THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1921 THE FAMINE IN RUSSIA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LVIII, Issue 17895, 24 September 1921, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1921 THE FAMINE IN RUSSIA.

The fall horror of the famine in Russia is slowly being revealed. Here is a catastrophe wnich is without precedent in Russia, which, in the twentieth century recalls the dark ages and which apparently condemns thousands, if not millions, of Europeans to perish miserably under the very eyes of civilisation. The seat of the famine is the Volga region, in the heart of Soviet Russia, ordinarily a vast wheatfield stretching for hundreds of miles, unbroken by fences or boundaries. There has been complete failure of the crop in an area with a population of 19,000,000, and relative failure in eight other governments with a population of 29,000,000. Over the rest of Russia the harvest is considerably below the average. The governments most severely affected are Saratov, Samara, and Simbirsk, and famine has reached the Donetz basin, the chief source of Russia's coal supply, causing mine after mine to be closed down. From Moscow westwards the crops are fair, but to the east and south-east conditions are very bad and vast multitudes of people are fleeing hopelessly and aimlessly in any direction that takes them away from the parched fields. Thousands and tens of thousands are dying in their flight, millions are living upon grass, dry leaves, cakes of acorn powder and the bones of animals ground to a powder. Hunger brings frenzy, and there are grim stories of mothers drowning their children, and of whole villages electing to die by their own hands. As might have been expected pestilence is stalking in the track of the famine, and not the least serious element of the problem is the manner in which refugees are spreading cholera to all parts of Russia and even the surrounding States. From the medical point of view the position of Poland is particularly unenviable. By the Treaty of Riga Poles and Bolsheviks agreed to a mutual exchange 6*f their nationals and among the Polish subjects liable to extradition from Soviet territory were the peasants of White Russia, carried off in the great retreat of 1915. Even before the famine they were returning slowly to their homes, but since they have been unable to obtain food in Russia have been pouring into the receiving station at Baranovitchi at the rate of many thousands a day, and a million and a-half are expected to cross the frontier before the stream ceases.

Famine is, of course, one of the causes of this unprecedented disaster, but it is not the only and perhaps not the principal cause. M. Kerensky blames Soviet misrule even more than the drought for the complete ruin with which Russia is threatened, and the Social Revolutionaries of Moscow have issued a manifesto arguing that the real cause of the famine is the Bolshevik system. Even Lenin has not maintained the pretence that the famine is solely due to the drought. He attributes it in part to " seven years of imperialistic and civil war imposed upon the workers and peasants by the capitalists of the world" and to " superannuated farming methods." Yet by these " superannuated " methods European Eussia alone in the years immediately preceding the war produced more wheat and barley than any other country in the world. In 1912 the production of wheat was 104,693,000 quarters, and of barley 30,171,000 quarters. In addition, 112,891,000 quarters of oats were produced, and 113,362,000 quarters of rye. To these figures might be added the large returns from Russia in Asia, making the Russian Empire the largest producer of cereals in the world. And the harvests from 1913 to 1915, which covered the first period of the war, continued very good. Poor harvests even in good seasons have synchronised with the gradual breaking down of the economic system, for which the Bolsheviks have been mainly responsible. Bolshevik administration may be divided into three phases. In the first, lasting until about the end of 1919, there was a continuous effort to nationalise all industries except agriculture; in the second, lasting until the beginning of this year, compulsion and military discipline were used to convert the absenteeism and idling which had become characteristic of all the State workshops and factories. This year the Bolsheviks, having destroyed capital in mistake for capitalism, have re-established capitalism in many forms in order to restore the wealth they have squandered. On all these changes of policy the peasants have exercised a very strong influence. The peasants are not communists. They have steadily resisted all attempts at food nationalisation, and in order to defeat the confiscation policy of the Government they have gradually reduced their production to a minimum. Ever Bince the Bolsheviks came into power ' food in Russia has become scarcer and scarcer, and this scarcity partly accounted for the low industrial efficiency of the town workmen, precipitated the effort to impose industrial conscription, and finally led Lenin to sanction late last year a limited free trade in foodstuffs. There was no drought in Russia last year, and yet at the beginning of this year the food situation was very threatening. Peasants would not grow crops for the pleasure of witnessing their surplus confiscated by the State, and thus every rural district had made a practice of producing only sufficient for its own needs. An earlier concession of free trade in foodstuffs might have averted or mitigated the disaster, but Lenin repented too late. The peasants still distrusted Soviet promises and there was a great shortage of seed, so that from one cause or another

only a small area was sown this yew*.' Moreover, the-standard of agriculture had fallen off and every farmer knows that drought is especially severe on land that has not been properly cultivated. The drought which came this year would have caused grave hardship in Russia under any circumstances, but if production had been on its old level there would have been a surplus in the favoured districts more than sufficient to meet the needs of the famine area. If Russia had not suffered economic collapse there would have been transport to move wheat from one district to another. As it is there is no surplus anywhere in Russia, and owing to lack t>f transport the greatest difficulties will be experienced in distributing supplies from outside. The drought has ruined the crops in an important region of Russia, but it is the communist system which has condemned thousands of Russians to perish under the eyes of those who would help if Bolshevism had not destroyed the machinery of distribution as effectively as it has undermined the basis of production.