THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHREN CROSS. MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1915. THE BAGDAD RAILWAY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 15891, 12 April 1915, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHREN CROSS. MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1915. THE BAGDAD RAILWAY.

Or the world-wide conspiracy of Germans against the British Empire, the most interesting portion is* that which concerned Egypt and India. Apart from military operations against the British Isles themselves, Germans hoped for most from an attack on Egypt and India. ( Indeed many Germans who' were frank enough to say that an invasion of Britain was impracticable yet believed that it might be possible to seize Egypt and the Suez Canal, thus cutting the Empire in two. Bismarck had called Egypt the spine of the Empire, and another distinguished German had suggested its vulnerability by likening it. to Achilles' heel. The cult of Napoleon, which was one of the minor sinister symptoms of modern Prussia, further turned German thoughts to the East. The Napoleonic plans for seizing Egypt and attacking India were widely discussed in Germany; the preparation of military resources in the East against " the day," has long been one of the chief activities of German leaders. This commenced with the wooing of Turkey about 1800. By flattering Ottoman vanity, by posing as friend when all the other Powers censured the Porte for maladministration and oppression in her European provinces, by watching Turkish duplicity with Prussian unscrupulousness, Germany gradually won ascendancy in the counsels of Constantinople, and prepared for the recent coup which added Turkey to the enemies of the Allies. What this coup is likely to bring to Turkey may be gathered from the news recorded to-day of the landing at Alexandria of a French expeditionary forco to assist in the attack on the Dardanelles. \yhat Germany really expected of :ier Turkish alliance may best be lppreciatcd by a consideration of the strategic railways she has built in Asiatic Turkey. The much-discussed Bagdad railway may be described as a German road to India. Built ostensibly to open up the decayed provinces of Mesopotamia, it is obviously a strategic line, and its construction has been governed entirely by military expediency. The scheme was divided into three sections, the first from the Mediterranean seaboard to Bulgurlu, the second through the Taurus Mountains— most difficult and expensive link in the chain—and the third to the objective on the Euphrates. The first section of the line was opened many years ago, permitting of railway traffic from Constantinople to Bulgurlu- It is no pioneer line such as would be warranted by commercial considerations. The construction is substantial, with a covering pretence of flimsincßS to disarm suspicion! and

»the route throughout follows military rather than traffic considerations. As a commercial venture the line has never justified itself. The average revenue from the first section did not exceed £10,000 a year, while maintenance charges were £25,000. After meeting interest on the capital cost (£BB,OOO per annum) and other charges, the Turkish Government has been out of pocket about £110,000 a year for the luxury of this section. From the Taurus range the Germans planned to carry the line to Bagdad, and then to Busra, at the head of the Persian Gulf. The British Government had viewed the whole project with apprehension because of the facility the line afforded for transporting an army for use against India, and was able to reserve the right to control any further extension to any point on the Persian Gulf. The route and control of the line will doubtless be greatly influenced by the war. Indian troops are now in occupation of Busra, which has for years been the hotbed of intrigue against British rule in the Middle East. Busra may be regarded as the warden of the Persian Gulf, and since the acquisition of the Persian oil fields has increased enormously in importance. A recent speech by Lord Hardinge, Viceroy of India, suggested that the British occupation of Busra may be permanent, and it can at all events be assumed that tho terms of peace will remove the menace which tho Bagdad railway in its original conception offered to India.

For the full development of the Turkish attack on Egypt wo have been asked to wait till a lino has been built across the desert from the Hedjaz railway. This is another inspired railway which has a - mili/tary purpose under a cloak of innocent pretence. The lino runs south from Damascus parallel to the shores of tho Mediterranean and the Red Sea and is projected to reach Mecca. It was built ostensibly to save pilgrims to Mecca the sufferings and perils of overland travel through Palestine- Mahomraedans throughout the world subscribed to tho cost, and German engineers constructed the line. They avoided the settled portions of Palestine and carried the line to the east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea, where it would be unprofitable, but fairly safe from attack. . They built, not a pioneer line, but a railway capable of carrying the heaviest traffic at high speed. They erected substantial stations and at intervals strong blockhouses. They provided extensive siding facilities, quite out of /proportion to any peaceful traffic, particularly at Ma'nn, near tho borders of the. Sinai Peninsula. This is the point from which a light military railway towards the Egyptian frontier is now said to be under construction. North of Damascus a line ran to Aleppo, which is only 30 miles from the route of the Bagdad railway. Had the German plans had time to mature there would have been through railway communication, connecting with the European systems, to the Red Sea and the head of the Persian Gulf, and troops could have been moved direct from Berlin to the Egyptian frontier and strategical points in Asia Minor. Unfortunately for Germany the railway chairi was not completed in time, and the Taurus Mountains still stop railway progress to the Persian Gulf and interrupt tho lino running towards Egypt. But though the German railway plan has miscarried its retention is obvious enough.