THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1917. GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16507, 5 April 1917, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1917. GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

It appears that the revolution in Russia has created in Germany a thirst for self-government. This is not a- movement likely to bo welcomed by the Kaiser and his Government, but since it has arisen it is not surprising to find it being used in the interests of the German peace which is the present goal of all classes in Germany. A new peace offer is expected from Berlin, and an American message says it will be based on universal manhood suffrage in Germany, with Cabinet responsibility to Parliament, This suggestion may be a I German effort to meet halfway the movement started in France for an allied declaration that there shall b ; no peace with the Hohenzollerns. Evidently a considerable section of Germans have grasped the idea that a change in Germany towards democracy would be a steppingstone to peace. We may take this as evidence that some glimmering of the Allied cause, and of the Allied determination to fight for that cause until it has been won, has penetrated even to Germany. While recognising this, we need not, however, accept at their face value German professions of admiration for democratic forms of government. If the, German Government made the war, the German people entered upon it' with enthusiasm, and gave it unanimous support so long as it appeared that Germany would win, and that all Germans would share in the spoils. It is not to be supposed, therefore, that any change of government, or any curtailment of the rights and privileges of the Kaiser, can absolve the German people from responsibility for the war. The mere promise of a change in the form of government would not, of course, be regarded by the Allies as more than a German "scrap of paper." Even an accomplished revolution would not necessarily change the heart of Germany. The overthrow

of (lie German rulers or the curtailment of their powers might result from Germany's. need to find a scapegoat, but when the revolution had been accomplished there would remain unsatisfied the Allied demands for "restitution, reparation, and guarantees." If the internal change was sufficiently drastic to be accepted by the Allies as a guarantee, it would remain for the German democracy to make restitution and reparation. It is apparent that the Kaiser is not at present thinking of either restitution or reparation. He is still contemplating an indemnity of six hundred millions sterling from France, and while lie solaces himself with the thought of indemnities it js unlikely that he will voluntarily make any such concessions to the German peoplo as the American message suggests. It seems unlikely that the German movement towards a change in constitutional form is more than an effort on the part of the Government to suppress internal dissension. So far as it has any bearing upon the, war, it can be no more —if it emanates from the Government at Berlin—than another effort to influence opinion in the Allied countries with a view to securing a German peace. ,

While the German rulers arc using the movement for their own ends, there is, no doubt, a serious demand for reform in Germany. The franchise for the Reichstag is liberal, but the Reichstag itself is little more than a debating society, with exceedingly limited powers. The ono power it has directly bearing on tlio of voting supplies —it has never exercised. The claim for a wider franchise applies more to the State Parliaments than to the Reichstag. In a great number of the States, most notably in Prussia, the voting power is in the hands of a few, and the Bundesrath, whose powers are greater than those of the Reichstag, consists of delegates from flic States instructed by the State ' Governments. The Government can always count upon support in the Bundesrath, and so long as it can resist the demand for a lepresentative Cabinet it. can always, by giving privileges and concessions to some of the rival parties, secure a majority vote in the Reichstag. In the last resort it can follow the example of Bismarck and rule without the Reichstag, although, in the present state of feeling. in Germany, that might be a dangerous expedient.