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THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1915. SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN.

The difficulties confronting General Botha in Africa, referred to in to-day's war news, aro very real even if they do not include the inferiority in numbers somewhat unexpectedly suggested in the cablegram. But since war was declared many serious situations have presented themselves to General Botha and his colleagues, and all have been faced with a skill and determination which augurs well for the successful completion of the operations now in progress against the German territory of South-west Africa. Early in September the Imperial Government requested the South African Union to occupy certain portions of this territory "for strategical reasons." How sound was the policy thus adopted later events have shown. German authority in South-west Africa has proved a fountain of intrigue. The first effect of the British offensive campaign was to interrupt the schemes being carefully hatched for the overthrow of British sovereignty. < The disloyalty which had been whispered was forced to declare itself, and treachery and duplicity were unmasked. From the German point of view it was doubtless excellent strategy that General Beyers should take this opportunity of resigning his position as Commandant-General of tho Union defence forces and become a rebel leader, after having been sufficiently long in the confidence of the South African Government to learn all its plans for the defence of the Union and the reduction of German power in Southwest Africa. But Boer disloyalists and German agents would doubtless have desired a further indulgence of time in which to perfect their schemes for the expulsion of the British. The initiative taken by tho Union Government compelled rebels and Germans alike to abandon their plotting and look to their own safety.

The Boer rebellions delayed opera tions against German South-west Africa for at least four months, but the period during which they were really formidable can better be measured in days. The operations of Colonel Maritz led to the proclamation of martial law oh October 12, and a few days later General Botha took the field against him to vindicate Dutch honour with troops very largely drawn from Boer commandoes. Maritz gathered his forces in the north west of Union territory, doubtless hoping to receive help from across tho German border. In the last week of the same mouth Generals Do Wet and Beyers headed revolts in Northern Orangia and Western Transvaal- A few days sufficed to show all three movements in their true proportions and on November 2 it was announced that the crisis was past. Tho rebels were outnumbered, outgeneralled and out-manoeuvred. Tho hope of German support was not realised. De Wet, master of guerilla warfare, found himself pursued by those who were as adept in irregular tactics as himself, and his capture early in January practically terminated the campaign. The last responsible leader in the field was Kemp, and his surrender a month later left tho rebels without guidance and direction—Beyers was dead, De Wet a prisoner on a charge of treason and Maritz, if still alive, a fugitive in German territory.

It has only been within the past few weeks that the campaign against German South-west Africa has been pressed seriously. In its favour operations against German East Africa have been suspended, and General Botha is himself cbnducting an important part of the operations. The Imperial forces are operating in two theatres. A blockade of the coast of South-west Africa was early established to cut off munitions of war from the Germans. Subsequently Swakopmund and Luderitz, the chief coast settlements, wero occupied by the Union forces. A* the same time the British and Dutch swept the country clear of rebels and Germans to the Orange River, which is the boundary between Gape Colony and German South-west Africa. The line of this river was held for a period and then the Union forccs commenced to push into German territory. Whether the main advance is made from the coast or the Orange River it will prove a difficult one. The coast is bordered by a belt of sand dunes about 35 miles wide in the south and narrower in the Beyond this is a mountain range leading to an undulating plateau. The administrative capital, Windhoek, is situated in a hilly district, ; 180 miles east of Swakopmund, but 237 as the railway runs. The eastern portion of the colony is a plain which gradu-

ally decreases in fertility till it merges into the Kalahari desert. The total area of the colony is 320,000 square miles, and it affords an ideal terrain for an enemy versed in guerilla tactics. The country is dotted with police posts, which are in reality blockhoi\;es constructed on the system Lord Kitchener originated. They are connected with one another by telephone and with Windhoek by telegraph and wireless. The normal garrison for each station is from 15 to 25 police, of whom the majority are ex-artillerymen. Further inland there are larger stations which are practically miniature forts and other defence works have been constructed in the mountains, particularly in the central and northern regions. The German strength has been variously estimated at from 10,000 upwards. During the last native rebellion the Germans placed 19,000 men in the field, and most of the settlers have undergone military training and have fought against the natives. There is a large quantity of light artillery in tho colony and neither men nor material are lacking for a stubborn defence. This will doubtless be offered, but despite the statement that General Botha's force is outnumbered the issue cannot be doubted. The Union force has ample reserves to draw on, and the South African Government is thoroughly in earnest. Sir Thomas Watt, Minister for Post and Telegraphs, recently estimated that the campaign would last six months, but he added that it would be completed if it took six years.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19150401.2.30

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 5883, 1 April 1915, Page 6

Word Count
979

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1915. SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN. New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 5883, 1 April 1915, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1915. SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN. New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 5883, 1 April 1915, Page 6

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