THE ROUMANIAN CAMPAIGN

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16408, 9 December 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE ROUMANIAN CAMPAIGN

THE STROKE AND COUNTERSTROKE.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. A. GRACE, X.Z.F.A.

\\ in- v the Teutons were successful in piercing the Roumanian line of resistance in Western Wallachia, apparently in the neighbourhood of -lie Vulcan Pass, and thus endangered the bi.es of communi--1 aion of tiie Roumanian army operating in tin vicinity of Orsova. it was a foregone i onciusion th.it the vh- !e of Western '\\all<uhia would have to be abandoned to the enemy. Simultaneously Mackensen was preparing to cross the Danube at points 40 to 50 miles south and southwest of Bucharest, anil by effectually carrying out this manceuvre lie threatened not only the capital, bin the lines of communication of all the Roumanian armies i ''elating west of the capital. As a necessary sequence. the Roumanian General Staff i- obliged to 'orm its western armies on a front facing wc. l ' and extending southward from the Moldavian front to Bucharest. In any cast., directly the Roumanians lost the power to maintain the aggressive and were forced to assume the defensive, it was plain'that the configuration of their battle-front made a successful defence along their original line almost impossible, and that if they could not resume the offensive they would be. forced to straighten their front sooner or later in the manner they are now adopting.

Defence of Bucharest.

. At the time of writing the Teuton front, from the Bodzai Pass, almost due north of Bucharest, to the south of that fortified city, forms a vast semi-circle, about 200 miles in extent, and the Roumanian armies of Wallachia appear tn be retreating in good order to the line of the Prahova, using their interior lines with advantage and effecting their retirement without undue loss. But the manoeuvre is one of extreme difficulty, and if it is effected without serious loss it will be by a miracle of good generalship and because of the efficiency and discipline of the Roumanian troops. But, however that may be, it is tolerably certain that there will be very serious lighting around Bucharest and on the Prahuva. After the fall of such fortresses as Antwerp, Liege. Xainur. Novo and other similarly strong places, it is not to be expected th.it Bucharest, if left to itself, would fare am better than other fortresses whielv-jiave fallen before the Teuton guns : but if Bucharest is turned into a huge entrenched camp, and is defended in the same manner and with the same determination as characterised the Allies' defence of. say. the line of the Yser. then it well may be that the eastward advance of the Teutons may be permanently interlupted at this point. Tn such circumstances Bucharest would form a pivot of manoeuvre which might possibly be used with signal effect, more especialk- in connection with the Bulgarian campaign, whether the operations should take the form of defence or attack. Mackensen's object appears to be to force his wav to the east of the city and to cut the railway ■which connects the capital with Chernavoda and- with the northern railway system. It is, too early to say whether or no he will be successful, but, if so, it may be pointed out that the "fortress is connected by : means of another railway with •the north and Russia, via Ploeski, on the -Prahova.

The Bussian Offensive.

But while these very important operations are being carried out on the Wallachian Plains it must not be supposed that matters are at a standstill elsewhere in Roumania. From the Jablonitza Pass, in the Galician Carpathians, to the Bodzai Pass—that is, along a front of 200 miles— the Russians have assumed the offensive and are reported to have advanced to. and occupied, dominating heights. This movement is, of course, the correct counterstroke to the Teuton advance into the Wallachian Plain, for, if carried to a successful conclusion, it will cut the lines of communication of Falkenhayn's armies operating in Wallachia. It may also be noted that the Moldavian front presents many advantages to Russia, not the least of which is the ease with which the Russian armies operating upon that front can be reinforced, via Jassy and Czernovitz. A determined aggressive on this sector would also he in conformity with the strategy which has characterised General BrussilofTs operations in Galicia and Bukowina.

Roumania's Mistake

Of course, it is indicative T>7 either the numerical inferiority of the RussoRoumanian armies or of the superiority of Teuton generalship, that Mackense'n should have been able to cross the Danube and strike at the Roumanians' lines of communication rather than, as might very well have been the case, that the RussoRoumanians should have crossed the Danube and have struck at Mackensen's lines of communication. Such a movement on the part of troops under the command of General Averescu would have been completely in accord with his general plan of campaign, which was distinctly one of aggression, so much so that he does not seem to have taken the ordinary precautions, which are usually adopted in su' '< , ircumstances, for turning his campaign into one of defence in :ase of necessity. Why he did not attempt seriously to carry out such a decisive manoeuvre as that of crossing the Danube and striking at Mackensen's lines of communication can be explained only by the insufficiency of his numbers or by the elimination of Bulgaria entirely from his campaign of aggression. It is evident that the neglect of dealing with Bulgaria effectually at the beginning of the campaign and before the Roumanians were thoroughly committed to their aggressive movements in Transylvania, was one. of the major causes of those movements ending abortively:

Possibilities of Campaign. At the same time it mav be pointed nut that with the Teuton armies placed as they are in the Wallachian Plans instead of on the line Orsova-Vulcsji Pass-Predeal Pass, the possibilities of a successful advance of the Russian armies from the wooded Carpathian Mountains of Western Moldavia are immensely increased. Indeed, it would seem that there is every possibility of that advance becoming a matter of great importance, and that it may develop into the long-contemplated major offensive of the Tsar's armies. In any case, there seems to be as much likelihood of this offensive achieving success as the offensive of Falkenhayn and Mackensen. the more especially as we are told that a large Russian army of reserve, commanded bv thai magnificent soldier, the Grand Duke Nicholas, is moving: to the support of the Roumanians : and it may be pointed out that- a successful advance of General Brussiloff in the north would achieve vastly mole important strategical results than would a successful advance ofFalken havn and Markensen ill the south. Whether Bucharest is successfully defended or not is not of maximum importance, provided the Roumanian army remains unbroken. What does reallv matter is the success of General Brussiloff against the Archduke Joseph, who is loudly calling for large reinforcements, because he fears lie cai-not maintain bis resistance successfully. Perhaps before this article is printed the issue may have been decided, and it must bp noted that .t-he success of General Brussiloff would almost certainly mean the enforced retirement of Falkenliayn from Ronmania. while the success of Falkenhayn asrainst Bucharest would have no serious effect on the plan of campaign or on the strategy of the Russians. [Written December 4.]