NOTES AND COMMENTS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16849, 14 May 1918, Page 4

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

THE "LIBERTY" ENGINE. Not the least contribution on the part of America to the war is what is known as the "Liberty" aircraft engine, the i successful completion of which was re- J cently announced. The story of the mak- ; ing of this engine reads like a romance. " I regard the invention and rapid develop- j ment of this engine as one of the really ; considerable accomplishments of the United States since its entry into the war," says the United States Secretary for War. A standard engine became the engineering objective. Two of the best engineers in the country, who had never before seen each other, were brought together at , Washington, and the problem of produc- I ing an all-American engine at the earliest | possible moment was presented to them- ; Their first conference, on June 3. lasted j from the afternoon until half-past two I o'clock in the morning. These two en- j gineers were figuratively locked in a room in a Washington hotel and charged with the development of an aeroplane engine for use by American aviators over the battlefields of Europe. For five days , neither man left the suite of rooms en- ■ gaged for them. Consulting engineers and draughtsmen from various sect ons of the country were brought to Washington to assist them.- Realising that the new design would be a Government design and no "firm or individual would reap selfish benefit because of its making, the motor manufacturers patriotically revealed their trade secrets and made available trade processes of great commercial value. A remarkable American engine was actually produced three weeks before any model could have hern brought from Europe. Parts of the first engine were turned out at 12 different factories, located all the way from Connecticut to California. When the parts were assembled the adjustment was perfect and the performance of the engine was wonderfully gratifying. UNITY OF ALLIED CONTROL. Mr. Lloyd George having announced that the decision of the Versailles Council in favour of unity of control of the allied armies on the western front was brought about mainly through representations made by the American military and civil delegates, it is permissible to explain in general terms how the American representatives were able to play such a dominating part in the Council. Long before the United States became a belligerent. Americans had seen the possibility of its doing so and had considered what in that case would be the role of the United States and

what would be required of it. These men were not armchair strategists. They w.'ie the best brains of the country, and they had been impressed with the disadvantage from which the allies suffered, because the war was being fought on the theory of separate campaigns instead of a single battlefront. These men did not form their conclusions from long-range deductions, but rather from close observation. Some of them had been at the front and others had the benefit of carefully drawn reports. Knowing these things, knowing what had been" so frequently discussed and speculated about in high places, it was easy to determine what the policy of the President would be and the direction in which his influence would be exerted. What was feared, both in the political and military departments of the Government, was that the coming into the war of the United States, instead of simplifying affairs, only created additional machinery for delay, as to the three Governments which were required to take consultative action before a decision could be reached there would be added a fourth, which made immediate agreement impossible, and in many instances speed meant the difference between success and failure. Colonel House and his associates went to London, and thence to Versailles. Roth in London and in Paris Colonel House, one of the most tactful cf men. with a sixth sense for the feeling and atmosphere of his surroundings, probably said to the Governments of England and France something to this effect:—"We are not going to interfere in the political affairs of Europe, because they are not our concern, and we are not going to tiy to make you believe that we are so foolish as to think that we know more about military matters than you do ; but we are coming into this war fresh, we are taking a new and outside view of it, and to us it seems necessary that there should be one control with plenary powers instead of an authority so divided that it rests nowhere. From certain political discussions the Americans remained aloof, but the necessity of winning the war by a decisive military action, by unity of action and co-ordination of effort, was pressed, with the result reached at the Versailles Conference.