VON BOTHMER'S RETREAT.
Military recognition of the success of the Russian advances that hinged j fc on Lutsk in the north and on Czer- j s novitz in the south of the great ( v Austrian section of the eastern i c front is given by the enforced re- ! , tirement of the army with which j r General von Bothmer held the I c central portion- From Lutsk the l Russian drove a great salient west- j l ward that approached Kovel on the . north, absorbed Vladimir to the ~ west and bent southward until it , threatened Lemberg. Possessed of j Czernovitz they proceeded to create * a similar salient which spread to the ' slopes of the Carpathians and curved , northward through Stanislau, \ , threatening to enclose Lemberg in i the grip of a gigantic vice. The ' Austrians under von Bothmer were thus threatened on either flank and were also in peril of complete isola- , tion. They endeavoured to free ] themselves from the deadly pressure . by attacking the relatively weak ; Russian forces left confronting them, and if these attacks had been successful might have reversed the position and cut the communica- ; I tions of one or both of the flanking j ! Russian armies. The Russians holding von Bothmer on the unbroken ) central sector withstood his attacks ; the enlargement of their salients at ] last compelled him to choose i between retreat and an isolation > which could only result in surrender, j His retreat upon Lemberg is an ad- j mission of military necessity. If j it is successfully accomplished it j will be very much the lesser of the ! two evils between which he was I i compelled to choose. There is a j tendency in certain quarters to j assume that a successful retirement , is almost a victory, a peculiar mode i of thinking popularised in British 1 minds by the famous retreat from ! Mons and by the remarkable series I of retirements effected by the Rus- ' | sians a year ago. The retreat from j I Mons was advantageous not because ' it was a retreat, but because it j greatly delayed a German movement ! I dependent upon speed and because ' I it inflicted much greater losses upon ! j the enemy. The Russian retireI ments were very far from advan--1 tageous, involving enormous losses ' lin territory, equipment, and men, | j though they were not fatal because '. the Russians avoided the wholesale surrendering which might have comi pletely broken their defensive ' strength. The decided though not decisive advantages gained by the Germans and Austrians a year ago • are being gained south of Kovel hy j the Russians now. Even though I our allies do not cut off the retreat ! of von Bothmer's main army they i will inflict upon him greater losses than they incur and when in possession of Lemberg will have won a strategical position highly disadvantageous to the enemy.
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New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16310, 17 August 1916, Page 6
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476VON BOTHMER'S RETREAT. New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16310, 17 August 1916, Page 6
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