THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CHOSE THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1917. GERMAN OFFENSIVES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16483, 8 March 1917, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CHOSE THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1917. GERMAN OFFENSIVES.

The strenuousness with which the British Government is gathering every available man into the army assures us that we can do our local duty with absolute confidence that every effort is being made at Homo to prepare for all eventualities. With Britain and her Allies energetically preparing for great campaigns in the coming months, we sco that Germany is filled with rumours of some great offensive being planned by the redoubtable Hindonburg. This warns us that tho conflict will be increasingly bitter, but need otherwise cause no great apprehension among tho Allies, tfindenburg is an able soldier possessed of extraordinary driving power, but the success of his great advance into Russia in the summer of 1915 was as largely attributable to the unpreparedness of the Russian armies and their lack of proper equipment as to his military prowess. Beyond Germany, where the name of Hindenburg awakens an enthusiasm approaching to fanatical devotion, the German General-in-Chief is regarded more as tho personification of all that is strong and determined in the German character than as tho embodiment of military genius. That he will strike boldly at his enemies as long as ho has tho power to strike, goes without saying, but i that power depends not on his own will and determination but on his ability to maintain in tho field armies of a size sufficient to allow him to act aggressively. It is generally agreed that thirty per cent, of the male population of Germany has been already called to the colours, and that about one-half of this number have become casualties, in one way or another. The armies of Germany cannot further be enlarged except by enrolment of the immature, the aged, and tho medically unfit, as is certainly intended by tho levy en masse. If Hindenburg is able to increase the size of his forces it will be at the expense of their physical efficiency. The new levies of inferior quality may be of some uso in purely defensive warfare, but they can be of little use in such aggressive operations as those which are supposed to be in contemplation. The German armies may possibly comprise at the end of the winter some five million seasoned troops with from two to three million men of non-military age, called to the colours by the mass levy. This is the utmost that can be placed at Hindenburg's disposal. Against these seven or eight million Germans may bo placed six million Franco-British troops in the West, or immediately in reserve, with an indefinite number of Russians in the East. The Italians on the Austrian south-west border, General Brussiloff's armies of Galicia, and the Russo-Roumanian army, and General Sarrail's army of Macedonia, may be considered as more than an offset to the Austrians and Bulgarians in the field. In any case it is not with the Austrians and Bulgarians that Hindenburg can propose to effect his great offensive. Plainly he must bring his great blow to bear against the Kussiaus, or against the Franco-British if he hopes to terminate tho war suddenly. Even with the use of convenient internal lines he will find it extremely difficult to concentrate on cither the eastern or western battle-front a sufficient force to give him preponderance, without weakening himself so materially on lines remote, from his point of attack as to render himself open to decisivo defeat on those remote lines. Hindenburg, like every other general, is no stronger than his army. Under his leadership the Germans will fight desperately, but if, for instance, they attack Sir Douglas Haig, not only will the French be able to support the British, bat they will be able to carry out an offensive of their own against the Germans from the Champagne, or Lorraine, or Alsace. Meanwhile tho German armies of the East, ' weakened to enable such an opera- ' tion in the West to be carried out, ! ] would be attacked by superior Rus- ! sian armies. To state the position ' briefly, while the armies of Hinden-1 J burg could carry out a major offen-i , sive on ono sector the Franco- i ; British-Russian armies could carry I, out major offensives on at least two ( sectors simultaneously. One major ( offensive would tax Hindenburg's i strength to the utmost and deplete: t his armies elsewhere, but two major I offensives of the Allies would leave < them with ample reserves with which! i to strengthen any part of their lines * which might need reinforcement, j ( Of course, the unexpected may hap-1 , pen. Instead of operating against! ] the British, French, or Russians, I ', nindeuburg may strike at Italy as ! \ the weakest member of the Allied] combination. But if this movement! i should bo made not only could the 1 r Italians be reinforced from France, 1 i but simultaneous major aggrcssives I by the Russian and Franco-British j l armies would tend to weaken Hin- a denburg's operations in the south- 1 r west. In any case, whatever may • ( be the plans of Hindenburg, it is 11 probable that by forestalling him ' the Allies may snatch from him that I ] initiative which would enable him * to act offensively, and may compel B him by their vigorous offensives to a conform to their operations, ~, 11

• t FEDERAL DISSOLUTION. - "';,<- *'V.'.~" .** ' .'. ...".'' : ■:■."•-,'', .-■. ';.>'. f ■'-''■'■. It is sincerely to: be hoped that the i depressing '■' chapter in Australia's political history v which began with the rejection of the conscription re-j ferendum will be closed by the ' approaching elections. Whatever may have been the final reason that decided the Ministry in favour of an immediate election, it appears that the leaders of the anti-conscrip-tion movement have convinced themselves that the majority cast against conscription will carry their party to power. They have retained control of the Labour Party "machine," and have shown great anxiety to bring about such a congest as is approaching before Mr. Hughes and his loyal followers can perfect their organisation. Ministerialists, on the I other band, are confident that a ; substantial majority of Australians will support the National Party which has been formed to organise Australian energy for war purposes. Tho test between the parties will' in all probability be decided upon i tho Senate elections. Only half the j • members of tho Senate go to the j 1 poll. In tho Senate each state has j equal representation, tho members i being returned by a block vote taken throughout tho State. The conscription referendum was carried by three states—Victoria, Tasmania, I i and West Australiaand rejected I by three—New South Wales, South, 1 Australia, and Queensland. A j i heavy anti-conscription majority was j ' recorded in New South Wales. In , South Australia and Queensland j the majorities were narrow. A ; strenuous fight will no doubt be made to carry doubtful states, and there are probabilities of considerable changes in the personnel of the Senate. In Victoria, which gave a| ! majority for conscription, all tho re- j j tiring senators. are anti-conscrip-j tionists. Here, as in all the states' ' with the exception of New South j Wales, the prospects of the Ministerialists are considered bright. It |is hoped that as a result of tho ; contest the Ministry will havo a strong following in the House of , Representatives, and at least a I working majority in the Senate.