phrases and sentences followed one another impressions of a wholly different character began to form in my mind. This Note was clearly an ultimatum; but it was an ultimatum such as had never been penned in modern times. As the reading proceeded it seemed absolutely impossible that any State in the world could accept it, o<r that any acceptance, however abject, would satisfy the aggressor. The parishes of Fermanagh and Tyrone faded back into the mists and squalls oi Ireland, and a strange light began immediately but by perceptible gradations, to fall and grow upon the map of Europe. J

I always take the- greatest interest in reading accounts of how the war came upon different people, and I believe that so long as they are true and unstudied they will have a definite value and an enduring interest for posterity: so I shall briefly record exactly what : happened to me. ' . » ;■ V ~i:

I went back to the Admiralty at about 6 o'clock. I said to my friends who have helped me so many years in my work (Mr. Marsh and Mr. —now Sir James —Masterton that there was real danger and that it might be war.

I took stock of the position and' wrote out, to focus them in my mind, a series of points which would have to bo attended to if matters did not mend. My friends kept these as a check during' the days that followed and ticked them off one by one as they settled, 1. First and Second Fleets. Leave and disposition. 2. Third Fleet. Replenish coal and stores. 1 3. Mediterranean mov®. merits. 4. China dispositions. 5. Shadowing cruisers abroad. 6. Ammunition for self-defensive merchantmen. 7. Patrol flotillas; Disposition. Leave. Complete. 35 ex-coastais. _ 8. Immediate Reserve9. Old battleships for Humber. Flotilla for Humber, 10. Ships at emergency dates. Shipbuilding for Foreign Powers. 11. Coastal Watch. 12. Anti-aircraft guns at oil depots. 13. Aircraft at Sheerness. Airships and seaplanes. 14. K Espionage. 15. Magazines and other vulnerable points. 16. Irish ships. 17. Submarine dispositions. •*<

I discussed the situation at length the next morning (Saturday) with the First Sea Lord. For the moment, however, there was nothing to do. At no time in all these last three years were we more completely ready. •' ,

The test mobilisation had been completed, and with the exception of the Immediate Reserve all the reservists were already paid off and . journeying to their homes. But the whole of the First and Second Fleets complete in every way for battlo and wore concentrated at Portland, where they were to remain till Monday morning at 7 o'clock, when the First Fleet would disperse by squadrons for various exercises, and when the ships of the Second Fleet would proceed up to their home ports and discharge their balance crews. Up till Monday morning., therefore, a word instantaneously transmitted from the wireless masts of the Admiralty to the Iron Duke would suffice to keep our main force together. If the word were not spoken before that hour they would Begin 'to separate. During the first twenty-four hours after their separation they could be rcconcentrated in an equal period, but if no . word , were spoken for forty-eight hours (i.e., by. Wednesday morning), then the ships of the Second. Fleet would • have begun dismissing their balance crews to the shore at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, and ; tho various gunnery and torpedo schools would have recommenced their

instruction. 'If mother fcrty-nBW had gone Won, i.e., by Friday mornings crta, . u f-jjv; ber of vessels -odd too 6 M mto^dook for refit, repairs, or laying up. . this Saturday morning we had the in hand for .at least four days. That night, at dinner, _ frotn GerBallin. » Ho , had just amVed from G many ; We sat next to each other, an I asked him what her thought about the situation. With the first + few, words he spoke it became clear that he had ■no come.here on any mission of pleasuie said the situation was grave. fcer," he said, "old Bismarck telling me the yea,r before ho died that one day the gfrpat European war would come , } of some damned foolish thing in kans." These words, he said, might c true. It all depended on the Tsar. What would he do if Austria chastised Serbia'! A few years before there would have been no danger, as the Tsar was too frightened for his throne, but now again he was feeling himself more secure upon his throne, and the Russian people besides would feel very hardly anything done against Serbia. Then he said. If Bus* sia marches against Austria, we vans, march; and if we march, France must march, and what would England do. I was not in a position to say more than it; would be a great mistake to assume that England would necessarily do nothing, and I added that she would- judge events as they arose. He speaking with very great earnestness: "Suppose we hid to go to war with Russia and France and yet took nothing from her in Europe, not an inch of her territory, only some colonies to indemnify us. Would that make a difference to England's attitude? Suppose we gave a guarantee beforehand." I stuck to my formula that England would judge events as they arose, and that it would bo : a mistake to assume that we should stand out of it whatever happened. I reported; this conversation to Sir Edward/ Grey in due course, and early in the following week I repeated it to the Cabinet. On the Wednesday following the exact proposal mooted to me by Herr Ballin about Germany not taking any territorial conquests in France, but seeking indemnities only in the colonies, was officially telegraphed to us from Berlin and rejected. I have no doubt that Herr Ballin . was directly charged by the Emperor with the mission to find out what England- would do. ; 1 *■ ' • Jf ■"•

Herr Ballin - has left no record of his impressions of his visit to England at this juncture. " Even a moderately skilled German diplomatist," ho wrote, " could easily have come to an understanding ; . with England , and France, who could have made peace certain and prevented Russia from beginning war." The editor of his memoirs adds : "The people in London were certainly seriously concerned at the Austrian Note, but the extent to . which the Cabinet desired the. maintenance of peace may be seen : (as an ' example) from the remark which Churchill, almost with tears in his eyes, made to Ballin as they parted, 'My clear friend, don't let us gc> to war.' " • ' /a

I had planned to spend the Sunday with my family at Cromer, and I decided not to alter my plans. : I arranged to have a special operator placed in the telegraph office so as to ensure a continuous night and day service. ;: That afternoon the news came in that Serbia had accepted the ultimatum. I went to bed with a feeling that .things might blow over. .

At 9 o'clock the next morning ' I call eel up the First Sea Lord by telephone. He told me that? there was a rumour that Austria was not satisfied with the Serbian acceptance of the ultimatum, but otherwise there • were no new developments.v ... v /

At 12 o'clock' I spoke to the First Sea Lard again. He told me vario® items of news that had come in ; from different capitals, none however; of decisive importance, but all tending to a rise of temperature. I asked him whether all the reservists had already been dismissed. He told me they had. I decided to return to London. I told him I would be with him at 9,, and that meanwhile he should do whatever was necessary. ~ ; I.'

Prince Louis awaited me at the Admiralty. ; The situation was evidently' degenerating. Europe seemed to be going mad. The First Sea Lord told me that in accordance with our conversation he had told the Fleet not to disperse. I took occasion to refer to this four months later in my letter accepting his resignation. I was very glad publicly to' testify at that moment of great grief anil pain for : him that his loyal hand had sent . the first order which began our vast naval mobilisation. ■- '

I called on Sir Edward Grey, who had rented my house at '33; Eccleston Square. No one was with him except Sir William Tyrrell, of the Foreign Office. I told him that we were holding the Fleet together. I learned from' him that he viewed the situation very I asked whether it would be helpful or the reverse if we stated in public that we were keeping the Fleet together. Both he and Tyrrell were most insistent that we should proclaim it at the earliest possible moment it might have the effect of sobering the Central Powers and • steadying Europe. I Went back ,to the Admiralty, sent for the First Sea Lord, and drafted the ; necessary communique. The next morning the following notice appeared in all the papers. . ' Here is the extract from. the Times BRITISH NAVAL MEASURES. ORDERS TO FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS. V"' NO MANOEUVRE LEAVE. Wo received the following statement from tho Secretary of the Admiralty at an early hour this morning Orders have been given to the First Fleet, whi.:U -is. concentrated at Portland, not to' disperse for manoeuvre leave for .the present. All vessels of the Second Fleet are remaining at their home ports in : proximity to their balance crews. ~ ' • "■

On Monday began the first of the Cabinets, on the European' situation which thereafter continued daily or twice a day. My awn part in these events was a very simple one. It was first of all to make sure that the diplomatic situation did not get ahead of the naval situation, and that the Grand Fleet should bo in its war station before ' Germany could know whether or not we should be in the war, and therefore if possible before we had decided ourselves. Secondly, it was to point out that if ( Germany attacked France she would do so through Belgium, that, . all her preparations had been made to this end, ' and that she' - ' f

v. Y--. neither corld nor would adopt any dif, ferent strategy or go round any others ' V To these two tasks I steadfastly adhere' After hearing the . discussion at day's Cabinet and studying! the tejJ 'grams,; I sent that night to all oxuc com, " $ manders-in-chief the following very warning V-v, •. S <<VtM 1 rr:>„ r / July 27, iju' This is not the Warning Telegnun, W fl European political situation xnal«»I between Triple Entente and Triple I Powers by no means, impossible. " . .-.J . Be prepared to shadow possible. hcwtiliSjjp men-of-war and consider disposition of ft wWM ships under your>ommand from this po'S ! of view. Measure ,is purely precaution,No unnecessary person is to be fafbrittafffi and the utmost secrecy is to be observed, '■ .']' : The " official " warning telegram'* .■despatched from the Admiralty on We&lfjJ nesday. thD 29th. On this same day'-rapi obtained from the Cabinet the authority ; i to put into force the "Precautionary j ? Period" regulations. The work of OWeyt*! and of Hankey was now put to the prfofp It was found in every respect thorough ; and comprehensive, and all over the coim, try emergency measures began to astoni^. 4 j' the public. Naval harbours were deaf&J;. bridges ~ were guarded, steamers boarded and examined, watchers lined coasts. .X The most important step remains jj, recounted. As early as Tuesday, Julytyjj I felt that the Fleet should go to its - station. It must go there at once, a&j secretly it must be steaming to the noi|",£' while every German authority, naval t, military, had the greatest possible est in avoiding a collision with - us. ,4j|i|| it went thus early it need not go by t&f, Irish Channel . and north-about. It could go through the Straits of Dover JjHlpJ through the North Sea, and therefore th» jj island would not be uncovered even iffi'm single day. Moreo'ver, it would ai.-tiv® sooner and with less expenditure of fne], 7 I

At about 10 o'clock, therefore, on. ; tfa» Tuesday morning I proposed this dtp to i the First Sea Lord and the Chief 0 ( Staff, and found . them wholeheartedly $ favour of it- We decided that the Reel should leave Portland at such an hoS? on the morning of the 29th as to pass th» Straits of Dover during the hours of d«]?, ness, that it should traverse these watfri at high speed and without lights, s ajjf with the utmost precaution proceed Scapa Flow. , I feared to bring this gut, ter before the Cabinet. lest it should mis. takenly be considered a provocative action likely to damage the chances of peace, ft would be unusual to bring movement# of the British Fleet in home waters from oni British port to another before the Cabinet I only therefore informed the Primi Minister, who at once gave his approfal, Orders were accordingly sent rto "ffii George Callaghan, who was told Jack dentally to send the Fleet up under 1# second-in-command, and to travel himself by land through London in order thai wo might have an opportunity of caniial,tation with him. We may now picture this great Fled, with its flotillas and cruisers, c team in; slowly out of Portland harbour, squadron by squadron/ scores of gigantic castles ci steel wending their way across the Jauityj shining sea like giants bowed in anxious thought. Wo may picture them again as darkness fell, 18 miles of warship running at' high speed arid in absolgj* blackness through the narrow Straits, bearing with them into the broad"; water) of the . North Sea J the safeguard ot : con. siderable affairs, i. 1 ; Although there seemed to be no conceivable motive, ~ chance or / mischance, which could lead a . rational , German Admiralty to lay a trap of submarines o» jnines or have given them the knowledge and the time to do so, we looked at each other with much satisfaction when on Thursday morning (the 30th) at our dsflj staff meeting, the Iron Duke reported herself and the whole Fleet - well out in tlu centre of the North Sea, We were noil in a position, whatever happened, to , : con trol events, and it was not easy to «< how this advantage could be taken few us. A surprise torpedo attack befors ol simultaneous with the declaration of-WW was at any rate one nightmare gone ever. We could at least see fop.ten day! ahead.--' .If war • should come :no on( would know where to look for the BritW Fleet. Somewhere in the % . enormoffl waste of waters to the north of oiil ; islands, cruising now this way, now that, 'shrouded in storms and mists, dwelt® mighty . organisation. Yet from tt» Admiralty building we could speak ft them at any moment, if need awN The King's ships were at sea. ..' ««. (To lie continued daily.) .;|gj