WAR NEWS BY THE MAIL.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVII, Issue 11367, 9 May 1900, Page 5

WAR NEWS BY THE MAIL.

From our American exchanges received by mail yesterday wo extract the following items of war news:—

TUB COST OF TUB WAR,

New York, April 9, A cable to the Tribune from London saysr The ultimate cost of tlio war cannot be estimated from data now beforo tlio Houso of Commons. It is known that, in addition to the millions expended from September to April, the army will require more than £60,000,000 during the next 12 months, and that will not jnoludo transport from South Africa back to England. All estimates for ships, horses, forage, and fowl supplies ap* pear unduly heavy, and it is an open secret that the rates of contractors have been abnormally high. Probably thora has been no way out of it in tho sudden einorgonoy of war, but there is a frank confession by military experts, In and out of Parliament that till Government is paying too much for the soft transport of freight, foodstuffs, military stores and forage, and that tho contractors are making immense, fortunes out of the business of tho war. There are no scandals in the purohaso of supplies, but the market is stripped, and the traders dictate their own terms, and aro fattening upon the army votes.

BOER WAR METHODS,

London, April 11

V. 11. Bm-nham, the American scout, with General. Roberts, explaining the Boer methods of obtaining tho range for rifle fire, «ays: —"One mini fired successive shots and Watched the dust raised by the bullets until accuracy was obtained, and he then communicated the range to his comrades." Burnham also mentions the way which work entrusted to men with tired horses was immediately taken tip by others with frosh. animals if occasion offered, tho newcomers being given instru urnis and tho range by tho men whoso plnon ftoy took. Ho was also struck by the *' extraordinary fulness of the instructions given by the Boer commanders to the men before any movement was begun." These included information as to tho route to be followed, tho intention of the movement, and the different rendezvous in case of either victory or defeat. Another thing that impressed him greatly was" the total absence of leading" in some instances, every man having received instructions and carrying them out independently and as speedily as possible, •■

THE BRITISH LOSSES. London, April 11. Tho War Oflice issued this afternoon a re? turn of the total British casualties, up to April 7. It was as follows; — Killed in notion, 211 officers and. 196Q men.

Died of wounds, 48 officors and 465 men, Missing and prisoners, 163 officers, and 3721 men.

Died of disease. 47 officers and 1485 men. Accidental deaths, 3 officers and 34 men. Repatriated invalids, 288 officers, and 4934 men.

Total, 13,35, exclusive of the sick and wounded now in hospital, To the War Office returns of casualties must ho lidded tho losses of tho last week and the wounded, aggregating about 10,000 men. making a grand total of upwards of 23,000 officers and men put out of action.

MORTALITY DURING THE SIEGE OF

LADYSMITII.

London, April 7. Tho last days in Ladysmitl) aro described by a Standard correspondent, who gives from official sources these figure*:-; ■"- November 2, when the investment began, wo had a garrison of 572 officers and 12,921 men. On March 1, when tho siege was raised, tho garrison was reduced to 400 officers and 9761 men, leaving 169 officer* and 3163 men to ha accounted for by death and sickness. When Goneral Bnller entered trie town there wore in hospitals 1996 officers and men, of. whom 708 were suffering from enteric fever, 341 from dysentery, and 189 from wounds. During the four months from November 2 (a March 1 no fewer than 10,668 soldiers,' oi newly 70 per cent, of the garrison, had boon admitted into the hospitals, to say nothing of oiviliana and others who had slight attack* of what the doctors called 'filth fever/ or incipient enteric, Tho admissions for onteriq fever were 1776, and for dysentery $57, There died of disease and wounds in tho four months 600 men of tho garrison and 40 civilians, while bn the lowest average 140 deaths will probably be recorded against the patients who remain, raising the total mortality from disease and wounds to 700 among Europeans alone. The deaths from enteric fever up to March ware 393, or mart, than 20 per cent.; from dysentery, 117, or 6 per cent.; and from wounds, 59. To this ghastly array of figures may lie added 18 officers and 193 inon killed in action; 17 officers and 160 men killed in assaults, sorties and storming parties; and two officers and 33 men killed by casual bombardment, Tho total of our dead is, therefore, not loss than 1063. Nor does the list end here, for wo have wounded in assaults and sorties 45 officers «nd 352 man,' and by casual bombardment 25 officers ana 207 men. A siege, like a battle, is usually a catalogue of blunders. After the non-destruc-tion of the railway came tho neglect to secure heavy guns and unlimited ammunition. With the material at command Sir George White oould not hope to maintain an equal duel with the enemy's batteries of four 9-ponnders. and 29 long-range guns and howitzers. Tho. Hoera, according to the automatic record of Sir John Willoufthby, who, with Dr. Jameson, lived in absolute seclusion in the centra of the town, fired 15,500 shells within the perimeter. Our expenditure of ammunition did not exceed 4769 rounds, including 3705 fired by field guns in action and assaults. The two 4.7 naval guns expended 524 rounds, the three 12-poimdor naval guns 784 rounds, and the two old-fashioned howitzer? that did excellent service fired 776 shells made 3d years ago. 1 '

WELCOME TO GENERAL WHITE. London, April 14, The scene which greeted Gpngrnl Sir George White when the steamer Dunvegan Castle, on which he left Capetown on March 28, reached Southampton this afternoon must havo convinced him of the admiration of hit countrymen for bin gallant defence of Ladysmith during the long and. trying siege of that place. From early morning crowds collected by thousands in the neighbourhood of the docks. Tho buildings In tho vicinity were gaily decorated with bunting in, honour of the occasion, and all the publio institutions were covered with flags. The harbour presented a brilliant and animated scene, the various vessels having dressed ship, and tho Dunvegan Castle's berth at the wharf boing resplendent with bunting and evergreens. Lady White, tho Mayor, and tho members of the corporation in their state robes, uniformed soldiers and sailors, and a number of privileged guests awaited the gallant defender of Ladysmitb. A? the steamer loomed in tho distance with General White standing on the bridge, the enthusiasm of the waiting multitude broke "loose, and a storm of cheering and singing, and the Bounding of sirens and whistles intermingled uninterruptedly until Sir George landed at half-past two p.m. The greeting between husband and wife boing over, General While, had to undorgo much hand-shaking and the receiving of congratulations, from personal fnends before he reanhod (ho dooksbed, where the municipal authorities presented him with an olaborately illuminatod address, of woloomo, expressing profound admiration at his "noble and sueoossful efforts to uphold and maintain tin honour and dignity of the Empire in distant Natal, which have won tho lasting admira* Hon of the civilised world," . ;' • ••, ; A suitablo reference was made to Ireland's connection with tho defence of , Ladyamith, and' regret was expressedh that tlonerAl White's health (had been imp»ired ■ b? tlw strain, of tho siege, and that he had been ob-

' Jigod to seek rest. The address concluded ; '. by expressing the hope that he would soon P'"to'completely restored to health and able to -' resume • the ! distinguished • task with" which • the Queen and the country had charged him. .'. During the reading of the address the huge crowds in tho vicinity seized every occasion, to hurrah, and the enthusiasm was indescrib- • able. :: '" Hats, handkerchiefs,' and flags wera waved : frantically, "and cheer followed cheer : in endless f succession. General White was visibly moved at the warmth of his reception. In acknowledging the address he referred with admiration to his gallant garrison, every ono Of Whom, he said, " from General Hunter to the bravo trumpeter, had behaved magmGeneral White and Lady White afterward ' proceeded to Nctllev. where the goneral will recuperate. Hundreds of congratulatory tele- ) grams awaited Sir George on his arrival at Southampton, including one from Queen > ictoria, making an inquiry as to his health. ' THE POSITION AT MAFEKING. MAFEKING, April 7. Tho success of Lieutenant. Smith-Eaman, the Rhodesian scout, who, with the exception of a Renter correspondent, a cyclist, is X only white man who has entered Mafeling since tho siege began, is likely to prove 0 great value to Colonel riumer, to whom he has returned with despatches should Plumer decide to raiso the Siege of Mafom in earnest, A Scottish crofter has introduced a method of making nourishing porSo with' oat bran, which u a great boon Lid is 'wiving the questionof feeding: he nitives. Wo are now confident of holding ou two months longer. The men in the trenches are determined to play the game to th The n Boer artillery about Mafeking is well horS Their " pom-poms are mountain light four-wheeled carriages, each drawn by fi smart horses, in marked contrast with these Colonel Dinner fought with at Orocodue pool. The Boers, too, are well mounted .i/t SSwrawd, and have fit-looking patrols. The land other crops in the distne excellent, bo the Transvaa ers are not like to suffer from scarcity of food for a long

OBITICISMS OP THE INTELLIGENCE W DEPARTMENT.

New York, April 13.

Mail advices from London, dated April 5 contain tho following:~A Times correspor, don Writing ot the intelligence staff with Sit George White, says:-"The Intelligence Dnpar mont with Si. George White furnish,, 3 food for criticism What amount o information they were able to supply to tho executive staff I am unable to say, but from the results ot ' mournful Monday one is die inclined to believe, that their local information nt that period was of value. Ihe operations on October 30 were undertaken solely upon the information supplied by the officers of the field intelligence. The results were deplorable. But out hold into} lgonce suffers not sc much from want of ability on the part of officers who guide the department as from a false economy which limits expenditures of money on secret service. Hie Boers understand these matters much better than wo do. The British Intelligence Department is content to buy tho information from a Kaffir for £5, whore the Dutch would attempt to corrupt the heads of departments with £5000. Lavish expenditure is the secret of intelligence; it is a marketable commodity, and,'tho market being an unpleasant ono for all concerned, the prices must naturally run high. Sir George White's intelligence officers trusted for the most part to information cheaply purchased from Kaffirs. Its valuo was consequently small. Moreover, before the investment, no check was placed upon the civil inhabitants. There is not the smallest doubt that during the early weeks of tho invasion of Natal, Ladysmith was full of Dutch spie3 and Boer sympathisers. No steps wero taken. As a result, tho enemy in absolute possession of all our movements,'* as I believe them to have been throughout the siege. The information which they possessed of all the miliary movements in Natal was wonderful. When the relief force took Oingolo mountain, they found among Botha's papers a file of General Builer's orders translated into Dutch. This file contained the memorable speech made after Spionkop. Knowing tho cupidity of the enemy, it is not saying too much to state the belief that if the money had been supplied some high official on the Boer staff could have been bought." A British mounted officer serving with the mounted colonial infantry under Genera] Bullor, writes to the ''Telegraph: " I never mean or wish again to soldier with the slower moving British cavalry. Their methods in these days oi wiro fences and long-range magazine fire is over; against the Mauser or the Lce-Metford nothing but infantry can prevail. But to cover the infantry's advance and watch its flanks, tho present cavalry is too heavy and too slow. Some radical changes must take place in our cavalry organisation. Ido not bcliovo in a system of mounted infantry, but in cavalry organised in something like tlfo manner of the South African volunteers."

DR. CONAN DOYLE ON THE BRITISH ' SOLDIER.

London, April 14.

/The Blownfontcin fcorrespondent of the Daily Mail says:—Dr. Conan Doyle contributes to the Friend of the Free State a

picturesque description ot the British infantry. He says: "Who could have con-

eeived that had seen this prim soldier in time, peace that ho could so quickly transform himself into this grim, virile barbarian? Bulldog faces, hawk faces, hungry wolf faces, every sort of faco except a weak one. Most of them have swarthy faces and lean a little forward, with eyes steadfast and features impassive, but resolute. Here is a clump of mounted infantry, with a grizzled fellow, like a fierce old eagle, at tho head of them. Some are maned like lions; some have young, keen faces, but all leave an impression of familiarity upon mo. Yet I have not seen / irregular British cavalry before. Why should it be so familiar to me—this loose-limbed, head-erect, swaggering type? Of course, 1 have seen it in the American cowboy over and over again. Strange that a few months of tho veldt should have produced exactly the same man as springs from the Western prairie."

/ THE ABANDONMENT OF SPIONKOP. London, April 17. Tho War Office to-night published in the Gazette a despatch from Lord Roberts, dated February 13, submitting General Boiler's despatches describing the Spionkop and other operations from January 17 to January 24. Lord Roberts deals severely with General Warren and some others. Even General Buller does not efeape. Lord Roberts complains that the plan of operations is not clearly described in the despatches. After sketching General Boiler's intentions, as communicated to Sir Charles Warren, who commanded tho whole force, Lord Roberts points out that General Warren seems to have concluded, after consultation with his officers, that tho flanking movement ordered by,, General Bullcr was impracticable, and therefore so changed the plan of advance as to necessitate the capture and retention of Spionkop. Regarding tho withdrawal from Spionkop, tho retention of which had become essential to the relief of Ladysmith, Lord Roberts says:—"l regret to bo unable to concur with Buller in thinking Thorncycroft exercised wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire 1 am of opinion" that Thorneycroft'a assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy's fire could not have be6n'formidable, and it would not have taken more than two or three hours for Thorncycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Warren. Coke appears to have left Spionkop at half-past nine p.m., for the purpose of consulting with Warren. Up to that hour the idea of withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Coke's departure Thorneycroft issued the order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices made to carry it into effect. On the other hand it is only right to say that Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day. The attempt to relievo Ladysmith was well devised, and I agree with Buller in thinking it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, have been 'Hie to the difficulties of the ground, and the commanding positions held by (he enemy, and pro- *" ~ dso to eirors of judgment and want of admin itrative capacity on the part of Warn n. But, whatever faults Warren may have emitted, the failure must also be attributed o the disinclination of the officer in the sum -me command to assert his authority, and st, n that what he thought best was done, and ,'lso to the unwarrantable and needless assumpJon u [ responsibility by a subordinate oflicei." General Buller's report, commenting on General Warren's reports of the capture and evacuation of Spionkop, after disputing the correctness of some of Warren's assertions and describing lluj dangerous situation occupied by General Warren's force, continues: —If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken in hand, entrenchments laid out, and the dead and wounded removed, the whole place would have been brought under regular military commands, and the hills would have been held, 1 am sure. But no' arrangements were made. Coke appears to have boon ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him. Those on top were ignorant of he fact that the guns were coming up, and generally there

was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence. It is admitted that all of Thorneycroft's command " acted with the greatest . gallantry throughout{the day, and really Wed the situation. 'But preparations for the second day's dcfenco should havo been organised during tho day and commenced at nightfall. As this was not done, I think Thorneycroft exercised discretion." General Warren sets forth tho fact that tho Spionkop operations had not entered into his original plans, as his instructions weroto occupy a plain north of it. On consultation with the Commander-in-Chief on January

21, howover, when the question of retirii _ from or attacking Spionkop was discussed, 1 Warren expressod him preference for attacking. This was successfully accomplished by Geaeral Woodgate. Then came the order of the Commander-in-Chief to put Thorneycroft in command on the summit; in the meantimo Warren had sent General Coke up to reinforco him, with orders to assume comand. Ineffectual efforts were mado to heliograph Thorneycroft and ask whether he had assumed command. Toward sunset he was finally enabled to get orders through, and concluded that the position could be held the next day if guns could be provided and shelter obtained. Both theso conditions were about to bo fulfilled, when, "in tho absence of Coke, whom I had ordered to come and report in person on tho situation, the evacuation took placo under orders, given on his own responsibility, by Thornoycroft. This occurred in the, face of the vigorous protests of Coke's Brigade Major and others."