TURKEY'S PART.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16157, 19 February 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

TURKEY'S PART.

FUTURE POSSIBILITIES.

Bt -COLONEL A. .'.. GRACE. N.Z.F A.

After trumpeting with much parade the intention of vigorously attacking the defences of the Allies at Salonika and the Suez Canal, it now seems that the Powers which form the Teutonic combination are unable to carry out their programme. The difficulties which are presented in regard to aggressive operations against the canal have long been appreciated by our side and probably by our enemies, but it was to be expected that the indomitable Teuton would not be balked where such gains as the capture of the canal and Egypt were to be had—at, a cost. Certainly* if he had troops for the purpose, the Kaiser would make the attempt. Obviously, not possessing them, he allotted to the Turks the hazardous task. The Turks should certainly possess all the troops that would be needed for the enterprise: but apparently they have jibbed. The reason ? Perhaps they are at loggerheads with their masters, the Germans; perhaps they find the difficulties so great that they regard the undertaking as hopeless; perhaps they are getting tired of the war, which certainly is bringing them nothing but loss, and threatens to end in the division of their Empire.

Moral Effects of War. We are prone to forget the moral effect which the war is having upon our enemies, though we may gauge that effect so far as we and our Allies are concerned. We know that the great retreat has had no very serious effect upon Russia; we knowthat our defeat at the Dardanelles has had practically no effect upon the British, except perhaps to teach a valuable lesson to our political leaders; we know that the Powers of the Great Alliance are to-day more firmly convinced that they will be victorious than during any previous period of the war. But r.vhat is the physiological condition of Germany and her allies? The bloodthirsty Kaiser and his ferocious myrmidons no longer inspire the German people with hopes of world-wide conquests and the exaction of huge indemnities which shall repay them for their prodigious losses, but vehemently instruct them that they are fighting for their very existence as a nation. The Austro-Hungarian people need no one to tell them that failure means the disruption of their Empire. Ferdinand of Bulgaria, always a gambler, knows that he takes the gambler's chances, and his unhappy people know that they are merely the tools of the overbearing and unscrupulous Germans. The Turks are well aware how they were tricked into participating in the sanguinary struggle, that they are now governed from Berlin and not from Constantinople, that they are no longer their cnvn masters, but the helots of the Teuton. However, it was to be anticipated that their successful defence of the Dardanelles would inspire the Turks to great exertions, yet they seem to hesitate, perhaps through divided councils, perhaps through exhaustion, which, however, may only be temporary, perhaps because of the obvious difficulties which they must overcome before they can enter on aggressive operations with hope of success,-perhaps because they are growing sick of a war for which they had no enthusiasm from the very day when Enver Pasha threw them into it for motives known only to himself and his German co-conspirators.

What Will Turkey Do? But it is not to be imagined that their masters iwill permit the Turks to rc.-fct.in quiescent. Having apparently abandoned the campaign against Egypt, which, if successful, would be the most useful strategical movement that they could make, what will be the major use to which the Turkish armies will be put ? Those armies should number 2,000,000 troops, if sufficient equipment can be found for them, though it is quite possible that there are not with the colours more than half that number. However, it is quite certain, that the Germans will enroll every single Turk that they can possibly equip, and that they will use Turkish armies in the way best calculated to serve the cause of the Central Powers. Putting on one side the muchheralded attack on the Suez Canal, what are the other undertakings on which the Turkish armies can be employed with hope of accomplishing useful work, and what the number of troops which such undertakings would occupy respectively ? There is, of course, the operation against the British-Indian army in Mesopotamia, which well might occupy 200,000 to 250,000 Turks, if the British choose to reinforce their armies on the Tigris sufficiently. Next, there are to be considered the Russian armies which are operating in the neighbourhood of Phzeroum and Bittis. What the size of these armies may be, there is nothing to show us. but it may be reckoned that to drive them back to the Caucasus would occupy quite 250.000 Turks, if not more, since Russia would find no great difficulty in putting large reinforcements into the arena. Then, it must be remembered that Turkey must retain an effective garrison for the protection of the Dardanelles, which is still subject to attack, and also of Constantinople. Two hundred and fifty thousand troops are not too many for the purpose, perhaps not enough. If major operations are to be carried out against the British in Mesopotamia, then it would seem thai, the Turks must retain in or about Alexandretta a sufficient number of troops to guard the railway which forms the principal line of communication between the Bosphorus and the Tigris and Euphrates Valley. The same may be said regarding Beirut in its relation to Jerusalem and any armies which the Turks may keep in southern Palestine as a threat against Egypt, where it is to their interest to retain in idleness

as many British troops as possible.

Germany's Supply of Men.

Now, it is to be remarked that the Germans hesitate to attack the Anglo-French entrenched line at Salonika. This can only be because of shortage of troops. The Germans have no troops to spare for the undertaking, the Bulgarians appear loath to commit themselves to the operation, the Turks, either because the task is distasteful or because they lack the necessary troops, refrain from marching into Macedonia. We have new come to the end of the list of the activities which seem possible to the Turkish force.-. We see that, whatever the field in which they operate, their exertions can lead to nothing which can be called decisive, even if their efforts are crowned with success. To drive the Russians from Erzeroum into the Caucasus, would have no definite effect upon the, struggle in which the Central Powers are engaged with the French, British. Italians, and Russians; lor tlie Turks to drive the British from Mesopotamia would have a moral rather than an actual effect. If the Turks were instrumental, with the Bulgarians and perhaps a stiffening of Teutons, in driving tne

Franco-British army from Salonika, perhaps much might be done to cool the Roumanian's ardour for the cause of the Great Alliance, perhaps the Greek army might join the Teutons; but apparently the attempt is abandoned at least for the present, if not permanently. The Aim of the Teutons.

It "would be good strategy for the Turks to concentrate their efforts on one object at a time, whether that object were the driving of the Russians into the Caucasus or the freeing of Mesopotamia from the British. It is equally good strategy for the Russians and British to occupy as many Turks as possible in the most remote parts of the Turkish Empire. We may, therefore, see heavy fighting in the province of Armenia and in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. The central General Staff which now controls all the armies of the Great Alliance, in whatever field they may be operating, will probably strive to accomplish . two things: the stretching of the enemy's fighting-fronts to the greatest length possible, and the retaining of sufficient strength to deal a knock-out blow at a decisive point or points. The Teutons' great aim will be to prevent the dissipating of their force, in order that they may have in hand at the decisive point or points sufficient strength to resist the expected blow. If this is so, it would appear to be consistent with the major plan of the Central Powers if the Turks refused to be draiwn into serious operations on their further confines, but concentrated their main strength where it could defend Constantinople and the Dar danelles, and at the same time be within striking distance of the main theatre of the war.