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SPECIAL INTERVIEWS.

A CHAT WITH CAPTAIN H. JOHNSON

ON SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS. As Captain Johnson, late captain in the 80th Regiment, served in the Cape Colony, in the Gaika and Ga-leka campaign, 1877; the Sekukuni campaign war, 1878-79; and in the Zulu war under Sir Evelyn Wood, a Herald representative had a chat the other day with him on South African affairs. The campaigns in which he took part belong to the past decade, but still they throw a light upon the present embroglio, and as his opinions are the views of an actor in some of the episodes which mark the pages of South African history, they are not without their value and interest at the present time. "Why did the English interfere in the Zulu war, and save the Boers," said our representative, "instead of leaving the Boers and the Zulus to fight it out?" " The reason that the British intervened," said Captain Johnson, "was from a belief that when the Zulus had overpowored the Boers, they would assail the colony of Natal. The Boers might possibly have held their own, considering what they did in the days when they were armed with the muzzle-loader. In the Sekukuni campaign, in the north of the Transvaal, the Boers assisted us, under the command of Captain and they did good work, being excellent bush-fighters and raiders. Piet Uis, in the same campaign, was of great assistance to Sir Evelyn Wood. The old Dutch settler—the dopppr—was never favourable to British power in the Transvaal. His idea of happiness was having flocks and herds, never seeing the smoke of his neighbour's chimney from his own homestead, and being always in a position to shoot a buck, should his larder want replenishing, He hated towns and villages, and large assemblages of men, except when he came to town to the nachtinal. At the time Sir Theophilus Shepstone was asked by a cosmopolitan crowd, living in the towns of the Transvaal, to take over the country, the Boers propei were even then averse to annexation, although the Transvaal Treasury was practically' bankrupt. The Orange Free State, on the other hand, was averse to severing the connection with British rule, believing her protection warded off any native attack. President Braund was an enlightened ruler, and was always most friendly with the British authorities. A different spirit arose in President Steyn's time, through kinship and intercourse with the Transvaal Boers, who have been continuously hostile to the British. This hostility arose from the trekking at every advance of British colonisation. When the Boers got to Natal, they were followed round by sea, and then they trekked finally to the Transvaal, where the Uitlanders flocked when the gold discoveries were made. There was no trouble about gold until after the retrocession, although when we were in Leydenberg, in 1878, some of the soldiers sluiced gold out of the streams in a miggetty form, but the whole output of gold of the Transvaal for the year was only £25.000." "What are your views on the present campaign?" Apparently the British commander is playing a waiting game, acting largely on the' defensive until such time as a general forward movement shall take place, after Sir Redvers Buller shall have arrived with his army corps'. The evacuation of Newcastle, and the northern portion of Natal generally, is easily accounted for, if one but glances at the excellent map published by the Herald the other day. Possibly the intention was to get the Boers into the open portions of Natal, and then try and cut them off from their bases of supply. It will be"noticed that the northern portion of Natal forms the apex of a triangle with the Orange Free State on one side and the Transvaal stretching right away down past Utrecht on the other. Thus an Imperial force left anywhere within this apex would be ill grave danger of having its communications with the main body of the Imperial troops operating iu Natal, cut off by the Boers on the east and the Free Staters on the west. Naturally it must have been very galling for General White to find it necessary to withdraw from such excellent positions as Laing's Nek and Newcastle would have been but for the danger of the Free State Boers dropping clown from the passes of the Drakonsberg spurs. All the same, I fail to see why a few thousand men could not have been spared to hold these passes against the Free State Boers, and thus prevented their operating on our left (lank. By the left flank I mean that flank which would be on our left with our face to the foe. Why it should have been found necessary to leave Colonel Powell with his handful of men at Matcking is a puzzle. It is not in any way a strategical point, and is a township of no consequence compared with the towns evacuated in Natal. Being on the main line of railway running from Buluwayo via Kimberley to the Cape, there should not have been the slightest difficulty in concentrating Colonel Baden-Powell's troops at Kimberley. There, I imagine, such a reinforcement would be most welcome. It will take the British troops all their time to guard the railway lines, to say nothing of tunnels and bridges, in our territory. No general would be such a fool as to think that he and his troops were going to take a first-class journey from Capetown, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban, and Lorenzo Marquez, without being just occasionally stopped on the way." "What may probably be the various routes of advance when the British army corps arrives in South Africa?" " Troops might be landed at Beira, and taken by rail to Fort Salisbury, from which point they would have to march to Buluwayo. From Buluwavo they can drop to Mafeking, although there may be danger of their being taken in Hank, as the route skirts the Transvaal territory for 150 miles. If arrangements can be made with the Portuguese for landing at Delagoa Bay, they would then have to traverse the Delagoa Bay flats, where, if any hitch occurred, there would be a danger of their being decimated by fever, and the tetse fly would kill ninetenths of the horses. Horses and cattle are especially subject to the ravages of the tetse fly, but mules and donkey? are comparatively immune. Fever and the tetse fly are rampant at this time of the year on the Delagoa Bav flats and swamps. The torrential rains at any moment might occasion a grave wash-out, and a boy with a capful of dynamite might cause the destruction of 5606 men there, where they would be stuck up between the flats and the top of the range, anywhere midway between sealevel and 6000 ft. In the event of no hitch occurring, and the expedition arriving safely at Koinati Poort, the line traverses Transvaal territory for over 200 miles to Pretoria, where it junctions with the Port ElizabethEasterling line. They might also land at Port Elizabeth, and move up to Bloemfontein, and into the Orange Free State. The main advance will be from Durban and Capetown." ' " What about the position at Mafeking?' " If Colonel Baden-Powell is not well provisioned at that post-, and his entrenchments armed with guns as heavy as any the Boers can bring against him, they will endeavour to shell him out-. In the event of his not being equipped with heavy artillery, and well provisioned, considering that he has been in direct communication with Capetown by railway, and that ample warning and time has been given, it would seem that 'someone has blundered. The Boers, in attacking Mafeking, would have no railway to transport either guns, men, or stores, and would have to bring them across country for 150 miles, At the last, if not relieved, Colonel Baden-Powell may cut his way out, and fall back into Bechuanaland, and secure supplies in friendly territory. There is no doubt that it is the intention of the Boers to make the colony of Natal and Kimberley the theatre of warin the latter district to capture and ruin the diamond mines, and lines of railway. It is not likely that the Boers will wreck Johannesburg until later in the campaign, when the game is up. In the long run the • British must beat them, as the instinct of self-preservation will prevent them from.doinc otherwise. To yield now means the loss of South Africa, and the only sure route and half-way house .to India, I think when the grand advance is made of the combined forces, two months should see the British army relieving Johannesburg and investing Pretoria. The Boers are splendid bush fighters, and will make their 250 rounds per man go farther, and do more damage than L other nation,, They labour under this, disadvantage, however, that every round exnended is a round less in their magazines,>s . they, have no factories for_ nianufactunng Mauser ammunition for their rifles, 01 for, making cordite powder, and every . Boer knocked over is a good; fighter who cannot ( be replaced."

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH18991025.2.6

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVI, Issue 11203, 25 October 1899, Page 3

Word Count
1,519

SPECIAL INTERVIEWS. New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVI, Issue 11203, 25 October 1899, Page 3

SPECIAL INTERVIEWS. New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXVI, Issue 11203, 25 October 1899, Page 3

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