THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 1916. THE ATTACKS ON VERDUN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16231, 17 May 1916, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 1916. THE ATTACKS ON VERDUN.

The motive of the original German attack on Verdun was admittedly obscure, but was not in any way mysterious. Apart from the military advantage of straightening out the most important and the most dangerous of the Allied salients in the west, of cornering and possibly capturing considerable French forces between a broken front and a river insufficiently bridged to facilitate retirement, of compelling a great Allied concentration of reserves to reconstruct and hold a new line west of the Meuse, and of thus preparing the way for another heavy blow at some weakened point, there was the great political advantage of opening the 1916 campaign with a There were great differences of opinion as to what was the real aim of the German strategists, but no doubt existed that they had a definite plan of campaign, of which the assault on Verdun was but a phase. It is now known that at the end of February the enemy nearly succeeded in breaking the French line at Douaumont owing to the sudden development of the attack in unexpected strength, and that for some little time the fate of Verdun swayed in the balance, until it was turned in our favour by the foresight of General Joffre, the excellence of the. French motor service, the steadiness of General Petain, and the heroism of the French soldiery. With this knowledge to enlighten us it is clear that the original German plan of attack was reasonable enough. It would certainly have been considered masterful had it led—as against less j skilful and less devoted resistance it might have led—to the occupa- [ tion of the French lines east of the Meuse and the capture of such French forces as could not pass the Verdun bridges under destructive gunfire.

Three months ago to-day, on February 17, the Herald reported the fall of Erzeroum forts and the completion of Roumanian mobilisation ; Lord Kitchener, on the previous day, in the House of Lords, had hopefully reviewed the general military position ; there had been exceptional activity on the western front, from Alsace to Ypres, for some days ; and a state of peculiar tension was everywhere noticeable. On February 19, following immediately upon the fall of Erzeroum, the Germans struck at Verdun; on February 26, exactly one week later, they reached and failed to grasp the Douaumont Plateau, the possession of which, we are told, would have made Verdun untenable to the French. Since then the French lines on the Douaumont side of the Meuse have not been shaken, while the subsequent attempt to carry the covering defences on the western side of the Meuse have been as fruitless. It is true that on the western side some German advance has been accomplished, this comparing with the earlier driving in of the outlying French lines north of Douaumont and Vaux ; but the main positions are untouched. Two months ago the Germans were charging up the slopes of Mort Homme, as they have charged this week and a score of times between. Mort Homme is still French, though its trenches have been battered by a dozen terrific bombardments, and though its slopes are carpeted by German dead. Nor would the capture of Mort Homme give Verdun to the invader behind it lies the great Charny Ridge, which must be reached and seized before the fate of Verdun can again be considered in doubt.

Looking back upon the events of the past three months, we can see that the German Kaiser hoped and intended by swift victory at Verdun, achieved regardless of immediate cost, to counter-balance the political effect upon both belligerents and neutrals of the proof of Russia's recovery given by the fall of Erzeroum, as well as to obtain distinct military advantage. What does he hope to gain now that month has succeeded month and Verdun still remains as evidence of German inability These three

months have been so much lost time to Germany, and it is recognised that to her months are more precious than men. All the plans—and we must necessarily assume that there were great dependent .upon the fall of Verdun have gone astray. German guns still thunder against the Verdun trenches; German divisions still dash themselves against its living walls ; but we cannot suppose that the Kaiser expects thus to compel the Allies to sue for peace. Hitherto Germany appears to have been inexhaustibly supplied with military plans and diplomatic devices, and the speed with which she has met and adapted herself to changing conditions has taught her adversaries the meaning of " thoroughness : ' when applied to the preparation-work of a General Staff. But it would seem; and is not altogether impossible, that with all ; their careful plannings and preparations, the German General Staff, in all its forty years of plotting, has not planned and prepared for the extraordinary position which has been created. It may never have occurred to the German War Office that in the second year of a war, while still having millions of troops and almost unlimited artillery at its disposal, its power of effective initiative would be torn from it, and its battle-fronts be exposed, east and west, to attacks in superior force. The battle of Verdun may be continuing indefinitely simply because the German General Staff has no attractive alternative in its pigeonholes, and does not know what next to do. Only by keeping the French on the defensive at Verdun can the Germans hold much of the ground which they have uselessly won at a prodigious cost, and to retreat from which would be a confession of complete failure.