THE SITUATION.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 11825, 30 November 1901, Page 5 (Supplement)

THE SITUATION.

NAVAL AND MILITARY MUDDLES.

SOME POLITICAL PUZZLES. { [from our OWN CORRESPONDENT.] j London, October 10. j Controversy still runs high as to Sir Red- j vers Buller's remarkable speech. Although the heavy weight of public opinion goes strongly against him there are, of course, j many people who, studiously ignoring the [ fact that he is condemned purely on the strength on his own statements, declare that j li 9 is being " victimised" by a " clique" who want to hound him out of the service, and so forth. It seems impossible to make these sapient persons understand that whereas; Buller was sent out to protect the interests of the Empire he insteadafter a defeat] which he attributes to 'Tank bad luck" but ; which other people explain quite differently —proposed to Sir George White a course which would have dealt the Empire and its interests the heaviest blow that either could possibly have sustained, and that he did so without the smallest warrant. Lord Roberts', comments alone make this clear. Buller wanted to abandon Ladysmith ; Lord Roberts insisted on his effecting the relief. Again Buller gave as his reasons for his .unworthy suggestion to White one which proved a baseless fearthat horse-sickness would occur, and another which when tested proved to be merely that ho " thought"— thought quite wrongly— had heard that White had not enough"stores to hold out. No; I fear that Buller must bo judged on his own statements and admissions, and if so it is no wonder he had " rank bad luck" or that the Empire had it also while he was in command. Notwithstanding Mr. Brodrick's defence a feeling of deep dissatisfaction still pervades tins country at the Ministerial muddle in South Africa. Were it not that the Opposition patty is hopelessly leaderless and split up into* irreconcileably antagonistic sections the Salisbury Government would have all it could do to hold its own. But nobody elm contemplate its replacement by a Radical administration, under either the weak and wavering " C.8." or the proBoerish John Morley. The really capable Liberal leaders, such as Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey, and Mr. Asquith, seize every possible opportunity of accentuating their unchangeable Imperialism and auti-Boerism and their consequent absolute dissent from the views of the C.8.-Hareourt-Morley-La-bouchere section of the Opposition. . Nor does ii. mend matters that Lord Salisbury's early resignation— any rate his resignation immediately after"next year's coronation—is persistently predicted upon what is alleged to be unimpeachable outhority. That may or may not be. But it is certairilv vraisemblable that the septuagenarian and widowed Premier should yearn for the repose he has so well earned by long and valuable past services to the nation, and for leisure to pursue his much-loved researches in chemistry. Even in the present crisis unprejudiced thinkers frankly recognise that Lord Salisbury's part has been the only really satisfactory one. It is true that he is blamed for inaction and for leaving things too much to his colleagues. But even a Primp Minister cannot be everywhere or do everything. He must practise devolution very largely in any case, and this is particularly necessary when, as in the present instance, the Premier is the supreme specialist and

expert in foreign affairs. It is in this respect that Lord Salisbury s unseen work has been so enormously valuable The mere fact that at such a difficult and dangerous crisis in the affairs of the nation, when Britain's hands have been to so large an extent tied by the South African trouble, not one single foreign nation, in spite of all the alleged prevalence of unfriendly feeling, has so far made the slightest attempt to profit by our embarrassment or to presume on our supposed impotence, speaks volumes for the wisdom mid skilland prudence and tact of Lord Salisbury's fixations with all foreign countries and their Governments. If for this alone, England'rnd her colonies owe ' ord Ns»li«bm : ! ''■ ' '•_' " ! boundless gratitude. Let anyone only imagine for one moment what would have been our position and that of the .colonies had France and Russia raised the Egyptian question at such a crisis, or had Russia interfered in Afghanistan on the Ameer's death, or even had Holland. Belgium. Spain. uid Portugal thrown in their lot with the Boers—no improbable contingency for various reasons and then the vast benefit which even in our present troubles we have enjoyed through possessing at least a " free hand" in dealing with South Africa, must at once be realised

That peculiar Rhodes-Scbmidhorst correspondence which was published in extenso last Sntti'.'av does not ten.! to inspire enhanced confidence in •' H.M. Opposition." The Opposition party and journals angrily repudiated the Spectator's charge that Mr. Cecil Rhodes had bought up their Egyptian evacuation policy with his cheque for £5000. But it is admitted that he made the nonevacuation of Egypt an essential condition of his gift of the £5000 to the Liberal funds, and that Schnadhorst so understood it, yet that, nevertheless the famous Liberal organiser accepted the "five thou.," while-Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Morley continued to advocate evacuation. It is, as one writer truly observes, a squalid and discreditable affair.

The Times remarks very justly:—"The Rhodes-Schnadhorst correspondence reflects no credit upon anybody concerned. Whether it bears out all the things that have been said on the strength of loose recollection of its tenour. and whether Sir Henrv CampbellBannerman was justified in describing these things as lies from beginning to end, are matters of very minor importance with which we are glad to know that wo have nothing to do. What will primarily strike the fender is a certain squalor that hangs about the wholo transaction. Without being able to point to any conspicuous transgression of the moral law most people will feel that the whole business is in the highest degree questionablesome might even say shady." Most true!

But to return to affairs naval and military. While manv critics regard the military side of the situation as it relates to foreign affairs relatively of secondary importance— because an enemy commanding the sea could starve us into submission without a single foreign soldier needing to land on our shores —these same critics point out that naval security'becomes of all the more paramount import, as Cobden himself so strongly, even passionately, urged. In this connection the Viper and C»brn disasters have ail the mor* sinister significance. The Cobra court-mar-tial has just delivered its unanimous verdict in most plain and uncompromising terms. It is as follows:- " 1. 11.M.5. Cobra foundered on the morning of September 16, 1901, while on passage from the Tyne to Portsmouth. The Court have come to the conclusion that H.M.s. Cobra did not touch the ground, nor was her locs due to any error in navigation, but was attributable to the weakness of the ship. 2. The Court also find that the Cobra was weaker than other destroyers, and in view of that fact it is to be regretted that she was purchased into His Majesty's service. 3. No blame attaches to Chief lui gincer J. J. G. G. Percey and the remainder of the survivors, and the Court fully acquit them." That is to say the opinion I originally expressed—on very good authority proved correct, viz., that the Cobra did not strike any rock or shoal or wreckage, but simply crumpled up through inherent structural weakness, which unfitted her to battle with the heavy sea that was running ; she got " bridged" across two .waves and probably another broke over her, so she hist "caved in;" her middle went down, and both pud* eame up with the tops of tin' end funnels " looking at one another." And sixty gallant,men perished !

It came out in evidence that the Cobra, as first offered to the Admiraltv by her eminent builders, was not deemed finite suitable. so she was altered here and there, and the weight of her machinery .largely augmented without any corresponding strengthening of her hull, never too strong. Her builders frankly declared that such vessels a..e unfit for work in rough weather—another rather disquieting enlightenment. However, it is announced that some new submarine boats constructed in compliance with the public demand, in view of French and Russian progress in respect of tries'" 'nival novelties, are turning out all right. Still, with the costly experience of the new Royal yacht and its cost of a m'llion sterling, through Admiralty muddling, still fresh in the memory, we are not over sanguine. Wo can only hope for the best. But whether or not we are

leaning on a broken reed in trusting to the protection o our navy we do not yet know. We can only trust that the question may not be practically tested in our time. For it is impossible to avoid feeling many and grave misgivings.