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DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

BT RET. W. G. MOKCKTOH.

| Mr. John Bttchax, in Vol. VITI. of his " History of the War," thus defines an integral part of Germany's plan of 'war : "If she could hold her own for two years rifts would appear in the Allied lute. The populations, faced with unfamiliar problems involving novel sacrifices, would grow restive. Criticism would flourish, ministries and Governments would fall into discredit, and half their efforts would he dissapted in idle quarrels. There, was a chance, too, of serious differences arising between the Allied Governments. One power would carp at the supineness of another; recriminations would follow, and then a division of energy. . Germany hoped for much from the old difficulties ! that confront an alliance of equals. Her | allies would give her little trouble, for [ they were not equals, and she was carry- | ing their burden as well as her own." i This form of warfare she has waged with I considerable success, and the operations in the Dardanelles have given her ample I scope for displaying her talents in pro- | moting discord. j For this reason it is imperative that we ! should grasp the real facts and not the ! facts as prepared for our consumption in | Germany. Meanwhile let us remember j two facts. The great naval feat of the | war was the mobilisation of the British i fleet. Only two men could have been re- | sponsible for this—Prince Louis of Batten- | berg or Mr. Winston Churchill. We have | got rid of both. The one British soldier feared by Germany is Lord Kitchener, he I comes nearest to their ideal of an or- ' ganiser. A section of the British Press ; made every effort to get rid of Kitchener. Germany at first through the medium of I her own press tried to make out that I Russia had forced the Dardanelles camI paign on unwilling allies. This was, of course, quite untrue and the allies replied t> it by inviting the Russian cruiser Askold. which came all the way from Yladi- ' vostock, to take part in the bombardment, I'We were in perfect accord with Russia !in undertaking the operations. But it was [ true that we undertook the campaign to ; help Russia and that the Foreign Office • brought pressure to bear on both the AdI miralty and the War Office to try and j open the Straits. Russia had helped us ! in the west by invading East Prussia and so relieving the pressure on the Marne. and when the Turk was pressing through the Caucasus' and Hindenburg was making | his famous drive on Warsaw at the end of j last year, the Russian Foreign Office asked I Kir Edward Grey if something could be | done to draw off the Turk. This was 1 just at the time when the struggle round ' Ypres was at its height and the War Office j advised that no men could be spared for j the Dardanelles. A conference was then | called between the representatives of En?- ; land, France, and Russia, when the poli- | ca.l situation was discussed. The Germans | ' declared that at this conference Russia | ' had forced the hands of the others. The facts were these : There was already a great shortage of munitions and metals in Russia, the Russian people had expected ; great things from the British fleet and yet I to them it seemed to have done nothing. | A Russian writer tells us that the people i fully expected, at the beginning of the j war, that the British fleet would come j sailing up the Baltic and enable them to : attack Germany's seaboard. Germany was | at this time using this feeling to try and j make the Russians think that her allies I were doing nothing for her, and she j pointed out that had it not been for Engj land's action in the past the Dardanelles ! would never have been closed to Russia. The situation in the Balkans was critical and Italy's intervention hung in the balance. The whole political situation seemed to demand some effort to open the Dardanelles. The army could give no help, what about the navy? j The first thing to be done was to consult the admiral on the spot. Tt was known that before Turkey actually declared war she had sown the straits thick with mines, her fortifications had been j strengthened, and her obsolete guns re- | placed with modern weapons. We knew ' more about Turkey's position than about I any other because our own officers had ; been acting as instructors to the Turkish | navy even , after we had declared war on I Germany and Austria. The Admiralty | advised that the straits might be forced I bv sea power alone, but that the co-opera-I tion of a land force would be necessary ,if the passage was to be kept open. The French admiral was of the same opinion. The political situation demanded immediate action, and so it was decided to begin j the bombardment and endeavour to collect 1 an army as rapidly as possible to assist I on land. The operations were not undertaken hurriedly or inadvisedly. The request from Russia reached our Foreign Office in November and the bombardment began on February 19, some two months later, after taking the most expert advice obtainable. It was arranged to begin military operations on March 10, and the failure to do* this makes an interesting chapter in the I history of the operations. But it is a I long chapter and I must defer the consideration of it for another time. The Germans have tried to use the Dardanelles campaign for the double purpose of trying to foment discord between the Allies, and of trying to promote discord in our own Empire. Their attempts rest on two absurdities, but absurdities that afe partly true. They assert that Russia forced our hand and that we allowed a hot-headed minister to go against expert opinion in France and England. We certainly would in all probability not have undertaken the campaign but for Russia, and Mr. Winston Churchill, once Sir Edward Grey had convinced him of ihe political necessity, threw himself into the scheme with characteristic vigour. But we were only too willing to help Russia I in her extremity, and both English and I French naval opinion supported the I feasibility of the undertaking. Germany | has not succeeded in making discord j between Russia, France, and England over the Dardanelles as she hoped : it will h° our fault if she succeeds in stirring up i domestic strife and causing us to dissipate j our effort in idle quarrels.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19151211.2.98.6

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 16098, 11 December 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

Word Count
1,096

DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN. New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 16098, 11 December 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN. New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 16098, 11 December 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

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