THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1918. THE GERMAN RETIREMENTS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16921, 6 August 1918, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1918. THE GERMAN RETIREMENTS.

. The scries of German retirements j which are reported this morning con- ; firm previous indications that the I war has entered a new phase. Roth j on the British and French fronts the i enemy is moving backwards at selected points, thus surrendering : ground gained earlier in the year at I great cost. Tho local retirements | are between the Ancre and the Somme Rivers, and near Montdidier, at the great angle of the line, on fronts of four and ten miles respectively. They are probably due to the enemy's desire to secure better defensive positions against the continual raids and local attacks which have taken place on these sectors. Between Soissons and Rheims the much more extensive retreat which has already contracted the Marne salient continues, and so rapid has been the progress of the Allies that it is certain the enemy cannot stand on the Vesle, his hold on which is already insecure, and doubtful if he will rest on the Aisne. There is a . strong defensive line north of the river, on which the Germans met the i ' I French offensive of April last year, including the ridgo carrying the Chemin des Dames, and should the enemy elect to fall back on this, . his only difficulty will be in covering the comparatively open country between Craonne and Rheims, over which his left flank will have to retire. It will probably be found, when the full facts of the battle of the salient are known, that allied airmen have been able for the first time to exercise a determining influence on a great action. It is clear, from the daily communiques, that they caused constant interruption of the enemy's communications by destroying bridges across the Aisne and the Vesle, and the effect of this on a salient where a great j army was concentrated must have been disastrous. Tho French General Staff regards the most important function of the air service as the j isolation of the sector of the enemy's 1 front under attack by making com- , j munication by road or railway imJ | possible. No side has yet estabi | lished a sufficiently definite superij ority to accomplish this, but it ap- ; J pears that in the Marne salient allied ' j airmen came nearer the ideal than ever before. At the root of every German retirement, great and small, is manpower. Every reliable evidence tears testimony to the difficulty the enemy command is experiencing in continuing an offensive policy with dwindling reserves against the reinforced Allied armies. The Germans commenced their campaign with a superiority on the whole front of 25 per cent, or more. The French Premier spoke of an excess of 50 divisions, and British critics have estimated that in March the Germans had 200 divisions and the Allies 160. In two offensives against the i British the Germans suffered at least | half a million casualties, and the in- _ j terval which elapsed before they at- ! tacked on the Aisne is ascribed to <• 1 the necessity they experienced of l waiting till the lighter cases came 1 i back from the hospitals to restore i their mass of manoeuvre. In his ! more recent effects the enemy has 0 1 suffered another half-million casual 3 ' ties, making a million in all. The ! Allies have also lost heavily, hut. 1 not so heavily as the Germans, and ° ; they have been able to replace all casualties and add to reserves by re turns from hospitals and American " ! reinforcements, which have liumo I bored nearly a million during the { I campaign. Fresh British drafts ! have also arrived, but no information ; has been given of their numbers. To * 1 offset this, Germany has had recruitr : meat only from her 1920 class, lads . ; born in 1900, and, therefore, a little ? | over or a little under eighteen years of age. It is improbable that she 5 | has b°en able to draw further rein- * 1 forcements from Russia since March, 3 I and it is even possible that she may have been forced by later events in i Russia and Italy to draw on the " western army. The 1920 class is, therefore, Germany's sole reservoir for recruitment. It should normally yield half a million soldiers,

but the class has been called so much earlier than is usual that its return , of fit recruits is a matter of speculation. These immature lads have already been reported behind the firing-line, but the. training of the i majority will continue till HeptemI ber. This is why doubt is being j expressed as to the ability of the J enemy to conduct another offensive j before that month. ' Ipto a certain point the German | position as regards man-power was . good, in spite of the arrival of Ameri-1 I can reinforcements. When the Aisne ' offensive was commenced strong ; reserves were retained by Prince ; Rupprecht's army, suggesting that j j the intention was to use them for j j a firm blow against the British. ! j'lhese reserves were not materially | weakened until the failure of the I last German offensive, but General 1 Foch's counter-attack, the battle of ' the salient, and the withdrawal have j put a severe strain on the enemy's j resources, and have entirely absorbed i the Crown Prince's reserves and ] , severely reduced those of Prince j i Rupprecht. When it is considered ; that more than one-third of the' j entire German Army has been en- j j gaged in the battle of the salient ' ; from first to last it will be realised ' that General Foch's strategy has 1 succeeded in an unexpected measure j in compelling the enemy to dissipate I his reserves. The Allies, although 1 still numerically inferior over the I whole front, now have, for the first , time this year, fresh reserves outnumbering the enemy's. In these : circumstances any new German offensive would appear to be foredoomed to failure. Nevertheless, it 1 , may be that the enemy will attempt j another blow, and that General 1 ! Foch. who has shown a rare com-1 | hination of prudence and audacity, j j may encournec him to dissipate his! i strength in this manner. If the Ger- ! man army on the Aisne finally exi tricates itself from the salient and reaches a strong line of defence, it "ill be able, despite heavy losses, to spare divisions for the reconstituI tion of reserves. The very difficult j Question the rulers of Germany, I political and military, will then have 1 I to decide is whether to risk everv.l thing on a final gamble or conserve | their forces fur defensive purposes, : Already two views are enunciated in ! Germany, one being that the war must end this year, whatever the result, and the other that it will continue through next year. It is impossible to forecast with any confidence which counsel will prevail, but , the enemy's movements during the autumn and winter will provide the answer. Whenever the Germans finally abandon the offensive it is 1 certain they will rectify their front by a number of retirements, some on , considerable scale, in order to elimi- ( nate the salients threatening their , safety at other points than south of the Aisne. Hindenburg may elegantly compare the Americans with • black troops but all Germany knows 1 that the Americans will avenge this i and more material insults next year. > It is still an open question whether L Germany will fight to the point of exhaustion this year or relinquish ' much of her recent gains in strategic -1 retirements to a defensive line which i j she will endeavour to render impregi j nable during the winter.