THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, APRIL 12, 1918. THE ATTACK IN FLANDERS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16822, 12 April 1918, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, APRIL 12, 1918. THE ATTACK IN FLANDERS.

Foe nearly three years the sector from Armentieres to La Bassee has been one of the quietest on the western front. The lines marked by the opposing entrenchments have remained with scarcely any change as they were cstblished after the heavy fighting in the spring of 1915, when the attempt was made to strike at Lille and the centre of the German communications in tho west and Xcuve Chapelle and Festubert were captured. Two years ago the New Zealand infantry obtained their first experience of western front conditions in this sector, and they returned to it after playing their part in the Somme offensive. Now the Germans have attacked the defences of the Flemish plains, opening a battle which has already extended to the outskirts of last year's struggle beyond the Belgian border. The greatest weight appears to have been directed against the Portuguese force, which has thus been engaged for the first time in operations on the major scale. The sector affords no natural advantages for the defence. From the low ridge behind the German lino there stretches far to the east a great expanse of level country. The first break in this plain behind the British line was made by the River Lys and its tributary the Lawe, which the centre of the German attack has reached. But the defence having been firmly maintained on both flanks, the fighting has created a salient some nine miles wide at its base, narrowing to a front of three or four miles on the Lys, and just exceeding three miles in depth. As a result of the pressure further north Armentieres now stands in an awkward salient, and the abandonment of the ruined town is not improbable.

There is good reason for believing that this thrust in Flanders formed part of the original plan of campaign, though it was intended to make it in different circumstances. Had the first attack achieved its purpose by breaking the allied line and driving a great wedge to the sea between British I and French, the reserves in Belgium would probably have been used to strike another blow at the British army isolated in the north. But that plan having been frustrated, the German High Command has modified its tactics to conform with the new situation. It is possible that the new attack was designed merely to relieve the position on the main battlefield by compelling the allied to reinforce the line in Flanders with reserves intended for use, in Picardy. But in proportion to the dimensions of the central struggle any such subsidiary operation .would neceasarily be on a larger scale than diversions of a similar character which have been made in the past. In some respects this attack resembles the British offensive at Cambrai last November, which was made against a comparatively neglected portion of the front, and, apart from its other consequences, unquestionably absorbed German reserves already destined for the Italian front. The Armentieres sector does not cover any vital link in the British defences, but by gaining any considerable success in this region the Germans might hope not only to improve the prospects of their own plans but also to modify the, possible success of a counterstroke by the allies. So far as the main offensive is concerned the German advance has been arrested. One of the principal obstacles to further progress has been the British defence on tho Ancre, supported by the equally stubborn resistance of the French. While the line of the Ancre is held by the allies the Germans cannot develop their plans. They have endeavoured to turn it by striking at its northern flank, and failed to make any impression. Now they are seeking to break down that obstacle to their advance by attacking the sector between the British salients created by the offensives in 1917, endeavouring, by advancing astride the Lys, to weaken the British positions on the Flanders ridges in the north and the Vimy ridge in the south. The attack in Flanders iu directly complementary to the main offensive. No doubt it involves a diversion of strength from the principal aim, but for the time being it appears that only by such a subsidiary operation can the Germans open the way for the prosecution of their main plans. They have hammered at the allied defence in Picardy, but have failed to make any impression on it. By attacking in the north they hope to disturb the allies' plans, and to gain time for the preparation of a new offensive in the south. As soon as the Hermans consider that result has been accomplished it may be expected that the battle for Amiens will be renewed more violently, than ever.