THE WINTER CAMPAIGN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16372, 28 October 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN.

MUD AND MUNITIONS.

Br LIEUT.-COLOSTEIi A. A. GRACE, N.Z.F.A. 'Jim: victory of the Somme was won because the allies were able to fire three shells to every one fired by the Germans. It was a victory of munitions used by brave and efficient soldiers, assembled in sufficient numbers to accomplish the task allotted to them. But, if by chance anything had intervened to effect the steady How of munitions and food required by (hose troops, their efforts would have been paralysed and the- offensive movement on the Somme would have ended in failure, -iiiyone who knows the climate of Kent knows the climate of Northern France. '1 lie summer is warm and full of sunshine, with occasional wet days—in any case the ground remains reliably firm. The winter may be of two kinds: it may be cold, with snow and frost, or it may bo comparatively mild, with much wet. I have spent a winter in Sussex, which is alongside Kent, when it rained every day for three months, from the middle of January to the middle of April.] Given a "soft" winter in Northern Franco, there will bo much mud, and mud is the greatest obstacle to effecting supply in the field. Given a "hard" winter, with a certain amount of snow and hard frosts, then the problem of supply will easily bo solved. But we have been told by General Maurice, Director of Military Operations, that the main strategic purpose of the Allies' operations on the Somme was 'to retain the bulk of the Germans on this front, that as five-eighths of the Germany army (presumably he refers to the German army of the West) was there, the purpose had been achieved. Now, if this pronouncement means anything at all, it means that the main aggressive operation of the Franco-British armies may bo looked for at some other point of the battle-front than the Somme, indeed than Northern France. Winter in the East. When we turn to the Eastern battlefront, we find that the question of mud is even more important still. It was mud which stayed tho seemingly irresistible advance of tho Germans into Russia a year ago. It was mud which recently set a period to General Brusiloff's successes in Volhynia and Galicia. The first snow, however, has fallen in the Carpathians, and the frosts may bo expected to arrive almost simultaneously. With the advent of winter, the Russians will uso sledges instead of wheeled vehicles, and will thereby increaso rather than diminish their facilities for supplying their armies in the field. Now, in Russia, if plot in Galicia, tho cold of winter is unbroken from November to April, when the spring thaw sets in and renders the unmctalled roads difficult for some six weeks, after which the short hot summer bakes the country from north to south. Therefore, the Russians have before them five good months in which to carry on an unbroken offensive against the Teutonic armies opposed to them, and when it is remembered that the Russian armies are composed entirely of men who are medically fit and of military age, whereas the Teutons' armies contain a big proportion of men who are not medically fit and are not of military age,, but are either mere boys or middle-aged or old men, then we clearly realise that the advantages of the winter campaign of lrfi6-17 will be altogether with the troops of the Tsar, themselves inured to the cold of their inclement country, and able to bear with equanimity the extrcmest frost. Allied Preparations. We are told that many millions of Russians, after manoeuvring for months, are marshalled, from Riga to Galicia, ready to fight the greatest battle in history. There is not much doubt that this is to be the great effort which, beginning in the East, will spread to the >>est, and will be increased by the fiery asaults of our Italian allies in the Southwest and by General Sarrail's armies of the South. But the greatest strength will be put forth in tho East and the West, because in those spheres the greatest strength of the Alliance exists. The united armies of Russia, France, and Britain number nothing less than 18,000,000 men, and the facilities for creating and supplying munitions possessed by those countries are commensurate with the size of those armies. German War Material, When wo turn to consider tho state if the German armies, faced with these odds and a winter campaign, we find a very different state of affairs. As long ago as August 1, General von Gallwitz complained in an army order "ot tho fearful number of accidental explosion of gun-tubes, and stated that unless bungling ceased there would soon bo a sensible diminution of artillery power." That means worn-out guntubes, not bungling—as an artilleryman 1 am able to state that with certainty. The grooving has been worn out and scored with excessive use, and new inner tubes (A. tubes, we rail them) are needed, but to effect tho repair the guns would have to he withdrawn from issue and others issued to replace them while repairs are. being effected, but, as there are no spare guns, this cannot be done, and so the worn-out guns continue in uso till they burst. This shortage is made very clear in an army order issued by von Biiclow, on August 9, which concludes thus:—''The replacement of cannon put out of action is now gravely | compromised . . . the War Minister states that it is no longer possible to increase the supply of cannon tubes." The J German material seems to be giving out, : and, if so with the Germans, what with I the Austrians and the Bulgarians and the ! 'lurks, all of them so largely dependent !on the Germans for supplies? Indeed, the I outlook for our enemies in reference to the winter campaign apnears to be very gloomy, the more especially because they I are well aware of the fact that with deI pleted armies composed of inferior troops i and equipped with imperfect material, they I will be obliged to meet the terrific onI slaught of greatly superior l armies, comI posed of troops who are all physically fit and equipped with the best material which the world ran supply. Coming Great Blow. 1 Apparently the Russians are about tr ! begin their general offensive, if they have I not already begun it. It is not likely that j the Allies of the West will be far behind the Russians in making their great blow, ■ I suppose there are not less than sever I million Franco-British troops in France, J Probably some four millions of these art ]on the battle-front. There remain sonn | three millions in reserve, not counting some two millions still in Britain. While j from the Alps to the sea a general offensivi ji s carried out all along the line. Then seems nothing to prevent the concentra tion of three or four millions of men a' the decisive point, wherever it may he, a< which it has been decided to break tin German battle-front. That point, we now know with certainty, is not on the Somme and probably nowhere in Northen , France. It must, therefore, be furthei south, somewhere on the Champagne-Lor ; raine-Alsatian line, where to break tin German front means the occupation o : German territory, the cutting of Gcrinai lines of communication, and the enforce! i retirement of the Germans from, Kortherj , France and Belgium,