THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1918. LUDENDORFF'S DECISION.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16971, 3 October 1918, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1918. LUDENDORFF'S DECISION.

The remarkable success which is now attending allied arms is a legacy from those heroic days of March, April, and May, when British and French fought against heavy odds and Marshal Foch nursed his re-

serves with more regard for the future than for the present. Manpower is clearly at the root of the wonderful transformation which has taken place, and in seeking the causes of the change equal honour must be given, to the devoted armies of Britain and France, which fought for time, and to the new army of America, which came to readjust the doubtful balance with a speed which was. not anticipated by either friend or foe. ,The information that the enemy has bad to disband twenty divisions to reinforce the. others is significant j the authoritative statement that Marshal Foch has gone far, towards exhausting the German reserves is momentous; but the clearest measure of the ..enemy's acute shortage; of : men is found; in the s events of the'« past few days. The abandonment of Passchendaele Badge and the Chemin des Dames

almost in a day is undoubted evidence that General Ludendorff could not, spare,-the v men necessary,, to. defend them. It. took the British five months to capture, the one and ! the French six months to conquer' the-J other, and there is no reason why the Germans should not have held them for .ah equal time this

year if they could have found enough divisions,to man them properly. •It was a direst .trial of strength. There was no considerable element of . surprise at either point. The! Allies' launched four first-class offensives almost simultaneously and maintained pressure on ■ the whole line. Under < this test, more severe 'than it had yet) sustained, the German army , broke. : The high command appears ;to have disposed ■■' its reserves in the Cambrai and Champagne sectors 'and at , the other points the > Allies had an easy triumph. ,:');•

The situation is full of promise because of this failure of German manpower. There isno occasion for dismay: because the cables constantly report that behind the fortified front which has been captured there is another, arid yet another. Neither machinery nor trenches can save the enemy when his man-power fails. The. Hagen line will fall as the Hindenburg < line fell, . and • the Volker defences will prove as vulnerable as Passchendaele. Ridge when the German reejrves are exhausted. The enemy is suffering the penalty of his wild gamble of the spring. Had he been content to remain on the defensive all the year, he would still have had substantial reserves. By electing to attack he sacrificed his chance of successful defence if the offensive should fail. Even before Marshal Foch retaliated, the enemy's,,man-power difficulties Were becoming plain. To them were due the long delays between his separate efforts, oven as the rapidity of the Allies' blows is now due to abundance of men. The enemy reached the climas of his offensive in the Champagne on July 15, in an attack which was on an even greater scale than the first attack of March 21, and he had then only thirty fresh divisions left.; The Champagne attack failed disastrously because the French knew it was coming, and had perfected new tactics, to meet it. The defensive had been organised in great depth; there had been a secret retirement, and only advanced batteries and scattered elements held the front against which the Germans advanced. The enemy launched a blow into the void, and the French guns ruined nearly a quarter of a million of his infantry. From this check he never recovered. His remaining reserves proved incapable of regaining the initiative, and since then they have been severely depleted, without in any way affecting the ability of the Allies to continue at the tremendous pace they have set.

Speed is the dominant characteristic of the present offensive. Attack comes hot on the heels of attack, and the battle has a continuity and intensity which argue abundance of troops, great mobility resulting from the efficient organisation of roads and railways, and a sound intelligence service. The Allies are using their superiority in arms and munitionment to render a larger aid larger section of the

front fluid, to make the enemy uncertain where the next blow will fall, and to keep his reserves perpetually in motion between one threatened point and another. The pressure is mental and moral as well as physical.! The whole German army is being harried, from the ranks to the high command, which is compelled daily to decide between losing Cambrai or Passchendaele Ridge, holding the Champagne or the Chemin des Dames. The means employed are material, but the whole effect is aimed at the human factor. Sooner or later the German soldier will collapse under the , strain; sooner or later the high' command, even if it makes no fatal mistake under the pressure of quick decision, will find the means at its hand insufficient for defence. Its only safety lies in retreat to a shorter line, even if this mean's evacuating the whole of Northern France and portion of Belgium. - There are indications that General Ludendorff has already taken this decision, although he would do anything to defer it till the winter comes to cover his retreat. For his part, Marshal Foch is striving to pin the enemy to his present front, or alternatively to overwhelm the retreat before it can turn to organised resistance on a new front.,