THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 1917. GERMAN OFFENSIVES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16500, 28 March 1917, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 1917. GERMAN OFFENSIVES.

Unless we assume that the German military organisation is able in the middle of war to completely transform its inherited and acquired habits of thought and to entirely reconstruct its strategical conceptions, we must expect it to make every conceivable effort to renew the offensive at some point or other. It is possible, of course, that the Allies may push the offensive on every front with such energy that no strong German counter-offensive can be made and that the strength of the enemy will bo exhausted in a desperate attempt to gain time by defensive action. But tho German is peculiarly the creature of his technical training and of his authorised text-books; he has been taught that success lies with the strong attack and that even in defensive strategy the massed offensive is a reliable weapon. Turning to the Allies, it is pre-eminently worthy of note that the new French commander-in-chief, General Nivelle, is the great exponent of carefully-prepared offensives, supporting artillery action of iiresistible intensity. General Joffre was unrivalled in defensive war; his transference from the field to the war council emphasises the belief of France that the long need for a saving defence is over at last and that the stage of victorious advance has been reached. The Russian uprising against pro-German and antinational influences, with trreir hampering of the Army and wilful embarrassment of national organisation, undoubtedly preludes a vast military movement for the expulsion of the invaders and the crushing of the "predatory state" of Prussia. Great Allied offensives, both east and west, are therefore to be confidently expected. The impact of opposing hosts during 1917 promises to surpass all precedents, even the astounding precedents of 1914, 1915, and 1916. We may .dismiss as mere bombast intended to reassure the disappointed and desponding German nation the claim of officially-inspired German publications that the retirement at the Somme and Aisne is the setting of a trap for the French and British. It is evidently the wisest step possible under the circumstances, but it was compelled by Allied pressure and by the waning man-power of Germany and her vassals. Granted that the Germans are able to withdraw without extraordinary losses to the positions designated by the General Staff at Berlin, a number of divisions would be released from the immediate necessity of front-holding and a mobile army would thus be mado available for an offensive campaign. Any such German offensive would in the nature of things be a desperaate resource and not to be judged by ordinary principles of strategy. The theory would obviously be that, while Allied attacks were held at bay for some months and penalised as much as possible for ground yielded to them, some blow might b<; struck in a vital quarter the effect of which blow would be to induce the indefinite peace that would leave tho Prussian military organisation unbroken and every small state in Europe convinced of Germany's invincibility. Both in tho west and in the east there are two points at which German strategists might conceivably hope to strike with effect, as is recognised by Allied critics, who do not doubt that the Allies would bring such schemes to naught. It is surmised that the German General Staff may still plan a desperate offensive against Dunkirk and Calais in the hope of closing the Straits of Dover, securing ideal bases for submarines, and enabling the " High Sea Fleet" to escape from the' Kiel Canal to a sheltered base from which it may threaten the Channel, as well as the North Sea, The coordination of such a military adventure with the submarine campaign is self-evident, but a scheme that failed late in 1914—thanks to the utter self-devotion of Belgians, British, and French—can be viewed with equanimity in the spring of 1917. The other western point which German strategy may be considering is that towards tho Swiss border, where the French trenches are withit- forty miles of the Rhine. The attack upon Verdun was strategically intended to break the French front in this direction and to carry the war into the heart of France. I Our French friends held them here in the summer of 1914, foiled thorn at Verdun last year, and are sup- J posed to be contemplating an advance through Alsace during the' Doming months, so that any German I offensive in this quarter can now hardly do more than gain time. On the east are the so-far abortive Ger- j man plans for marches from Riga to | Petrograd and from the Danube . to r Odessa. What might ,' have been ' iccomplished in these ; , directions with traitors in ( office ■at Petrograd .' md supplies deliberately withheld crom. the ; army by pro-German igents ; must j necessarily . be • different "■ to what is possible- ; ; to German ' strategists • dealing. ; with ' a .■ reorganised and regenerated Russia, , I —*—■*—■«~—"———t—.*.,- •.■■■:-■.-,„■•:.... . -■