NOTES AND COMMENTS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 15886, 6 April 1915, Page 6

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

BATTLESHIP ABHAMKNT.

A long-standing controversy is 'hat regarding the best kind of main armament for battleships. Some have held that the delivery of a large .volume of fire of shells of moderate calibre, others that a smaller volume of fire of shells of greater weight is preferable. Hie former school found its chief support in the German Navy, and tho first battleships of their modern fleet carried nothing larger than tho 9.4 in gun. Comparing the weight of the individual sheik we find that the earlier German battleships threw one of 4201b weight from their 9.4 in guns, against one of S:solbs weight from the British 12in of that date: that the German llin gun of the intermediate period fired a 6£olb shell against shells of 8601bs and 1400lb.« delivered respectively by the British 12in and 13.5 in guns, and that their latest ships in commission, ot the Kaiser class, oppose an 8601b shell from their 12in guns to the 192011) shell of tho British 15in guns mounted on the Queen Elizabeth. In explanation of the German preference for lighter gnus, it has frequently been stated that those respon- | sible fur German naval ordnance believed that a greater volume of light shells would prove to be more effective than a smaller volume of heavier projectiles. There has been one notable case in which the Germans failed to use an opportunity In pit their theory to the test, remarks the Scientific American, namely, in the recent kltle-nuiser fight in the North Sea. Here tlu> German battle-cruisers, lad they closed in to a range, say. of 9000 to 10,000 yds, would have been in a position to perforate the Bin and 9in belts of the British battle-cruisers with their high velocity 50-calibre llin guns, to say nothing of the 50-calibre 12in pieces cartied by the Derfflinger. At these ranges the greater rapidity of fire of the llin guns •would, according to the German theory, have compensated considerably for the slower fire of the heavier and more nrmerous English pieces, particularly as the German ships aro generally believed to carry much heavier belt armour. That they made a running fight of it, and loft the Blucher to its fate, indicates that the Germans believed victory would inevitably rest with the ships carrying the heavier guns.

IMPORTANCE OF COTTON'. In urging upon M. Villerand, the French Minister for War, the desirableness of treating cotton as contraband, Sir William Ramsay re-echoed views that have already been emphatically expressed by a number of people in England. Mr. Hilli'.ire Belloc has referred to the matter several times. As ho points out, cotton is not only a harmless substance, which provides the civilian portion of the enemy with a livelihood, with wealth, and with clothing. Nor is it even only a necessaiy requisite, for the equipment of the troops, whose function it is to kill or disable as many of the allies as they can. It is also the equivalent of what was known to generations of soldiers as the chief factor in ammunition—gunpowder. Every explosive charge which launches a missile in modern war is simply cotton treated in a particular fashion—-' nitrated," as it is called. The chemicals whereby cotton is subjected to the process of nitration, which turns it from a harmless vegetable product to an explosive, are obtainable by Germany and Austria in spite of the blockade They are obtainable, in the last resort, from the air. But cotton cannot ho produced in Europe at all, and to cut off the entry of cotton into Germany would be almost certain to force her to resort to the old gunpowder, which is not suitable for modern guns. Certainly other substances than cotton could be ttfed for the purposes of making the explosive. Hut before this could be done on a large scale it would mean, among other things, the erection of new plant and a host of new experiments, all representing a prolonged delay in the output of ammunition, and a serious handicap to Germany. The latest decision of the allies in regard to tightening up the blockade of Germany, should have the effect of cutting off the latter's supplies of cotton to a very serious extent.

THE SUEZ CANAL. The view may be held by the Turks that a mere handful of men, if thev reached the canal, could effectively block that waterway. Someone has even gone to the length of saying that " a Cairo donkey-boy with a pocketful of dynamite" could destroy the canal. This is absurd. The truth is, as Commander Carlyon Bellairs recently pointed out, the canal is practically indestructible, since it is not a lock canal. The worst block would be by heavy explosions to displace banks of sand into the waterway—and as soon as the enemy were driven off the dredgers would set to work and remove the block in a few days. Both in regard to such explosions and the sinking of ships the blocks could only be effective if the resources of the canal, which are very (Treat, wero destroyed at the same time. If the Turks want to definitely stop the traffic of the canal they will have to take it a.nd hold it. And to take it will need an army that will be able to overwhelm the forces defending it.

VON HINDENBURG. Tli.' commander of the German forces in East Prussia, von Hindenburg, is one of the most popular military leaders tlie nation has ever known. His foresight with regard to the region where he recently inflicted a defeat on the Russians was most remarkable. Almost on the boundary between Russia and Prussia there lie the Masurian Lakes. For years these lakes had been the subject of dobates among the military men of Germany. The younger generation of officers contended that it would be an impossibility to defend them should the Russians ever try to cross the border. Von Hindenburg, at the head of the older generation of military men, said that not only could the, lakes be defended, but that they were, of iminonso strategical importance, as they would prove a barrier to the Russians. " These lakes," he said, "are of more military value to Germany that a wall 200 ft high." And to make sure that the officers and men under him became familiar with the lakes and the region surrounding them he would lead them through the water and the marshes adjacent for days at a time. In the Reichstag one day it was proposed that the lakes be filled up and the reclaimed ground lie given over to farming. Von Hindenburg heard of the proposition, and, being out of the capital, lie caught the first train he could for Berlin. With his bundle of maps he hastened to the Kaiser. He talked lakes strategy and defence for half an hour. Then the Kaiser stopped hira. "Keop your lakes !" said he to von "Hindenburg ; *' I promise you they shall not be filled in."