GERMAN MILITARY PARTY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, Issue 17336, 6 December 1919, Page 1 (Supplement)

GERMAN MILITARY PARTY.

WHAT CAN IT ACCOMPLISH? BY. LT.-COL. A. A. GRACE, N.Z.F.A. RESEKVE. There was nothing more certain, ever since the signing of Peace, than that the German militarists will make a bid for power. It was clear to many .at the time that there should have been no Armistice with the Germans in November, 1918. The mistake is patent i now to everybody. Armistice may be exj tended to a chivalrous, beaten enemy, but ; not to barbarians such as were .Wilhelm's savage hordes. Marshal Foch should have been permitted to deal his annihilating stroke in the valley of the Moselle, between Metz and Strassbourg, and have given German militarism its death-blow. As it was, the lenient and gentle counsels of President Wilson prevailed, and the German Army was permitted to withdraw behind the line of the Rhine in good order, to march garlanded through the streets of Berlin with colours flying and bands playing, as though, victorious. That army, though temporarily disbanded, has lost little of its prestige in Germany, and has retained all it 3 love of power. For fully 20 years the military caste governed Germany under the Kaiser. After their defeat a year ago the heads of that caste stepped aside for a time, and allowed the Republicans to perform the ignominious service of concluding a shameful peace, but no one who is endowed with a spark of intelligence imagines for a moment that we have finished with the German military party. Never in the history of the world did there exist so complete, so thorough, so efficient a system as the German militarists' system. It pervaded and controlled every class and coterie of the State. It was predominant, absolute, omnipresent, indefatigable, ever-active, overwhelming, the perfect, finished system of government by Force. The strange thing was that the German people liked it. It suited their temperament. It saved them the trouble of thinking for themselves, it ordered all their affairs wisely and well. All they had to do was to obey, and they liked to obey. The system gloried in pomp and show and gorgeous uniforms and orders and brass bands and titles and all the gaudy ceremony affected by the hundred-and-one courts of the multifarious dukes, princelets, and kings who represented and upheld the system in every nook and corner of the land. It must be realised that the German people did not count, except as grist for the military mill. Of course they must be placated, be made comfortable, so that they might increase and the excellent plan of municipal government was the result. They liked the evidence of power exhibited in the Kaiser, the visible and tremendous might of the Army, the arrogant and vociferous claims "to national superiority which they were encouraged to make. The proof of these contentions is to be found in the unanimity with which the entire German people backed the Kaiser and the military caste, when they iniquitously invaded France and Belgium.

A Lost Omnipotence. To-day matters are changed decidedly. The military caste has lost its omnipotence;, no one in Germany oelieves it can conquer anything; but nevertheless no one in Germany can deny that, in the domestic economy of the country, that caste is the greatest political factor. It must b e clearly understood that the caste is free in the minds of the German people from the stigma of defeat, because there was no spectacular and annihilating victory won by the Allies. The militarists are considered by the people to have done very well in extricating themselves from the hopeless position in which they were situated, on the west side of the .Rhine, in the face of overwhelming odds. lam of that opinion myself, but I find the cause, not in any cleverness in the German militarists, but in the mistaken leniency of President Wilson and the political leaders of the Allies. German militarism should have been smashed irretrievably. We could, and should, have taken a million German prisoners on the west side of the Rhine. The German territory from the Rhine t*.- Berlin and Dresden should have been occupied by the armies of the Allies. It should have been demonstrated beyond argument or cavil that the German military ca»ie was helpless, powerless, crushed, broken, incapable, dead. The effect would have been twofold. As matters stand to-day it is quite clear that, though temporarily . eclipsed, the German military class is alive and full of vigour; tnat it will seek to restore the monarchical system of government; that it will try to cause endless trouble in reference to the terms of Peace which the Republican Government accepted; that it will be a hotbed of intrigue and trouble in Europe for years to come; and that so soon as it can do so with any chance of success it will seek revenge in the west, at the expense of France and Belgium, and recuperation in the east, at the expense of Russia. Minus Their Navy and Artillery. But we are most interested in what the German militarists could actually do, rather than what they "would like to do, if they were able to" seize the reins of government. Really there is not much that they could do. They could not inv.-jie France, for instance, or Belgium: it i.-> doubtful if they could even, cross the Rhine. It must be remembered that they have lost the greater part of their artillery, that their great arms factories at Essen are dominated by the Allies, and could be destroyed by Ihem in a few days. The German air service has ceasrd to exist. They possess, doubtless, sufficient small arms to equip a million men and more, and small arms' ammunition in proportion : but an army of infantry could not succeed in driving" the Allies from tho line of the Rhine. On the sea they are helpless. Their fleet has ceased to exist. Immediately they made trouble their coastline would be closely blockaded, and probably an army could b.- landed on their coast, and the Allies could move towards Berlin. An Economical Blockade. Economically Germany is used up, and can only recuperate by 're-establishing her transmarine commerce. This she cannot do except by permission of the Allies. She could do nothing effective in the west, and if she tried to recoup herself at the expense of Russia, the Allies would t;.ke such action by land and sea as would quickly bring her to her senses. All the militarist party could do, if it is successful in retraining power, would be to organise the country tor defence with a view to defying the Allies and repudiating the Treaty of Peace. But even so the result would be the same—-the economical blockade of Germany, and aggressive action against her by land and sea. It must hp remembered that to-day Germany stands alone, and a much-weakened tifrmany at that; whereas the Allies consist of all the Powers which were her enemies, together with such Powers as have joined the League of Nations. Manifestly Germany cannot wage war successfully against the Id inarms. We may expect to see much infernal trouble, and (■veil civil war, in Geimany; we may very likely see the military caste again in power, with a Hohenzollern once more seated 1,11 the Prussian throne; but we need not fear for many years to come the development of a military power in Germany whiih w»l be in any way comparable with the German military power of 1414. Though much disguised r>y the alleviation of the Armistice, Germany's defeat was in reality decisive. If the Germans do not realise that positive fact, thev would quickly be made to recognise it 'if thev were foolish enough to defy tie .Miles. and to seek methods of revenue. For ourselves, however, we must remain awake to the fact that while the German military caste exists, and while a prmcelet or e.x-king remains to lend it, there will never 'ease to be in Germans' the elements of revanche, tintiritiL'lv vigilant, constantly conspiring, alwavs working openly and surreptitiously for the re-establishment of Kaiserkm, and thirsting for revenge.