BRITAIN'S NAVAL POWER.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXIII, Issue 10081, 17 March 1896, Page 5

BRITAIN'S NAVAL POWER.

DEFENCE OF COLONIAL INTERESTS.

OUR MERCANTILE MARINE,

EFFECT OF WAR.

INTERVIEW WITH H.E. ADMIRAL

BRIDUE.

Recent events, doubtless destined to become historic, causod a wave of Imperial feeling to sweep over the colonies such as perhaps hud never existed before. And that Imperialist sentiment caused every colonisb to turn to the navy in such a way that would scarcely have been dreamed possible a few months ago. But thinking people recognised that there is a danger of that sontiment producing no practical and permanent result. With a view, therefore, of obtaining, if possible, tho views of the highest naval authority in this part of the world, a Herald representative, shortly after tho arrival of the fleet In Auckland, sought, and was courteously accorded on the flagship H.M.s, Orlando, an interview with His Excellency Admiral Bridge, in command of the Australasian Squadron.

RS-AWAKENKD INTEREST IN THE NAVY.

Conversation turned, naturally, at first on the intense interest now taken in naval defence.

"One of the mosb favourable symptoms of the re-awakened interest in naval affairs," said His Excellency, "and in tho readiness shown by the British public to submit to all tho sacri-

(ices necessary for establishing and maintaining a very powerful navy is, that it gives proof of tho fact that the nation in general realises what the true condition of the British Empire is. In the Mother country it would bo quite the exception to find anyone who regarded the empire as composed only of the British Islands, with a few outlying dependencies of inconsiderable importance. The immense importance of tho traiis-marine dominions of tho Queen is now fully realised by the mass of tho population, of all classes, in the United Kingdom. And the fact that tho position of Great Britain withoutthese dependencies would bo very different from whab ib is with them, aoetns now to be fully understood. It is this which explains the readiness shown by tho people at home to incur the very large expense causod by the naval establishment on its present scale."

OBJECTS OF THE NAVV. "With the realization of the importance of the navy, there is too a moro complote understanding of its objects, is there not?" " There k The first object undoubtedly has been to render it practically impossible for any probable combination of enemios to dismember the Umpire by forcible occupation of any portion of it. In my opinion our naval power has already reached a stage of efficioncy and number which ensures that the first object has been gained. The next object is undoubtedly to ronder reasonably secure our great ocean trade. Virtually the ocean trade of the British Empire is about 70 per cent, of the whole world. The immense importance of this proportion is not fully roalised evon by ourselvos. Bub there are symptoms that this much, at all ovents, is realised—that wo should be in a position to secure our great share ot the trado of the world against all risks that can be foreseen. _ The moat recent increase of the nary is no doubt largely due to a desire to ensuro the security of our trade. It is important that these two objects should always be borne in mind, because it shows that the powerful British Navy is in no sense an aggressive force."

PURELY DEFENSIVE. " You look upon it then as defonsive only ?'' "It is as purely defensive in its way as tho batteries and fortifications that aro erocted upon the frontiers of independent States. The most recent naval programme has been lately stated by the First Lord of the Admiralty, to have been formally drawn up as far back as November 1895 1 cm answer for I,it, from porsonal knowledge, though not formally put on paper, it was virtually decided upon fully two years ago. This will mako it quite evident that no hostility to any particular nation, or nations, was intended by the large increase to tho fleet lately sanctioned by Parliament. It was simply tho continuation of a policy, essentially defensive, adopted at leasb eoven years ago."

IMPORTANT TO COLONISTS. " As you hare stated tho objects of the navy, it is clearly of an imporUnco to tho colonies unthougbt of by very largo numbers." "It seems hardly necessary to draw attention to the deep interest which every colony should take in what has beon called the first object, namely, security against forcible occupation by a foreign enemy. Thatepoaks for itself. From remarks that are frequently made by men in public portions, in some of the colonies, and in somo colonial newspapora, it is to be inferred that the interest of tho colonies in the maritime trade of the Empire is very inadequately realised." "In what way?" " It has beon stated, in so many words, that it is to the interest of tho mother country, and nob the colonies, to dofotid tho trade between those colonies Mid tho Unitod Kingdom. There could be no more serious mistake. The trade botwoen Australasia and the rest of the world is far moro essential to the prosperity, or even the existence, of the Australasian colonies than it is to that of the mother country. The wholo prosperity of these colonies depends ultimately on freedom of access to these markets for their produce. And these markets, almost) without exception, are separated from tho area of production by considerable oxtonts of ocean. It is true that tho products are chiefly carried in ships owned in tho other country. But if anything wero to happen which would prevent these ships, so owned, transporting tho colonial products no other means would remain of effecting the transport. This must bo obvious whon wo consider the proportion of trado abovementioned. If 70 per cent, of tho rolling stock of any groat carrying organisation were, for any reason, to bo ronclered unavailable, it does not require to be argued that tho commodities usually convoyed by thab organisation would have to lie in the places whore they wero produced. Tho fact that tho British Mercantile Marine occupies so large a place in the ocean trade of the world, shows that, if it wero unavailable, there would be nothing like sufficient material to take its place. If the trade routes originating in the Australasian colonies were insecure, owing to imperfect) defence, ib would bo an absolute necossity, at all events at the beginning of a war, to give up or largely abandon them, and fall back upon routes originating elsowhero which would be more secure. Thus ib will be seen that it is directly, and greatly to the intoresta of the Australasian colonios to have proper de« fence. This shows thab in the second objecb the importance to the colonies is very great, and cannot, in fact), be exaggerated."

COULD OUR MARITIME TRADE Bl EASILY RUINBD? " What would bo the effect of a war upon our maritime trade "Ib is frequently asserted by foreigners that the maritime trade of the British Empire could be easily assailed, and easily ruinod, in war. That is opposed to all historical precedent. British maritimo trade has nob only nob boon destroyed in formor wars, but in the most) oxacting wu.rs in which ib would be possible for any country to engage, our trade has annually, and regularly, increased. This was nover more conspicuously evident than between tho years 1812 and 1815. Our great) war with continental Europo had not come to an end when we found ourselves in a deplorable, and altogether unnecessary, war with tho United Statos. The naval activity of the United States largely took the form of privateering attacks upon our commerce, and our European enemies had been practically reduced to tho same form of warfare. Our trade was asßailod from all sides by hostile ships of war and privateers. Notwithstanding that, cur trade increased.'' " That is very significant ?" "It is. You may have seen the othor day that a well-known American was reported to have ssid that within three months of our going to war the ocean would bo as bare of British coinmcco as the palm of his hand. Now hern is tho case; Between 1791 and 1815

the value of the British import and export i trade increased, on an average, £2,180,000 a year. That is the increase, remember, and of course in those days that sum was in far higher proportion to the total trade than it would be now, though it) would not be inconsiderable evon in the present day. During the great war with France the tonup.ge increased from 1,513,401 tons in 1703, to 2.081,276 tons in 1815, or at an annual rate of 49,000 tons. Now here comes another very significant fact. In the last four years of the war, when we had an additional enemy in the United States, and depredations by American privateers were very actively carried on, the average annual increase was 41,000 tons. So we went on increasing. And the small reduction of 8600 tons was duo, not to the depredation# of tho enemy, but to the cessation of trade with American ports, which then belonged to a hostile Stato."

" What do you give as the reason for that?"

"The real reason why our trade increased was, bocause wo had an adequate navy, and our maritime defence was based upon propor principles. During tho War of American Independence, from 177G to 1783, our maritime defence was based upon principles altogether faulty. The result was, that we losb an avorage of £284,633 a year of our ratal import and export trade. The difference in the figures of the war just mentioned and those of the great conflict ending in 1815, was very clearly tho improvement due to adequate naval strength and proper naval arrant'oments. As these two wars havebeen mentioned, this vory interesting fact should be noticedthe increase of trade during the peace which began in 1783 and lasted till 1794 was less per annum than the increase of trade during the great war which ended in 1815."

BKARING ON THK COLONIES. " The significance of these figures," went on Admiral Bridge, "is comprised in their boaring on tho position of these colonies as great producing and exporting communities, so that overy inhabitant of Australasia to whom the prosperity of his home, or even its existence, is dear, should occupy himself without ceasing in perfecting the maritime defences of tho empire. The whole principle, which bore such good results in tho last groat war, was that our defensivo arrangements should be so devised thab they would tend towards rondering complete our naval efficioncy. That general principle was carried out in this way. The navy was lefb to do its own proper workthat of operating on tho oceanwhile the various localities assumed, and carried out, their proper sharo of work in providing for the defence, the local dofonce, of their own particular portions of the empire." "You thon would lay upon each locality the work of providing for its own land defences?' "It is a matter of absolute certainty, if history is any guide, that the re-adoption of this principle would remove from us any serious cause of apprehension in future hostilities, and that the trade which passes between any colony—Now Zealand, for instance—and any other country, would be efficiently dofendod. If the local defences of the colony were well organised, the ships of the navy would bo not only free to oporate upon tho ocean, but could also come, with confidenco, to certain ports where they would find their supplios secure, and even would have the support of the local dofences during replenishment or re-fit."

LOCAL DEFENCE. " Will you suggest anything that could bo done." " Well, tho ideas of a naval officer on land defences arc not likely bo bo of much importance, oxcept wlion he looks at it from a naval point of view, which is that of the attacking side. Naval officers havo to considor what thoy would bo likely to moot, and what) thoy would find most formidable, if they woro called upon to make attacks upon foreign territory. Generally speaking, naval officers regard tho human element of local defence us more important than tho passive or tnatorial element. And though thoy do not undervalue tho importance of fixed fortifications, or evon of submarine mines, 111 certain special circumstances, yet they consider generally, that the men who form thedefenco force are important than any other olomont. If you take tho case of any particular port, and say 'this port is surrounded with batteries; all its entoring Channels aro obstructed by submarine mines ; but there are no men to work the battories, or lay down the mines, it is plain that that port cannot offer as effective resistance to an enemy as one which, without batteries or mines, has a number of sufficiently trained, and properly organised, human defenders." " What kind of defence would you then consider tho —say for Auckland ? •'Tho kind of dofence which naval officers would consider the most formidable is that in which a proper proportion is maintained between tho human find the material element, and it does seem to us that throughout tho British Empire, especially in somo parts of the Mother Country, more attention has boon paid to the more erection of passive dcfonces, than to the provision of a proper number of men to meet an enomy if ho appears on the scene.

PROPOSED TRAINING SHIP. " There is somo talk about establishing a training ship in tho colony," said our representative. " What ao you think of the suggestion?" "It would largely be a question of monoy," was tho reply. "We have 4600 boys in the Mother Country under instruction on training ships, and 5194 others serving in the fleet. We have offored to take boys on this station, but the applications have boen vory few. Then the men who have entered here, have with very ruro exceptions, availed themselves of the potmission, given to any entering from the colonies, to leave the service after six months' trial. So that in spito of the fact that exceptional privileges have been given to youths and mon of colonial birth to enter the navy, very few have taken advantage of it." " Would that bo bocause they don b like the discipline?" t " Ib may be that, and also that they don b think the pay of an able seaman (Is 7d a-day) sufficionb. They do not remember the many indirect advantages they get— ponsions, tho amount of leave given, the fact that tho pay goes on all the year round sick or well, the ponsions to widows, and tho compassionato allowances to the children." " What do you think the cost of a training ship would bo ?" " Thab is a difficult question. A train- | ing ship is a very costly thing. I once commanded a training ship in England, and at that time ib was considered tlub every boy cost £54 a-year." " Provision is now made for colonials to enter the regular army as commissioned officers. Could nob something of the same sort bo made to apply to the navy ?" "Tho colonios have special provision already. Each colony has a certain number of nominations to naval cadetships allotted to ib, and these cadets have great privileges which are nob givon to boys in the mother country. For instance, if a boy is givon a nomination at Home for a naval cadotship, he has to compete, in a very difficult examination, with other boys. A boy with a colonial nomination has nob to compete. The privilege is so marked thab people sometimes try to make out they are colonists in order to get) colonial norai* nations." " Gould anything in the shape of a naval resarve be formed hero ?" " A naval reserve, to be of any use, rausb be prepared to go to any port of tho world —and take Is 7d a day. Bub the fact is there really is no wanb of men. We can gob as many men as wo wanb. THE CALLIOPE DOCK.

" You spoko just) now of the advantago of having a secure place, where, in time of war, a ship might replenish and refit. Would the Imperial authorities, do you think, do anything towards perfecting tho Calliope Dock?" T , „ " I think not. That would havo, I should imagino, to bo a colonial matter. No doubt the dock would be' a groat attraction for ships visiting tho place." " YVhab machinery do you _ think would bo required to properly equip it ?" " I cannot profess to speak about this dock, and coujd nob until I had actually seen a shipdockod there. But, as a general rule, my opinion is that the absence of special machinery from a dock, is given a great doal more importance than is necessary. We are so accustomed nowadays to find machinery made ready to our hand to do anything, that) if wo do nob gob a machine just at the moment we want) it, the inclination immediately is to cry out and make a griovanco of it. lixcopb in the case of very considerable repairs, British seamen,

notwithstanding the fact that) they are suffering from tha.inevitable effects of pro- ■ longed service in ships entirely worked by steam, ought still to have sufficient ingenuity and readiness of resource left to be able to devise arrangements tor lifting and moving weights—evon considerable weights —with such'material as they would find on the spot, Personally I like to see mechanical appliances kept at the lowe3fc possible level, so as to encourage our people to exorcise their ingenuity, and to develop the readiness of resource which used to be, j if it is not now, one of the leading characteristics of British seamen. At tho same I time ono has to admit that there are heavy repairs to the complicated ships of tho present day which may require special mechanical appliances. But the question arises whether, when these special appliances becomo absolutely necessary at a particular place, the repairing resources of the port would be sufficient to carry out the heavy repairs required. For instance, 1 walked underneath the Howe, in dock, when she had the wholo of her bottom taken clean out. The mishap necessitating this had occurred only GOO miles from Home, and they wero able to patch her up and send her back. She could not liavo done 13,000 miles, and if the accident happened here I do nob think you would have been in a very much better position to patch her up for the voyage than ab present. I do nob mean to say that when docks are being supplied with machinery it should nob be of tho latest and best pattern. Bat what Ido feel very strongly, is that when somebody suggests the introduction of some new machine careful investigation should be made, if, taking all circumstances into consideration, the obtaining of this machine is really necessary. I am nob saying don'b get the latest, but inquire whether it is necessary to get anything at all." COLONIAL INTERESTS. " Judging from your remarks a little while ago, you look upon colonial interests as of supreme importance." There are two facts," said His Excellency in conclusion, which came out in these two recent crises—the Venezuela and the Transvaal crisis—that they were both colonial questions, and that tho foreign policy of the country is shown to be, what you might oxpect that of a great maritime Empire would be—a policy which really means the defence of colonial interests as being its mosb important. Ido not know 1 have a right to say anything of a political bearing, bub recent affairs have thrown into very clear relief the iramonso advantage it is to small communities, like the British colonies, to be attached to a powerful mother country which has both the desire and the power to defend their interests."