COMMANDER AND CABINET.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LVI, Issue 17179, 5 June 1919, Page 7

COMMANDER AND CABINET.

FRENCH'S REVELATIONS.

PROPOSED COAST OFFENSIVE.

[REJECTION OF THE SCHEME. Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. (Red. 7. 15 p.m.) LONDON. May 23 (delayed). Lord French, in a further article in the Daily Telegraph, states that in September he formed the opinion that it would be extremely desirable to push along the coast northward, and drive the Germans from the sea. Mr. Winston Churchill enthusiastically supported the idea, and promised absolutely devastating naval support. French anticipated that Marshal Joffre and the French Government would oppose the. plan. Mr. Winston Churchill on December 8 wrote stating that Kitchener M 1 fully agreed to the plan, nr »:«d ■ 11>r the Twenty-seventh Division to effect it. Objections of Joffre.

The Cabinet next rlav slrontr'y urged the plan upon the French Government, which referred :':e question to JofTre. Ho rejected it, as ho had'another elsewhere, which, says French, proved a very feeble substitute. Mi*. Winston Churchill continued to press the matter, urging French again to put the Admir-. alty's views before J off re. ;

Kitchener, in a memorandum on January 0, 1915, showed that ill;/ War Council had abandoned the coastwise advance on the grounds that it would he too costly and would extend the line too far. Heavy reinforcements could not he furnished without disorganismg general arrangements. A sufficient supply of ammunition was not available to ensure carrying the project through to a conclusion, though every effort was being; made in all parts of the world in order to obtain an unlimited supply. The council also anticipated a strong German attack in the near future, which could bet-, ter be resisted in the existing pre-, pared positions. French disagrees . with these objections seriatim. He mentions that large train loads of ammunition traversed France a few I months later, bound for the Dartla-1 nellcs. i I Seeking Other Theatres. j Lord French considered these rea-' sons for rejecting the plan for a coastal attack illoeical. Probablv the true explanation would be found in the War Council's memorandum of January P, in which the view was' expressed that the operations on the west front would probably develop into a stalemate* stating it. would bo necessary to find another j theatre of war where more decisive i results could be obtained, and in- 1 viting French's opinions. French replied, discussing all possible theories, including Gnllipoli. He said an attack on Turkey would be • devoid of decisive result. The only 1 decisive theatre was Germany itself. I He added: "It is quite feasible to break the German line with a suffi- j ciency of guns and high explosive , shells. In any case it would be j unsafe to withdraw troops from the . western front, which is vital, and , where alone decisive results can be | obtained." _ I Marshal J oft re expressed the final j opinion that it was necessary to be prepared for a German offensive in , the near future. The front must be : made absolutely secure. The Allies must be ready to assume the offensive. Reserves were absolutely necessary. All secondary operations, including a Flanders coast | attack, must give way. French' concludes by saying he always dis-1 agreed with these views, and re-, mains convinced that his plan should i have been accepted and tried, j whereas those actually employed onlv resulted in feeble and nnsuc-1 ecsfiil attempts to break the Herman line and in absolute failure at J the Dardanelles.