BRITAIN'S AMPHIBIOUS POWER.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 15912, 8 May 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

BRITAIN'S AMPHIBIOUS POWER.

BT uect.-colonel A. A. GRACE, S.l.T.k.

The most remarkable feature of the war to the present date is not the terrific forward movement of the Germans on Paris or the no-less terrific counter-attack of the allies which hurled the Germans back to the line of the Aisne; it is not the wonderful successes achieved by the Russians in Galicia and the Carpathians—it is the transformation of Britain into a military Power of the first magnitude. Nine months ago Britain could array in France against the German hosts perhaps 350,000 men; to-day she can place in the firing-line in various parts of the world three and a-half millions, and yet leave her bases of supply amply protected. The whole history of war shows nothing comparable to this marvellous metamorphosis whereby a nation which wished lor nothing but to pursue the arts of peace so quickly prepared itself to practise war on the most tremendous scale. The question immediately irises: To what use will Britain put the enormous military forces which she has created We are told that England is full of armed men. waiting to be sent abroad. Where and how will they be utilised? If I knew I should refrain from saying, but there are one or two features connected with the possibilities open to Britain which I should like to point out, as they arc of an extremely reassuring nature.

The disadvantage under which Britain fights by reason of the scattered nature of her Empire is understood when one realises that she must retain garrisons in all her bases of supply— lndia, Canada, Australia, the Ope. New Zealand, and the rest of her less-important possessions. The advantage under which Germany fights consists of the fact, that her troops in the firing line protect their bases of supply. In proportion to her whole military forces Britain can put less men into the firingline than Germany can, but being a maritime Power, possessed of the mastery of the seas, Britain has an advantage which Germany lacks, and it is an advantage which, if properly used, should prove a deciding factor in the war. Surprise is of the utmost importance in war. The power of striking like a bolt from the blue is of the greatest possible value. Surprise has been the foundation of all the greatest strategical combinations in the wars of the past, and it will be so in all wars of the future. The great generals' first thought has always been how they might outwit their adversaries and strike'them where least expected. To prove this assertion it is sufficient to recall Marlborough's march to the Danube, Napoleon's passage of the Alps, his movement on Jena, Lee's strategy at Chancellorsville. But the surprises effected on these great occasions are small compared with the surprises which may be created by a paramount naval Power which possesses the enormous army which is to-day in Britain. Lines of supply arc of four kinds— roads, railways, waterways, and the sea. High roads in some ways are better than railways, which are good servants, but bid masters. Waterways are safer and surer than railways, but less numerous; but, as a great authority has said* " Neither railways nor waterways as lines of supply or of operation arc to be compared with the sea."

In 1370 a careful study of the French railway system enabled Von Moltke to determine with complete accuracy the direction of the French armies' advance, their distribution when deployed, and the extent of their front when deployed. In a war on the Continent of Europe the general staffs of the contending armies can easily determine the line of attack, the points of concentration, since all movements of troops are governed by the carrying capacity of the railways and roads, and the means of supply can be gauged in the same manner. But if an enemy's armies are transported across the sea tinder the protection of an all-powerful fleet neither their strength nor their point of attack can be calculated with any certainty, for their movements will be hidden and their destination will be secret.

It follows, therefore, that Britain possesses a great advantage by reason of her power to use her maritime supremacy for the springing of such a surprise on her enemy as may altogether alter the aspect of the war. Roughly speaking, the German coastline is 750 miles long. It, of course, is invulnerable so long as the German Navy can keep the seas, but experience proves ! that that navy is unable to keep the seas. ! For instance, it has not been able to inter- ' fere with the transportation of troops from I England to France. It has not been able | to interfere with the transportation of ! troops from Algiers to France, or from ! Egypt, and other countries to the j Dardanelles. It has failed even to dis- ! pute the mastery of the seas with the I allies, which has passed to them without i a struggle. The German fleet has lain for ! nine mouths inactive in its ports, and only German cruisers and lesser craft have ventured to put to sea. Is it not possible, ' therefore, that Britain may use her amphibious power to effect that strategy J which is capable of tho greatest surprise? : First deceive, then surprise, and finally I annihilate your enemy : that has been a , maxim which has been impressed by the , British General Staff on all field and j general officers. Now would seem to be the time for the British General Staff to l put that maxim into practice, for never, it , would seem, was there a greater opporj tunity. i Already Britain's amphibious power has | given her possession of the mouth of the j Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and the cmi trol of the eastern terminus of the pro- '. jetted Bagdad railway, which has played I so great a part in German diplomacy; I already Britain's amphibious power has i enabled her to garrison Egypt adequately and to land an effective army at the DarI dandles. We may await with confidence . some action greater than these, made j possible by the combined action of tho I King's navy and army. The principle of strategy which 1 have I enunciated in this article is no new one. j It was understood by llit> Carthaginians, it I was understood by the Romans, it was I understood by all the great soldiers of the past, best, perhaps, by Napoleon. But never in the whole history of war was it given to any nation to possess the opportunity of putting it into practice as is presented to Britain at the present time. Difficulties there arc in the way, of course, but not difficulties which are insuperable or which the power of the British Navy I cannot be expected to overcome. How | many British troops the French will require to help them when the great advance 'I takes place it is useless to inquire, but it is manifest that there will remain to bo employed a sufficient number with which to effect such a strategical stroko as may i prove the death-blow of German mill' ( tarism,