FIGHTING CRAFT' OF THE FUTURE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLII, Issue 12833, 5 April 1905, Page 3 (Supplement)

FIGHTING CRAFT' OF THE FUTURE.

I I MODERN BATTLE SHIPS" THE MAINS ' STAY OF THE WOLRLH'S NAVIES. , t ■ ••- ■ ■ P " _ Charles H. Cramp, of the William Cramp | _" ' ' and Sons' Ship and Engine Building Company.) " ■■-'■'■ 1 £■ Is my opinion, based upon the lessons :of II- '• the; two recent wars as 1 have learned them, I y the warship of the future should be the I , battleship; and there should' be two great classes or types. The principal difference I - ; in' their make-up should be speed and coal \ endurance: the important of the two 1 1 classes, should bo the speedy type, with * fi ..g gunpower. „ A slower "class, that 1 would permit the use of a greater number of •; I heavy ,is, would comprise the second-type 0 ships*. .The latter would servo admirably |j FT to defend harbours from within and to atII tack forts. I cannot see that the ones! ion fp ■-~* whether the armament of such "ships be ; ; . ' lOiu or 12in guns is importaut. Damage ■■"' effected bv the I2iu gun. with its awkward accessories., during the wars between Spain and the United States and Russia and Japan, hardly justifies its >»;?. : . Therefore, ships of both types should carry lOin guns, with a. greater number npou, tie battleship of tho" second type—whidv 1 § would call "A Sea-going Coast Defondjr." Ships of tho first type also might bo described as" Coast Defenders.' because faey 'I could defend oui shores by attacking nn I Therefore, ships compelling the preface lOin "tins, with a greater number upo».t)i© battleship of tho" second type—which l would call " A Sea-going Coast Defend*-." Ships of the first type also might befdescribed as "Coast Defenders, because hey could defend om shores by attackiug an enemy's coast and compelling the presence of that enemy's vessels at home. Tire importance of speed in connection with the ships of the first type is so ohvims a« not, to require discussion. 1 The Minotaur class of ship, that the inti«h are now "laving down." evidences the Admiralty's faith in the first type. .he. propriety.of, their construction io nuassu-i l \a'combiualioii with these imporbt I In pombjnation with these nnporknt • fighting factors, of course I would not opr look certain other craft that I cousier '■ ; nccc'saK accessories, namely, torpedo-bojts, : or. rather should I say, torpedo-gunboat— I swift despatch-boats and scouts. This is I the point at which to say that we must lot jj overlook the real utility of the torpedo-hjit. Such are my views," stated with seveest brevity. ... ,1 . 1 What the warship of the future will b is % a question I cannot answer decidedly, *\o I naturallv would assume that the figlAng ships, built horn lime to time, in their mkev.p will hate" the improvements suggeted ! ships, built horn lime to time, in their n»ce«p will have the improvements suggeted by the lessons -and experiences i»f asjual warfare; but that, is nevei the case. The lessons of Manila. Santiago and !ort ? Arthur have been interpreted according to I the bias of observers, historians, or mateurs. The ■ writers of the last class 'ave prejudices, like other men. ? EFFICIENCY OF BOILERS. I .«, From mv view point, the most impejant 1 ■ lessons I have gathered from the ltent 1 naval'" battles: and had impressed upoj me I sometime before, are that tlie gage of Warn sometime before, are the of the we" enev must ,be the condition of the balers » '■ and* the engines. These must be of nofoulv I - r rood design and excellent construction but I must be kept in perfect order by the*ngiI nee'r and hi.3: crew, all members of [hich I must be trained, intelligent, and indubious 1 men. Jw . I The difficulty with the fleet at, Port Arthur, for example, was not coniifeo to the destructive damages done by tfe unexpected attack of the torpedo-boat $wh>le the shios were at anchor; the inefcacity for prompt defence was due to the fat that the machinery of all the Russian shiDjfwns in deplorable condition. The. vessels lift were not injured in the attack were nofcin any better condition as fighting factors ban the .imaged ones, owing to their Efficient machinery and accessories. |.' _ : The complete destruction! of till -Spanish I fleet at Santiago was due tc thewretchc-d condition of the engines and boilfs on the ships; the mechanica. iuefficiencj was the I condition of the engines and boihrs on the ships; the mechanical inefficiend was the real gaga of the fighting capacif of each shin and of the aggressive pover of the fleet. With the exception of lie Colon, those ships were designed and instructed bv a reputable Scot elf firm. vvb?li had established itself in Spain and sot there its foremen and best skilled labour/The ships were delivered to the Spanish Government in good condition, were eorretflv rated as 20-knot armoured cruisers, id were so considered by our naval authorities : but, owing to the neglect of the engneering force, their actual speed hardly equaled 10 knots. Had they been able to" go fen 1A knots, when they steamed out that-beautiful Sunday morning, most of thai would have escaped, because the boiiersVJ most of the ships in the blockading fiet were in bad condition. Our' fleet was lot prepared for such an aggressive act—in some vessels, half the boilers Were empty of water. T have been informed br a distinguished officer, -who. in the Jattle of Santiago dc Cuba, that the standard of the 20-kuot Spanish ships was accorded by the officers of the blockading fleet * their actual condition. If so, the re asm for that "Hard a-port!" incident at tin beginning of the fight is obvious: if the Spaniards were " 20knotters" and gun-pofered as published, they would have surpundered and sunk the" first cruiser or uniimoured vessel that approached them. I The vital proposition of "getting at the enemy and getting ayay again" cannot be cried down the wind: like the ghost of Banquo, it "will not down." I quote from a letter of mine,...written in April last, that further states my position : "Regarding the sjbject of boilers:' No matter what kind of boilers these ships may have had. or hor thoroughly they were constructed, they could not have remained ! efficient for.the 'first year, because the firemen, coal-passers and the entire engineroom , personnel up to the engineers had nc- ex- l perience whatever in 'firing' any kind of. boilers. The/firemen had been taken, as the captain stetedjWirectly from the. country. Wc know the result. While the engineers, as a rule, were educated far beyond the class of "experts who ordinarily run engines, they were unable to train the men under them," because they had not had any experience as firemen themselves. Nor was then" an intermediate class of people, as in some other navies, to help the chief engineers. . •."../1 ' "We have found the same trouble in our navy. "The English navy, the best equipped of any in. this world with engineroom artificers, stokers and handy men, has hid its trials and 1 tribulations. "All sorts of schemes have been attempted to overcome these difficulties. . English writers now suggest that all dock labourers be trained as stokers, so that whenever ex- | pert firemen wanted the Admiralty can draw upon, that class of labour. In addition, a largs number of hoys, about 14 years of age, are under instruction as .stokers. What must the United States navy expect I except trouble, therefore, if the English. with more practical engineers than any other country can boast and a larger army of workmen, tit draw upon, confesses to constant discouragement? "All these complications have arisen from the addition of the water-tube boilers: and. as I have frequently said, if siieh boilers rue to lie used, it is indispensable that the enginei'ooms be equipped with trained men. "The roubles of the English ami French with defective boiler's and incompetent stokers have induced many of their writers-, on naval;subjects to assert that the 'man behind'the shovel' i? more important than the 'roan' behind the gun." What is necessary is to get within effective distance in', the quickest possible time. To.accomplish this, the boilers must, have been, originally,. of superior make, and kept at 'n..high standard of efficiency. . ... -In a .general way, the introduction of. water-tube boilers,lias revolutionised naval engineering, ':-.'■' and has had,extraordinary -effects upon the capabilities of ;■ warshi] ~oi; a fleet. Otic British ■admiral describes the pending contest over the best type 'of'boiler for warships as 'The Battle of the Boileis.' Some ;? of the best English authorities go so fat as y: to say that sea battles of the future w'di be !;/' decided, by the ooilers in the hold, mil by the guns in the turrets or on. deck." COMPARISON OF THE WORLD'S ■"/. '' NAVIES. ;■_•''■ Until recently, comparisons' of strength ''■;"■ and efficiency "I" the world's navicr were : nothing .more than v para'.!,', on paper—a. ; - - I?rassey v list- of battle-hips., armoured crui- [','"• . ser?, cruiser-, guns, etc.. will tictiti-i'is > .sjiecd .tutl boitc pottci. A lct«*rniin.<tion of thSi.(i<4U-Jl' ?fii , .;iein;,v ■••)' the shipi uc^tr li*H ti«ca.m«4ii «!Jd Uvw tin UMtHJ'e v* lb* «I*U >U|(«lied, could not 'be wade,

-•■*-Our war with Spain-save vise to the first iiouuts as to the representations made bv lie governments of the/world regarding the true conditions of their fighting ships. The accepted rating given bv Spain was proved to be incorrect. The sea fighting between Kussia and Japan has swept away forever the hist vestige of the old rating. Japan has appeared in the open as a first-class sea "lower; while Russia still must be rated as an undetermined factor in naval strength, An examination of Clowes or Brassey, previous to 1898, gives Russia tremendous preponderance in sea power over Japan. Wo know better nW. Japan was treated with scant courtesy', by those lexicographersin tact, Japan rated no higher than some of the small South American States. / Splendid as has been the advance in details of contraction during the past 15 years, no opportunity has justified the enormous expenditure's in certain types of large fig}itin| ships or to establish the correctness/of their designs, under conditions of actual battle. Naval experts have declared' that' no lessons were taught at Santjigo, 'because " battleship did not meet battleship.'' This is true; but battleship did/not meet battleship at. Port Arthur. Tlierefore the cruicial contests at these two .pXiees have not added greatly to our in'formation. ' The annual construction programmes of the naval Powers generally follow the precedents set by some one of the compel slots in the race of warship building-. Only a. little while ago, the large, high-speed cruiser class, like the Blake and Blenheim, was in vogue; this fancy was tollowed 'bv the Powerful and Terrible, which Great Britain built 4 chiefly because Russia had laid down lite keels of the Bosnia and Rurik. Now. England has gone mad over the. colossal battleship, merely because other Powers are adding to their navies that kind of ships. The contagion has spread to America. It is argued here that we must build an Ajax or Hercules, forsooth, to fight a Jupiter or Mars of.another nation—as if the fighting was to be done as it was in the days of chivalry ! Two ships of the same class may never meet. Wisely directed Powers today have large navies, composed of ships of all types, and all A these vessels can do some fighting and the individual ships are likely to be scattered over the planet when war occurs, so that the large ship may never meet hei echo, unless- the navies of the two warring Powers could meet in midocean to settle the question of supremacy. I was aware of the arming of Japan, and in an article entitled "Coming Sea Power," published in the North American Review. Octobei, 1897. made the first public announcement or* the progress of the island empire toward a r>kce among the naval Powers of lite world. Bui my statements did not attract attention, for many reasons. I did not disclose all the information in my possession regarding the ambitions of Japan: likewise. I was regarded as an admirer of Japan, when I was nothing of the kind. However, to out it mildly, my views of Japan's preparations were thought to be utterly visionary and extravagant. The events of the war now in progress have far more than justified my predictions, although I am as much astonished as are the rest of mankind. While the Japanese were building these ships at Armstrong's and elsewhere, they were training thousands of men with particular reference to the mechanical requirements of modern warships. Extraordinary methods were employed to instruct stokers and other accessory labourers. I find in Louis Livingstone Seaman's new book, "From Tokio Through Manchuria With the Japanese." an important paragraph on the education of stokers. "There was one building at Kure, the operations in which revealed to me more than any other thing T saw the thoroughness of Japan's far-sightedness in preparing for war. It was a low shed where stokers were trained to distribute coal evenly and regularly ovei the great furnaces under the boilers of warships. Probably no other nation ever thought of making such preparations lor training, what might be called its cheapest labour, in expeditious methods of work. Here were long lines of men doing nothing foi hours together except shovelling. They were not shovelling coal, but large stones and pebbles supposed to represent coal, into a series of ovens. The pebbles were dumped, from time to time, upon an iron floor. The men then shovelled them back again into the supposed furnaces of warships. Hour after hour this work went ou, the stokers seeming to execute their tasks with as much enthusiasm as if actually on board a warship and engaged in hostile operations." This explains the extraordinary means Japan employs to train her stokers and all other accessories to warship administration. When a builder of battleships sends one of his creations on bet trial trip, he exercises the utmost care in the selection of the stokers who are to tew the furnaces. The adoption of water-tube boilers make." the stoker's part in the war game vastly more important tnan formerly. The man in the stokehole will settle the "Battle of the Boilers" to which I have referred.

Since writing the foregoing. I have read: with great interest the last report of Ad- ; moral Converse of the Bureau of Naviga- I tion. He deals with conditions in actual I battle. He says:—"Early events of the hostilities in the Fa.- East and subsequent accounts of various exploits, in all of which torpedoes or submarine mines had a prominent part, have given rise to considerable discussion as to the relative values of battleships and torpedo craft—especially the larger type of torpedo boat destroyers. Some writers have gone so far as to declare the usefulness of the battleship at an end. and to incur the expense of buildina more sheetwaste. It is too soon to draw final conclusions from the teachings of this war. but already there are signs that sentiment adverse to Dattleships has been unsettled, if not altogether abandoned, in the minds of many people. "To wage successful warfare with a naval force requires now, as it has required in all ages, a type of vessel which shall combine, in the most effective manner, the qualities of offence, mobility, defence, endurance, self-maintenance. Such vessels are battleships, and they constitute the main strength and reliance "of a navy. Other types — armoured cruisers, protected cruisers, torpedo vessels —possess all or some of these qualities, but in degree: so different as to unfit them for the heavy encounters which the battleships are designed to endure without disablement.

"It is no revelation that a 'battleship's existence is menaced bv torpedo vessels. Such a risk has always been admitted, and provision is made against it in the construction of the vessels themselves by the method of interior subdivision : also by giving squadrons of heavy •ships the protection afforded by torpedo-boat destroyers and other light vessels. " With regard to torpedo vessels, it will be .recalled that after the war with Spain not a few persons said that the torpedoboats were if no practical value for war purposes. The moral effect alone ot the torpedo, it is safe to say, will prevent this opinion being furthei entertained, notwithstanding that the tangible results so far achieved by the automobile torpedo are less than at first reported." , I hardly expect the warship of the Inline 1-. iiilly meet, all the result gathered from the lemons, of Manila, Santiago, and Port Arthur. Amateurs and mountebanks will appeai with extravagant and fantastic projects, that will divert attention and cost millions of good money. i have a painful remembrance of the disastrous effects of theEricsson craze in the Civil War, the bluri.dels of" which ar-3 not entirely outgrown. Prior to the rebellion, we had in this country . as wise . shipbuilders as lived—their equals are'iiot alive to-day! Capable shipbuilders, naval constructors and designers were swept off their feet bv the Monitor craze. I have a .vivid recollectior. of the extravagances, persecutions and- threats employed against naval officers, of staff or line, and every shipbuilder or private citizen *.ho had the temerity to combat the Ericsson craze. About 80 per cent, of the prominent naval officers were antagonistic tc the Monitor type of fight ins, ship. Having been ill the thick ot„tuf fight, I can speak from experience. The country was impoverished --foi live ht'iidred million dollars oi the national debt is directly and indirectly a consequence ot " the Monitor madness."