THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1921. STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LVIII, Issue 17964, 14 December 1921, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1921. STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC.

Tflfi latest speculation from Washington is that Pacific fortifications will be involved in the final adjust-

ment.of the naval ratio. This is highly probable, and it opens up a question of vital importance to both Japan and the United States. In consenting to\ a •five-three ratio Japan will in some measure give hostages to f priunei It would be strange if she r did;ndt 'ask that the United States shquld ckvthe same, and it is ; possible her •demand will take the fbrip. that ih ; fortifications as well as in ships the, status quo should be maintained. The" formula is topical and simple, and /one against which the United States would |bd;iti>{Mcult to argue. Yet its acceptance would mean that in

spite of numerical inferiority the Japanese. Navy would command the Western Pacific almost as completely as the; American Navy commands the eastern half of that ocean, A glance at the map will illustrate this point. In the Northern Pacific the United States hold , the Aleutian Islands, off the 'Alaskan coast, in the Southern Pacjfic portion of the Samoan Islands,, and :mid-way, between them Hlwauf 'Properly fortified, these three points : would, t cover sill the approaches from the Pacific to the United States coast. On?y Hawaii is fortified, there being a naval base at Pearl Harbour, 12 miles from Honolulu, but this is sufficient, with the superiority of her navy, to give America command of the Pacific at least as far.west as Hawaii. The chain of American possessions proceeds irregularly westward to the very coast of Asia. About 1100 miles west and somewhat to the north of Honolulu lies Midway Island, it is another stage of the same distance to' Wake Island, which, however, lies ton the direct

route from Honolulu to Guam and the Philippines. Another westerly step of over 1000 miles and the American flag is met at Guam. The final stage of 1500 miles is to the Philippines which themselves lie about 1700 miles south of Japan and {iOOO miles from the nearest American naval base at Pearl Harbour. this very hurried geographical survey points to the strategical weakness of the insular chain which carries the Stars and Stripes to the very gate of Asia. There are no fortifications west of Honolulu? and, under these circumstances, the fivethree naval ratio must be discounted at Guam and something more must be written off at Manila. Guam is the key, and until it is fortified the American Navy will find the greatest difficulty in defending the western links of the chain. This weakness has long been recognised by American strategists, and it is interesting to find their fears confirmed from a reliable British source. Mr, Hector C. By water has written a book on sea-power in the Pacific which very strikingly emphasises the strategic importance of Guam, Not as an alarmist, but in a sober effort to point out the hazards of such a struggle, Mr. Bywater discusses the probable strategy of a war between the United States and Japan. His

conclusions are full of interest. He thinks that if Guam were unfortified when war broke out and the American fleet was not in the western area of the Pacific the Japanese would have seized Guam and the Philippines within a fortnight. Assuming that the United States disr appointed Japanese hopes by not then suing for peace, the reconquest of these territories would prove an adventure of extraordinary uncertainty. Even if they' improvised an advanced base at Wake Island the Americans would find it very difficult to maintain their fleet in the Western Pacific, to provide it with [coal-.and oil,, and fc>.protect it from

submarine attacks. Mr. By water thinks that under these circumstances the Japanese might risk a fjeei engagement, 'trusting to such advantages as the proximity of their owh; bases and the facility the superior speed of their battlecruisers would confer on them for breaking off ? the battle Wjhen it suited khem. As Mr. By water's hypothetical confliot is dated 1922, when the ratio of the fleets would bo about that proposed to be embodied in the agreement it is the more interesting to note his conclusion that a battle fought under such conditions would be indecisive and that a naval, stalemate would ensue. If Quam were fortified he anticipates thatjites! would v take a different coulfief./Thi' Philippines might in q^fallj;;bfrr.;the arrival of the Unite'd';Stateß "fleet at Guam would not tin'iy imperil'thiß Japanese line of but enable the Americans to\et about the task of recoverulg *th£ Philippines. The transport of troops across the Pacific L hazardous, but not an enterprise, and finally the Japjiieso would be faced with the alternatives of abandoning the Philippines or fighting a naval action to decide the oonimand of the seas. Mr. Bywater writes with the avowed object of influencing American and Japanese opinion against war. His arguments, though stated before the Washington Conference met, endorse very strongly the commonsense of the settlement which* is within sight. A five-three naval ratio leaves neither Power with smfficfent force to defeat the other decisively. The American coast iB absolutely secured against attack, the Japanese, considering the vast distances of the Pacific, almost equally so. The inferiority of the ! Japanese fleet gives the peace- , makers of Japan a prima-facie case. The difficulty of defending a chain ] of unfortified islands straddling the ( Pacific should make America careful ( of>ffending Japan. The only risk, j

considering the probable settlement in its broadest aspects, is that the defenceless condition of the Philippines and Guam might tempt the cupidity \of Japan. Against this must be set the Japanese capacity for clear thinking. No educated Japanese can imagine that.the capture of the Philippines would bring America to her. knees. That would be the beginning, not the end, of the war, and the longer, the war lasted the more surely wfald the economic resources of the, Urtitpd States tell. War in the Pacific would not be short-lived or spectacular. It would probably be an exhausting trial of strength in which the victor would have ty spend himself to gain a decistfe advantage. The alternative method of determining Pacific quarrels which is now being perfected in Washington is not only moral and humane; it is commonsense. War between . peoples separated.by the breadth of the Pacifici, Ogean would be the more cruel because it would be illogical. .' — n