THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JUNE 12, 1916. THE RUSSIAN SUCCESSES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16253, 12 June 1916, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JUNE 12, 1916. THE RUSSIAN SUCCESSES.

It is again being demonstrated that the Austrians are no match for the Russians when our allies are in possession of a reasonable amount of ammunition. In that great southern sector of the Eastern front, which stretches from the great Pripet marshes to the Roumanian frontier, the Russian impact has broken the enemy' line, and a steady forward movement is progressing. The advance has flowed resistlessly over the famous Volhynian triangle, the group of fortresses by which Russia had planned to defend her frontier against Galicia. Luck and Dubno, lost last year, have been recovered. Lemberg again lies open Russian attack. The line of the Dniester is being rapidly cleared. The Strypa is in Russian hands. If the advance can' be sustained it will soon become another invasion of Galicia, and we may at any time hear of the occupation of Bukovina, of Cossacks swarming along the eastern slopes of the Carpathians, of renewed Austrian anxiety for Przemysl and for the passes that lead into the great Hungarian plain.

Among the first fruits of the Russian advance is the lifting of AustroGerman pressure from Roumania, which should at least ensure' her neutrality and may encourage her to intervene on behalf of her Transylvanian kindred. We have also the display of a much more conciliatory spirit by Greece, partial demobilisation having already been authorised by King Constantine in response to the imperative demand of the Allies. As the Greek Army made no attempt to defend its country against Bulgarian invasion, it was plain that its mobilisation was really directed against the Allies and was not an act of national preparation for defence. Had the attack on Verdun met with the dramatic success anticipated in Berlin, and had the Russians been repulsed when they recommenced operations, King Constantine would have been much less conciliatory, even in the face of an Allied naval blockade. It is still too early to estimate with any confidence the strength of the Russian advance or to appreciate the full possibilities of Austro-Ger-man resistance, but it is only reasonable to suppose that Austria is weaker and Russia stronger than when our Allies fought their way almost to Cracow in the spring of 1915. German control of Austria's military resources counts for much,

and we must expect that a desperate struggle will be made by the enemy in Galicia, but the temper of Austria's composite forces is very evidently what it has always been, for the Bohemian regiments are reported to be surrendering at opportunity, as, they have done since the beginning of the war.

The renewed pressure upon the Eastern front should show within a few weeks whether Germany has nearly exhausted her reserves, or whether she still possesses sufficient men to meet all her needs during the coming summer. It is said that the Italians are already being relieved by Austrian transference of troops from Trentino to Galicia, and that German divisions are similarly being carried from the west to the east. When millions of men are in question it is obviously difficult to discern the extent of any partial movement, but the Russian advance has already encouraged every ally, and the Germans should be the last to doubt the value of this encouragement- From German official communiques, published for the purpose of persuading doubting Germans that all goes well, it is clear that the Kaiser is conscious that tales of British naval victory and of irresistible Russian advance would go far to destroy the lingering German faith in ultimate triumph. We may, therefore, expect that renewed attempts will be made to score such a measure of success at Verdun as may bolster up the declining prestige of militarism in Germany itself and may excuse the cessation of German attack in that region, so as to permit the movement of great bodies of men eastward. Theoretically, it is at some such juncture that the Allied pressure will be increased on every front, so as to prevent the exercise of the favourite Prussian strategy of using alternately superior forces on diverse fronts. The summer is still young. In 1914, seven weeks later, Germany considered that there was ample time for her to crush France and Russia in detail, and to make a triumphant peace before the Christmas of that year. The unmistakable German anxiety for peace suggests that the Berlin War Office is afraid that the Allies, in 1916, may now be able to enforce peace on their own terms before another winter. The prospect of such a peace will be greatly increased when the German people realise that the Allies intend to crush Prussian militarism, however long the war and however great its cost.