THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1900.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVII, Issue 11536, 22 November 1900, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1900.

Ihe people of loyal Natal have presented a sword of honour to General Bulier, and have received from him in return that frank explanation of his now historic difficulties which a brave man can only make to sympathetic hearers. We are sure that our readers have read that explanation with interest, and have recognised in it the generous courage and simple truthfulness of the general who, by a whole year's unassuming work, has more than regained the confidence of the Empire. For when we come to see it put before us in soldierly frankness we have to admit that General Builer's main offending, indeed, his only offending, was that he failed to relieve Ladysmith at the first attempt. As nothing succeeds like success, so nothing fails like failure. " I came here and failed in my first attempt to relieve Ladysmith, and lost the command in South Africa, and, I think, rightly:" this is his own statement. We believe that his own patient and persistent and unassuming qualities, assisted by a most fortunate series of opportunities to show his capacity, have entirely freed General Buller from any mistaken condemnation. And we cannot help thinking that many other deserving soldiers of the Queen have been unjustly condemned and criticised, in that unreasonable and ruthless spirit with which public indignation is always charged. Doubtless there have been many mistakes, and there is much need for stringent reforms in the entire War Office system and for important reforms in the officialism of the army itself. But the public is apt to exaggerate the importance even of important matters, particularly when our national pride is involved. And a year ago, the " bottl-ing-up" of our armies in South Africa by a foe we hardly estimated aright, filled us with sullen rage under all our stoicism and led us to hunger savagely for scapegoats and sacrifices. It is rathei ? pity that we

cannot ; have a thorough investigation of the whole war ; we feel satisfied that while it would show many places where reforms and amendments were necessary it would show that in many cases those whom we have been blaming were in reality guiltless of any shortcoming and deserving of every praise. None but competent military experts can give any opinion worth having as to the strategic correctness of General Buller's advance on the Tugela. Yet those of us who are not military experts but understand somewhat the political situation, have a very vivid recollection of the delicacy of the position last November, and of the need for staving off any crowning disaster, and of preventing further Boer encroachments. The South African Dutch j were ripe for rebellion, and rose in arms wherever the Boer flag was set up. Natal was full of loyalists who were making heroic sacrifices to stem the tide of war and beat back invasion. It was doubtful, a year ago, whether General Joubert would not crush General White in Ladysmith and move resistlessly down to Durban and the sea. We know now that the Boers attached so much importance to the capture of Lady- ; smith that they even looked for European intervention when it fell; and though our European friends smile on us in the Empire's hour of triumph, they smiled much more naturally in the Empire's hour of gloom. It seems now generally recognised and admitted that the strategical mistake in South Africa ! arose when it was decided not to ! take the recalled General Butler's advice and fall back to the strong position oh the Tugela. This would have given the Ladysmith country into the hands of the enemy, but it would have enabled the Ladysmith garrison to have practically covered the railway, to have occupied, in short, the position afterwards occupied by General Buller, with a protected front and an unassailable rear. But we must remember that we can criticise now with a full knowledge of the Boer strength and armamenture, and of the military experts in their pay. General Butler was known to have peculiar political views on the South African problem, and this naturally lightened his inI fluence. The idea of abandoning British territory was, as naturally, bitterly opposed. We fought the Boers under the worst possible conditions, with everything in their fa- ' vour ; Sir George White was surrounded at Ladysmith. Joubert did win to the Tugela, after all, but Ladysmith lay in his rear. From that moment it became of supreme importance to stay further Boer advances and further Boer successes. On the one hand, the Afrikanders were making ready for ? rising against us; on the other hand, troopships were speeding to Capetown and Durban from every part of the Empire. Everything depended on gaining time, and we know how nobly every leaguered post and every battling line that upheld the Union Jack gained time for us. General Buller was not able, for lack of men, to carry out the tactics before intended, and afterwards so successfully followed by Lord Roberts. He placed himself, while waiting, at the most vital point, and strove to relieve Ladysmith. He has been blamed because he failed. But while he was failing, the Imperial army swelled to 200,000 men, time I was won and the Boer was beaten.

We should feel some diffidence at recounting the well-known facta of the Ladysmith campaign, were it not that things bear such a totally' different aspect when looked at in the clearer light of later days than when looked at through the smoke of present battle. In the navy there is a very laudable and exemplary custom of regarding as in commission every ship, whether sunk, lost, captured, until its fate has been officially pronounced and the parties responsible officially adjudged innocent or guilty; every injury to a ship is similarly inquired into. It has been suggested at Home that this method might well be adapted to the military branch of our defences. While the suggestion has been made with the idea that thereby incapable officers could be detected and strategic mistakes punished, we are strongly of opinion that officers themselves would favour such an inquiry system as only just to those who reach positions where they are prominently in public view. Only once in a very great while does such a lamentable event as the loss of the Victoria happen. Many navy vessels are lost or injured, but our confidence in the searching investigations which we know will follow prevents any premature condemnation, and enables impartial justice to be meted out to the innocent as to the guilty. In army matters, on the contrary, the public is inclined to run to the extremes, having no authoritative information, and often, with all the well-meaningness in the world, it does injustice to capable and praisedeserving but unhappily circumstanced officers.