THE BALKANS' PROBLEM.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 16050, 16 October 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE BALKANS' PROBLEM.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. A. GB.ACE, N.Z.F A. Whatever may be the subtlety of the Tear Ferdinand of Bulgaria, it will be noticed that he failed to hoodwink the Powers of the Entente, who withdrew their representatives at his capital while his Government vehemently protested its neutrality Russia's timely ultimatum at once placed Ferdinand in a quandary and cleared up the military situation, as the strategists say. Bulgaria's desire from the beginning of the crisis was to mobilize her armies behind cover of her protestations of neutrality, while in reality her true object was to assist the Central 1 owers by attacking Servia so soon as she had mustered her armies. However, before she was ready, the situation was forced by the action of the Powers of the Entente, and Bulgaria found a Russian naval squadron at Varna and a French and British expeditionary force at Salonika. before she had time to place a single Bulgarian regiment on Servian soil. I think it may be justly claimed that the first move in the terrible game was a score for the Allies. But. what of Greece and Roumania' It is very plain that the mobilization of their armies lias been slow and that in the case of Greece, the concentration of those armies is slower still. There is not a shadow of a doubt as to the spirit of those armies. Their sympathies are with Servia and the Powers of the Entonte, whatever may be the sympathies of their rulers, and though they may be prevented from playing their true part in the bloody drama, at least, they will not be found turning their arms against Russia and their erstwhile comrades of Servia, with whom they have fought against the Turk and the treacherous Bulgarian but two and three years ago. Therefore, in trying to gauge the complex situation in the Balkans, if we are forced to consider Roumania and Greece as unknown quantities, at least we may reckon on the certainty of their not hindering if they don't help the Allies, who, happily, are in a position, to extend material help to Servia, That unhappy country, after having successfully resisted the invasion of Austrian armies, now faces the combined forces which Austria and Germany can spare from the main, theatres of war in the East and WestAt the same time she has on her flank a treacherous foe who covets that part of her territory which she recently wrested from the Turk. Her position, therefore, is precarious in the extreme. But there are other unknown factors which must be considered. How many troops can Austria and Germany use for the purpose of forcing a way to Constantinople? How many troops can Bulgaria place on the Servian frontier, after she has provided for the protection of her southern and eastern coasts? How many troops have the Allies in Macedonia? To what extent can Turkey support Bulgaria? 'W hat forces can Russia, who commands the Black Sea, precipitate on the eastern shores of Bulgaria? These questions must be answered before we can be in a -position to gauge the situation correctly. Of course, if Roumania and Greece declare for the Allies, then the complexion of the problem is immediately changed, Servia will be saved and the fate of Bulgaria sealed : and in regard to the attitude of Roumania and Greece there is a certain matter which may exercise a deciding influence. If there is any truth in the report that the Turks are willing to cede Constantinople to the ambitious King of Bulgaria, then it is hardly likely that the .Roumanians and Greeks will remain quiescent spectators of the struggle. For the rest, the Great Allies will continue to fight against the Central Powers, whatever Roumania and Greece may do, and will resist them to the bitter end, whatever the fate of Constantinople. As yet, they have not drawn on their last reserve forces. There still remain unused the troops of Japan and the armies which can be raised by the native Princes of India. Any great schen e of conquest iii the East which may be 'iiitertained by Germany would immediate lv alarm the nations of Asia, and ever if the Turk may willingly make himself the tool of the Teuton, the independent princes of India, be they Mohammedan or Hindu, would require no persuasfon to resist with all their strength the upsetting of the status quo in Asia. Tsar Ferdinand may be dazzled vith the vision of a throne in Constantinople, .the Young Turks may be glad to evacuate Europe and, with Teuton assistance, to make good their losses at the expense of Asiatic kingdoms further east, but such a convenient settlement of their difficulties could not be made without roijsing the teeming millions of India to furv.

In the meanwhile, the military situation in the Balkans, altering as it does, in kaleidoscopic fashion almost every day, is likely to remain undetermined until some decisive action forces Greece and Roumania into the camp of the Allies or into that of our foes. Left to their own inclinations, they would have sided with us before now. It would appear that nothing but a German triumph over Servia and the Allies in the Balkans will cause them to place themselves on the side of the Teutons. The importance of developments in the near East cannot be disguised, but the issue of the war will, nevertheless, be decided, not in Servia, or at Constantinople, or on the Suez Canal, but in Central Europe—perhaps on the banks of the Rhine, perhaps in the frozen wastes of western Russia. The Germans cannot restore their lost armies by successes i i the Balkans, they cannot renew their depleted resources by entering Constantinople. With Powers of the Quadruple Alliance re.mains the command of the sea, to them the markets of the world remain open, with them are numbers, riches, the choice between effacement or victory. They will tight on till they have rid the world of the, tyranny which threatens it and Prussian militarism and_tha JioJieazollem .dynasty have perished,