THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1901.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 11582, 21 February 1901, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1901.

Tx the opinions being taken by the Federation Commission, considerable stress is being laid upon the commercial results which might accrue from our joining the Australian Commonwealth. It is frequently assumed that there is no possibility of a very desirable reciprocity, based upon mutual advantage, being arranged if we refuse to merge our political rights and privileges in the Federation. This may prove to be quite true while our neighbours are in the first flush of their enthusiasm and while they may regard alleged commercial advantage as likely to induce us to become absorbed ; we are assuming for the moment that there might be commercial advantage to be gained, an assumption which the opinions generally expressed do not at present justify. ."But we think there can be no question that, in the ultimate, trade relations will have to be considered apart from any such question. Whether we federate or not, New Zealand and Australia are both loyal and inalienable sections of the

British Empire, and integral sections of still wider Anglo-Saxondom. It is not possible to think that our fel- , low countrymen across Tasman's Sea | can nurse any persistent ill-feeling j towards us should we decide that our '. well-being is better served by our relatively independent status. What- ! ever momentary unpleasantness our inability to see things through their ; spectacles may cause in our com- : mercial relations, any such stiffness , must in the end be softened by the | sense of our common national and | Imperial interests. The interna- j tional struggle for that commercial j and industrial supremacy which is j the basis of worldly prosperity must ; inevitably overshadow our local dif- ! ferences. New Zealand and Austra- ' lia are both vitally involved in the I broader and wider life of the Empire. The battle between the world- j powers is altogether likely to be too I pronounced to allow two sections of j the Empire to fritter away their strength in merely local bickerings, j The question of mutually advan- j tageous reciprocity between Austra- j lia and New Zealand may safely be j left to settle itself. j That the Twentieth Century will j be marked by commercial rivalries j of ever-increasing intensity can ■ hardly be doubted. Britain is itself j a consistent advocate of tha " open : door' policy, establishing that prin- ; ciple not merely in every depen- j dency over which the Imperial rule I is extended, but maintaining it with j admirable courage in the United \ Kingdom itself. But though it can | proudly point to it? commercial su- ! periority in proof of the soundness I of its position, it must be confessed j that it has not converted to its views j either its commercial rivals or the j majority of its self-governing off- j spring. On the contrary, its rivals | have been keen to seize upon every j opportunity of securing preference : for their own trade, and have only j waived their inclinations where no other method was possible, as in j China. Even in China, we know very well that Russia will do her ut- j most to exclude British trade fr)in that Manchuria which never is but ; always to be evacuated. These ri- I vals, if they cannot point to com- ' mercial superiority as the result of their fostering policies, can at any rate assert that the once unapproachable commercial supremacy of the United Kingdom is no longer so amazingly in evidence. Doubtless, very many factors have combined to equalise the commercial struggle, and it was clearly not possible for Britain to hold completely the unique position she won as the result of the long struggle with France. But however we look at it the hard fact remains that with the single exception of Britain the competing nations are determined to " corner" markets wherever they can. This is exerting an influence upon the Imperial policy which may well- lead to endless complications and to unforeseen eventualities. And if foreign nations are thus strenuously seeking to close their markets to all rivals—particularly to

the arch-rival of them all, our own Mother Country—the British colonies are being inspired with a conn-

I tervailing desire to advantage trade | within the Empire. Canada has led I the way with preferential duties to Britain. The initial Australian Government has declared itself in a similar spirit, and appeals thereon to the electors. The loyalists in South Africa declare themselves like-minded as a response to the threat of the Bond to "boycott" British goods. It is hardly necessary to state what would be the general feeling in our own New Zealand. An Imperial " zollverein" can-

not be considered within the scope of immediate Imperial politics. But the idea is abroad, and spreading far and wide. The increasing intensity of foreign' rivalry and the persistent exclusiveness of foreign policies, combined with the growth of the Imperial conception and the gathering clannishness of the Imperial provinces, may easily dry public opinion to tinder; the necessary spark may at any time be supplied. The Empire will form its commercial ranks to meet any really serious danger, as readily as it formed its military ranks to resist unexpected invasion. Just what form a prospective Zoll-

verein might take it is impossible to forecast, but some such commercial alliance cannot be regarded as an impossible event of the Twentieth Century. In the face of these greater problems, any petty jealousies between Australia and New Zealand would inevitably disappear. For many centuries the sword must continue to be the final resort in national disputes which cannot be compromised. But apart from war, the Twentieth Century is bound to see great commercial battles, A skirmish is going on at

the present time between Russia and America, When Frante and Germany struck with their sugar bounties at British trade, the Briton stubbornly *stuck to his " open door" policy, and resisted the temptation to retaliate. But America has no such fiscal principle to prevent her retort to a similar sugar bounty instituted by Russia and Belgium. Russia has retaliated by specially taxing American "hardware." And it is possible to conceive of commercial rivals, in great periods of industrial depression or in times of great political excitement, proceeding to such extremes in these fiscal tactics as to almost cause a suspension of trade relations. Britain does not conduct its public business in this fashion, but Britain may be attacked in this fashion by one _or other of her persistent foes. We know now that the Russian Government once proposed to the American Government to "corner" wheat, a suggestion directed against the United Kingdom. The American Government, conscious of kinship, bluntly refused. But this idea of " cornering" foodstuffs against Britain is not dead. French strategists have suggested that the course the Americans officially refused to adopt might be pursued by employing huge sums of money on the American markets. Dependence on imported food is the vulnerable spot on the heel of Imperial Achilles ; the shoe of a Zollverein that would include the whole English-speaking race might come to be thought a most desirable protection.