RUSSIAN DIFFICULTIES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 12602, 17 June 1904, Page 4

RUSSIAN DIFFICULTIES.

The Russian has always been reputed to share the inherent Northern capacity for improving under defeat and flisaster. He has now an excellent opportunity for demonstrating this quality, seeing that his difficulties grow greater and his position more hazardous day by day. The reported "escape" of the Bussian fleet from Vladivostok resembles in many ways that of the Spanish fleet from Santiago. In both cases the hostile fleet is recognised as being so superior that the open sea is only sought as a desperate alternative to otherwise certain destruction or capture. For we cannot but assume that the advisers of the Tsar must have ordered Admiral Skrydloft to leave the protection of Vladivostok, and that this order was induced by considerations nearly allied to despair. Food is known to have been running short, and sailors must eat as well a3 soldiers. The imminent fall of Port Arthur would let loose an overwhelming naval force upon Vladivostok and its sheltered ships. While on the seas, the Russians may possibly do some damage before they are captured or sunk, and may even manage to escapo to more friendly waters. As for the naval superiority of Japan being seriously challenged we can as easily suppose that Admiral Cervera dreamt of wresting the command of West Indian waters from our American cousins. But the excursion of the Vladivostok fleet is, aftei all, only an incident. The main interest of the war and the most vital difficulties of the Russians centre round the fate of beleaguered Port Arthur. The Japanese are now in actual possion of the Manchurian coast and of the entire neck of the peninsula, at whose head Port Arthur stands. They have penetrated for a considerable distance into the country that flanks the railway to Mukden. The inhabitants are wholly friendly to them and semi-hostile to their opponents. With the sea immediately in their rear and with no need to protect " lines of communication," their movements are as easily arranged as though they were at field manoeuvres in their own islands. In a word, they have every advantage. If General Kuropatkin really intends to attempt the relief of Port Arthur and is not merely gaining time, as is the more probable supposition, he must mova through a country where every eye seeks information on behalf of the enemy and along a railway on whose flanks press mobile and dashing foes. He must not only feed his troops, in itself a difficult task, but must move forward the necessary artillery and ammunition wherewith to dislodge a stronglyentrenched and completely-equipped army. Possibly, greater feats of arms have been accomplished than that which confronts the Russian commander. Frederick the Great extricated himself from more complex entanglements and against greater odds, while a dozen of the great captains of history would have found in the situation the inspiration that comes /to military genius when weaker men despair. But there is no evidence as yet that Kuropatkin will make himself the Olive of Manchuria. Judging from the incident of the Vladivostok fleet he has very little hope himself of reaching Port Arthur before famine and assault open its gates.