THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1917. THE POSITION OF HOLLAND.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16590, 13 July 1917, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1917. THE POSITION OF HOLLAND.

The German offensive at Lombaertzyde, near the Belgian coast, and the heavy bombardment of the Belgian coast by British warships must be considered in connection with British plans for driving the enemy from Ostend, Zeebrugge, Blank enburghe, and other Belgian coastal towns which have been used as bases for submarine activity. These bases have been invaluable to the Germans because of their proximity to the Straits of Dover, to the mouth of the Thames, and to the east coast of England generally. It is understood that great efforts are being made to eradicate them, and the German offensive may bo regarded as an attempt to forestall a coastwise British advance or even to create a diversion by another attempt upon Calais. It has been asserted that the Germans, if driven from the Belgian coast-towns, intend to invade Holland and seize the Scheldt, which would be equally convenient as regards its situation, would be easily defended, and is the estuary which gives access to Antwerp. Without possessing the Scheldt the Germans could not be sure of being able to make use of Antwerp even as a , trading port, supposing that on the conclusion of the war they remained its masters. One of the objects of the Germans' world-war was to possess Belgium and Holland, including the Scheldt and the mouths of the Khine and the Meuse, while the desire to secure immediate control of Antwerp undoubtedly influenced them in their attack upon Belgium in August, 1914. Granted that they were prepared to risk Dutch resistance there would be nothing remarkable in their seizing the Scheldt even at this late period of the war, especially if the Belgian coastal-towns are rendered untenable by the British Navy.

If the Dutch Government acquiesced in the violation of its sovereign, rights Britain and her Allies would have to treat Holland as an enemy; if the Dutch decided to fight for their independence, Britain and her Allies would quickly send military aid to them. In either case, if the Germans should violate Dutch territory the Dutch would be forced into the war. There is not much doubt if

Germany were to invade Dutch territory that its sturdy people would copy the example of the Belgians and fight for their independence, the more especially because the military strength of Germany is visibly waning and that of the Great Alliance is visibly increasing. The Dutch could bring into the war the strength of a nation six millions strong. Their army, on a war footing, consists of about 200.000 troops, and could be increased, if the necessary provision*} have been made, to over half-a-million without interfering with the essential industries of the country. The Germans possess facility for invading Holland northward from Antwerp and Turnhout and westward from Gronau, Epe, Ahaus, and Bocholt, all of which towns are conveniently situated on the Westphalian system of railways. Britain, possessing command of the sea and vast re-

serves on British soil, could transport to Holland two army corps, or 100,000 troops, in fifteen hours, and could and would subsequently pour into Hsilazid all the troops necessary to preserve Dutch independence. The apparent result of a German invasion of Holland, so far as the Germans are concerned, would be that they would increase the length of then- battle-frontage by a hundred miles or so, and that they would require to keep in the new field from 500,000 to 1,000,000 troops, which they can ill afford to do.

But besides the military aspect of the question there is the naval

aspect. Dutch territorial waters would be opened to the British Navy. Co-operating with the Dutch Navy, British flotillas would operate both inside and to seaward of the West Frisian Isles with a view to attacking the German bases inside the East Frisian Isles. The utilisation of Dutch territorial waters would also allow the British to carry into effect schemes of amphibious warfare which would permit them to turn the. northern flank of the German armies in Holland, and to strike at Oldenburg and Hanover to prevent this the Germans would either have to extend immensely J their lines in Holland, or to hold in

reserve strong armies for the protection of their own territory. At first sight it may seem a simple thing for the Germans to seize the Scheldt in lieu of the untenable coastaltowns of Flanders, yet the seizure would almost certainly plunge Germany into such difficulties as would tax her military strength to the utmost, weakening her defence in the east against the Russians and in the west against the French and British, to such an extent as to put in jeopardy her hope of preventing the invasion of her own territory. It would certainly hasten the termination of the war.