AN ANALOGY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 16032, 25 September 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

AN ANALOGY.

BT MEUT-COLONIX A. A. GRACE, n.z.t.a.

In a very great measure the conditions governing the operations of the Central Powers of Europe to-day are much the same as the conditions which governed the operations of Napoleon during his campaign in Central Europe in 1815.

After his disastrous retreat from Moscow, Napoleon had lost no time in reorganising his forces, and in the spring of the next year, 1813, he took the field w-ith an army of upwards of 350,000 men against the Russians and Prussians, who were subsequently joined by the Austrians in such numbers that Napoleon's troops were outnumbered two to one. After defeating a strong force of Prussians and Russians at Lutzen, he marched on Dresden, where he formed his headquarters. To the north of him, at Berlin, was an army of 30,000- Swedes, under Bernadotte, a renegade Frenchman, whom Napoleon had permitted to be nominated Crown Prince of Sweden, and, who had under his command, besides his own soldiers, some 60,000 Prussians and Russians. m To the east, in Silesia, were the two main armies of Prussia and Russia under Barclay de Tolly and Blucher. To the south were the armies of Austria, with certain corps of Russians, based on Prague. Altogether the allies numbered 800,000 men.

Thus it will be seen that Napoleon in Saxony, .was almost surtounded, and that his only hope lay in retreat or the decisive defeat of his enemies. This he hoped to do accomplish piecemeal. First he struck east, at the armies of the Prussians and Russians of Silesia, and defeated them a* Bautzen. Next he struck north, at Bernadotte's army based on Berlin, at Grossbeeren, where his army uude- Oudinot was defeated by Bernadotte. Next he struck east, at Blucher, or. the Katsbach. where his army, under Macdonald, was defeated. Simultaneously, the Austrians advanced from Bohemia upon Dresden, and hurrying from Silesia he dealt them a terrific blow which drove them out of Saxony. But all to no purpose. The allies, guided by Moreau, another French traitor, and Bernadotte, had formulated a plan of campaign which in timj was bound to reduce Napoleon to extremity, unless he could decisively defeat and crush his opponents piecemeal. Therefore the leaders of the allied armies agreed that whoever of them should be attacked or pressed by the French, should as far as possible refuse battle, but retreat, and thus tempt Napoleon to follow, leaving Dresden open to the assault of some other part of the allied forces, and so to enable them at once to seize all his magazines, to break the communications between the remaining divisions of his army, and to interpose a powerful force in rear of them all, i.e., between the Elbe and the Rhine. In other words, when Napoleon attacked, the forces opposed to him withdrew, and simultaneously other portions of the allied forces closed on his rear. It was a simple plan, it worked admirably, and Leipzig, the Battle of the Emperors, saw it brought to its consummation.

It will be seen, therefore, that to-day, the armies of Central Europe are situated very similarly to Napoleon in 1813. They are surrounded. They hope to defeat their foes piecemeal. But the Allies, following very much the same plan as the allies of 1813, will not permit themselves to be brought to decisive battle. " First the Germans struck west, at the French and British. These retired to the Maine, with what results we know. Simultaneously the Russians advanced into East Prussia and Galicia. Next, the Teutons threw their major strength against the .Russians ,who have retired, drawing the German armies into their own country. True, on this occasion, the Allies in the West did not advance, as might perhaps have been expected, but they contribute to the campaign by holding on the west side of the Rhine considerable German forces, in the same manner as do the Italians, who are holding large numbers of Austrians in the Tyrol and Istria.. The analogy is not quite perfect in one particular. Napoleon's weak spot ' was his long line of communication with France. The Central Powers of Europe have no .such lines to guard, or rather their lines of communication are guarded by their armies in the field. But their lines of communication with • foreign countries, whence they hoped to draw supplies, are blocked by the Allied armies in the field and by .the British fleet. Just as Napoleon's only hope of success consisted in his rapid and decisive defeat of the armies surrounding him, so to-day the onlv hope of the Teutons lies in the same direction. Unless they can completely triumph in one or other part of the theatre of the war, so that they can concentrate their united force to triumph in another direction, they are merely using up their strength in vain. But their stupendous onslaughts, first in the west and now in the east have left their enemies' forces intact. The French and British armies are to-day stronger and better equipped than when a year ago they so successfully resisted the stupendous advance of the Germans into France. Since then the Allies have been strengthened by three million? of Italians. The Russian armies, though no longer operating on the territory of their enemies, except in eastern "Galicia, are as full of ardour as when they successfully stormed the heights of the Carpathians, and have contributed immensely to the depleting of the Teutons by drawing them into the difficult country of western Russia, where, if they remain after the snows of winter have fallen they may find their graves, as did Napoleon's soldiers in 1812. In any case, whether they seek to remain in Russia during the approaching winter, or whether they retreat, they will have served no purpose unless they have brought the Russians to decisive action and have signally defeated them, and this seems impossible for them to accomplish. In the meantime, as every month passes they are growing weaker and less able to break the cordon of steel which surrounds them. In the meantime, the Allies are consolidating and increasing their resources. We are inclined, in mentally reviewing the situation, to' regard almost entirely the difficulties of our own nation and of the Alliesthose difficulties are evident to us and frequently are accentuated by the press. But we should endeavour to comprehend the much more serious difficulties which beset our enemies their isolation, their interrupted trade, the cessation of their productive industries, their financial stringency, the difficulty c/f -their maintaining the requisite supply of war materials. We should think of the effect of what must be to them the very disappointing result of the exertions of the Austrian armies and of the armies of the Turks.

Now. in 1813. Napoleon's generals were under no delusion as to the hazardous position in which he had placed himself. When thev pressed him either to make peace or to withdraw behind the Rhine while vet there was time, his reply was, " Ten lost battles would not sink me lower than you would have me place myself by my own voluntary act: but one battle pained enables me to seize Berlin and: Breslau, and make peace on terms compatible with my glory." That seems to be very much the state of mind of Kaiser Wilhelm and the German general staff. Napoleon gained not one but two remarkable —Bautzen and Dresden — yet his doom was sealed. So, we have every reason to hope after tracing the analogy of the campaigns of 1813 and 1914-15, that the fate of Kaiser Wilhelm and his staff will be similar to that of Napoleon,