THE ALLIES' STRATEGY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15768, 17 November 1914, Page 9

THE ALLIES' STRATEGY.

TRAP LAID FOR GERMANS.

BATTLE OF THE MARNE.

REVIEW OF OPERATIONS.

The general effects of the battle of the Marne are well known. It is now a matter of history how it turned the tide of German advance, parried the blow at Paris, and sent the enemy headlong to the shelter of the strong positions along the Aisue, where the fight still continues. The various phases of the battle of the Marne have been fully described in the Herald. These are placed in tlieir correct proportion 'in the following summary of the operations which combined to make the battle:—

The strategy which dictated the " historic' ' retreat from Charleroi and Mons abundantly justified itself. General Joffre and General French, in carrying out this retreat, led the enemy into a skilfullylaid trap. That the French Army, with their national disposition for dash and attack, ami completely in the dark as to the meaning of this backward movement, were able to carry out the retreat without loss of '■ morale" shows alike France's confidence in her commander in-chief and the new national spirit in which Britain's gallant ally is facing this war. The German attack on the British represented the extreme end of the great German wheeling movement from the north—the German piv.it resting on Met/. —and it was Von Hindi's mission to envelop the allies' left flank and crush it as the preliminary of a greater Sedan. How desperately the British Army held its ground, giving way only inch by inch during nearly a week's incessant fighting—has already been told. This dogged British retreat was part of a deep laid plan of strategy to draw the German deeper and deeper into the jaws of he trap. The Germans were all along niancruvring for position in a determined effort to crush the' French Army according to their time schedule. They took all the risk in trying to accomplish this. They were permitted to advance almost to the gates of Palis itself, where their difficulties started. The German Difficulty.

Why (lid not the Germans attempt to storm' Paris in accordance with their original intention'' For one reason they had been misled by the allies' retreat into believing they hail them beaten, and they had followed so vapidly in order to crush them that they had no heavy artillery— none of the heavy howitzers which reduced the Belgium and frontier forts—to storm the Paris forts. And the immense masses of troops which France had within striking distance of the French capital rendered that attack a long and doubtful one. To continue a westward course round Paris in pursuance of the original outflanking movement was too dangerous to be thought of. To halt was not to be thought of; "pressure of time made it inevitable that the German attack must continue in some form. Faced with these alternatives, and estimating the strength of the allied forces opposed to them, the German general staff made the fatal mistake of relinquishing the enveloping movement to strike at the allies' centre. General Von Kluck turned towards Meaux, leaving

Pari? on the right, in an attempt to cut off the main blench armies from Pans. Immediately this hazardous movement was commenced he laid himself open to lie outflanked in his turn by the Paris forces, and soon he found he had the British Army also on his V.nk. The British troops did not lose tho opportunity of fastening with a bulldog grip on the enemy that had harassed them for a week. Strong Position Chosen. The main allied line stretched from Paris on the one hand to the Verdun fortress on the east, at the other end. Tims neither wing could be enveloped nor crushed. In other respects the position was equally strong. The French troops could operate in country they knew well much better than the Germans. A good deal of the allied line was covered by rivers and swamps, which did much to minimise the German superiority in artillery. The disposition of the allied forces must have been exceedingly good, for while the B.iti.-h troops were holding the Herman attack at bay, the French forces bad been methodically withdrawn from the La FertsLaoiißheims line to the line where General Joffre had chosen for the main battle. There was no mystery about the general strategy which preceded the battle. The enemy, knowing they, dared not assault Paris while the allies remained in the. field undefeated, swung south-eastward to deliver the celebrated " smashing blow" of the German plans on the allies' centre. It failed there, and it failed all along the line, because the Hermans had been misled by the allies' retreat into grievously underestimating the strength of the French and British forces. In that factor, and the more important one that General Joffre. after losing the, attack at the outset of the war, was ultimately able to compel the Hermans to meet him in battle o i a ground of his own choosing, lay the superiority of French strategy. The enormous German forces were drawn right into the jaws of a trap, and then the trap was sprung on them—or it would be more correct to say that they had to spring it on themselves bv being compelled to give battle. The main battle ground was an historic one. It was upon the field where Napoleon won the last of his great battles before his banishment to Elba. Meaux. La Fere Champenoise, Marne, Vitry-le-Fran-cois ! " Ignoring the British." From the despatch of Sir .John French, issued from the front on September 11, the battle may be said to have begun an September 4. On that day the allies' air scouts repotted an alteration in the direction of almost the whole of the first. Herman Army, which, under General Von Kluck, had ever since August 'lb been nlaving its part in the colossal strategic, endeavour to create a Sedan by outflanking and enveloping the left of the allies' line, so as to encircle and drive both British and French to the south, 'the change in direction took the German first armv in a south-easterly direction—towards the allies' centre —instead of continuing on Paris. The Germans left a strong rearguard along the line of the River Oureq—which flows south, and joins the Marne at Lizy-Kiir-Ourcq— to keep off the French sixth army, which had been firmed to the north-west of Paris.

This bold - and fata! — manoeuvre Amounted to a German Hank march diafOnnllv across the allied front. Sir John French savs that the Germans were prepared to ignore the British, as "driven out nf tli- fight." in mi effort to attack the 1.-ft flank of the French main army, which otrctdicd from the British right towcrds th" east. On Saturday, the sth, the movement continued, and advanced parties of Hermans crossed the Manic at various points, and the French fifth army on the French left fell back towards the Seine. The German advance continued throughout Sunday, pushing past th« British right at. f'oulomiers. In t, lint nisrht they were attacked by the Fren-h fifth armv.

General Advance. The minor attack on Sunday night was the preliminary to a general' advance, on the part of the allies the following dav, «*i- 7»h. In this quarter of the field. Tie British troops, strongly reinforced, pushed on in a easterly direction, co-operat-ing with the advance of the French fifth army to the north, and the French sixth army eastward, with the object of attacking Von Kluck's rearguard along the Oi'rcq. The attack succeeded brilliantly. The southward advance of the German right wing left it dangerously exposed. Wi*h danger threatening both its rear ana its

right flank, the first German Army had to retire, after severe fighting, in a northeasterly direction. This was the first time," says Sir John French, " that these troops had turned back since their attack on Mons a fortnight before, and from reports received the order to retreat when so close to Paris was a bitter disappointment. From letters found on the dead there is no doubt there was a general impression amongst the enemy's troops that they were about t:> enter Paris." The fighting along this important front was fierce, sanguinary, and protracted. Meanwhile the whole'of the allied forces had advanced and engaged the enemy. By September 10 the Germans had been defeated all along the line, and were in full retreat. The German right wing was definitely defeated by that clay, and fell back in great disorder, abandoning many guns and stores, and hotly pursued by the French and British. The defeat of the German centre was accomplished by September 11, when it abandoned Vitry and fled towards the north, across the Marne, with the French close at its heels; and further east the Duke of Wurtemburg's army had been chased through the forests of Argonnes. The .Teat importance of the victory lies in the fact that it brought about the utter failure of the German plan of campaign in Fiance, and lost them the strategic initiative, which has now passed into the hands of the allies. Reports from the front in- [ dicate that while the Germans suffered heavilv along the whole line of battle, their losses were particularly heavy north of Means, a provincial town in the valley of the Marne, about 20 miles east of Paris. Here the French gunners had a fine position in a dense wood, and the accuracy of their fire worked fearful havoc ' in the ranks of the. enemy. At Soissons the Germans also suffered very severely in retiring towards Laohand La Ferte. But in a battle front of 120 miles there were many points of contact at which furious fiphting took place. The casualties of this unprecedented struggle were enormous. Two million men were locked for more than two days in a sanguinary , struggle. " j