THE New Zealand Hreald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, MARCH 11, 1905. THE RUSSIAN COLLAPSE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLII, Issue 12812, 11 March 1905, Page 4

THE New Zealand Hreald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, MARCH 11, 1905. THE RUSSIAN COLLAPSE.

Twelve months ago . the Japanese were marching across Corea, bent on the invasion of Manchuria by .way of the Yalu. The Russians, held the whole of Manchuria, and treated with scorn the suggestion that the outcome of the war could be disastrous to them. To-day, the Japanese are in complete possession of the southern half of the province they were then marching to invade, and the Russians have not only been beaten from Mukden but display a. demoralisation unprecedented in their history. It is. consequently, of exceedingly great interest to re- ! call briefly the circumstances immediately connected with the rupture of negotiations that preceded hostilities. Japan was not prepared to fight for Manchuria, but she was determined for fight for Corea, and to refuse any proposals which endangered her position in that land. Russia, on the other hand, was not satisfied with " the recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria, and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests." She insisted upon the creation of a neutral /one in Corea, while refusing to acquiesce in the creation of a corresponding neutral zone in Manchuria; upon prohibiting to Japan thq use of " any part of the Corea coast for strategical purposes," and the undertaking ''on the coasts of Corea, any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the straits of Corea,'' which lie between the mainland and Japan, while insisting upon her own right to use Manchuria for strategical purposes, and to undertake military works on its coast and upon the guarantee by Japan of "the independence and territorial integrity"' of the Corcaa Empire, while refusing point blank to agree to respect " the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria." 'the only concession, if it can be so termed, which she offered in Manchuria was contained in the formal article submitted to Japan at the climax, of thesis futile negotiations. This read: " Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interests, while Russia within Die limits of that province will not impede Japan or any other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements." In its circular to the Powers after the rupture of negotiations Russia claimed that she saw " absolutely no reason to include in a special treaty with Japan regarding Corean affairs any provisions j concerning territory occupied by j Russian troops."' Presumably, the military reasons since supplied by j Oyama and his troops have convinced the Tsar that Japan had a right to discuss the Manchurian situation at Mukden, even although his diplomatists refused to discuss it during the negotiations at Tokio. To sum up, apart from Japan's diplomatic championship of the "open door" policy for both China and Corea, the war arose because Russia not. only insisted that her occupation of Manchuria was not to lie challenged, but that Corea should be left defenceless against any raid she might make upon it in the future. That she was determined to back these extraordinary pretensions by force was clearly proved by the pouring into Manchuria before the end of - 1903 of 150.000 men. with 2GG guns, ! by the great increase in her naval| strength in Eastern waters', and by j the ceaseless work on the fortifications of Port Arthur and Vladivostok. She was only negotiating to gain time, in the Muscovite fashion, and undoubtedly intended and expected to acquire not only Manchuria but Corea. as preliminaries to her firm establishment as the acknowledged suzerain of the Far East. And in one short year her navy has been demolished, and her army reduced to such a plight that the chief care of St. Petersburg is whether or not it can avoid annihilation.

Daring the whole of the campaign of 190] the Russian troops opposed to the Japanese, advance that stubborn resistance which has so often turned their defeats into ultimate victories. As is now generally known, they foiled in this way the complete consummation of the Japanese plans, which were to winter in Mukden. Bur, an astounding though very natural change has evidently come over the temper of the Russian soldiers. Even thus early in the campaign of 1905, they have shown that though they may still fight they have no heart in the war, and can no longer be depended upon to resist to the uttermost. The outbreak of Russian feeling against the autocracy, against maladministration, against the war, has infected the soldiery to such an extent that for the first time since the war began the plans of the Japanese work without a hitch through all the intricate movements of a strategic battle. Napoleon is generally credited with having claimed that, Waterloo was won by him at three o'clock in the afternoon, a contention explicable on the basis of the admitted,, fact that by that time he had battered the British troops to such an extent that under all ordinary circumstances they would have abandoned the field. If we can conceive of those British troops at Waterloo having been so disturbed

by news from England that they had become demoralised we have a conception of what has happened in the battles round Mukden. The Russians were in a desperate plight at the best, outnumbered, outgunned, outflanked, but they were on the defensive, and defence is the Russian military strong point. Last year they would certainly have made a better stand and have fallen back in such a deliberate fashion as always to have maintained an unbroken line of battle. Whole brigades, in every part of the extensive field would have stolidly sacrificed themselves in obedience to strategic orders, whereas now only a part of the army appears to retain that admirable spirit of military devotion. With the result that the battle appears to have degenerated into what is very much like a rout, and would be altogether a rout were it not for the peculiar advantages possessed by the retreat in these days of long range rifles. Over and over again, during hist year, the Russian soldier saved his generals from overwhelming disaster along the long retreat to Mukden, but he will hardly save them during the long retreat to Harbin, and on to the Siberian frontier. We may expect surrenders by wholesale .and retail, the flingingdown of arms whenever brigades are cornered, the slipping across the enemy's linos of discontented squads—a symptom of demoralisation that has already begun. And we shall have a louder demand than ever from Russian merchants, manufacturers, artisans, shopkeepers, peasants, all the industrial classes, for the cessation of a war that was never approved by any but the military class, and that only success could have justified in the public mind. That peace can only be bought now by the withdrawal of Russia from Vladivostok, as well as from the whole of Manchuria, does not eliminate the possibility that it may be made. For the ill-omened Baltic fleet is apparently being recalled, leaving Vladivostok to its fate, and it is evidently impossible for Russia to effectively reinforce Kuropatkin's army, which has proved itself quite unable to withstand the onslaught of the Japanese.