THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1887.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIV, Issue 8926, 15 December 1887, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1887.

Since it became known that Russia was stationing an enormous force along the whole Austrian frontier, the public mind of Europe has been solicitous to ascertain what this might portend. It naturally occasioned some anxiety among the leading officials both of Austria and Germany, and a report, according to the cable messages, was current at Berlin that the members of the Triple Alliance had asked Russia to explain her action. That this was something more than a mere rumour may be inferred from the circumstance that, as was stated in a subsequent message, Russia had represented the massing of troops in question as being a mobilisation experiment. With this explanation those making the enquiry would seem ostensibly to have been satisfied. At all events, the military Conference held at Vienna to consider the situation appears to have deemed it sufficient, as it was resolved that no responsive measures should be immediately taken, a decision which would seem to have been more readily come to in consequence of the information that for a few days prior to the Conference the massing of Russian troops on the Galician frontier had been stopped. It is impossible, however, to resist the impression that the explanation and the satisfaction expressed therewith are not equally feigned, and that there is a deeper cause for the attitude assumed on both sides than either

party cares to avow. The fact vouched for by the Cologne Gazette, that the Russian forces massed near the Austrian frontier are three times more numerous than those maintained by Austria in a similar position, is not consistent either with the idea of a mere mobilisation experiment, or with the acceptance of that idea as accounting for a military demonstration on so large a scale. There must therefore be other

reasons to explain the suddenness and extensiveness of this concentration of

troops, and the facility with which Austria persuaded herself that such a concentration presented for her no cause of alarm or immediate action.

Now, it bo happened, that a few weeks before the massing of Russian ■troops on the Austrian frontier, an announcement appeared in the Independence Beige which serves to account for the attitude of apparent indifference of Austria regarding it. The statement, which embodies the conception of a bold policy on the part of the central European Powers, is as follows:—

One of our German correspondents writes that in certain diplomatic oiroles it is believed that the reconttitation of Poland is one of the articles of the treaty of alliance between Germany and Austria. The Courts of Berlin and Vienna have long been agreed on this point. Poland is to be made a sort of Belgium, to serve as a buffer between Russia and Austria.

In case of war with Russia, three Austrian armies would be formed in Galicia— two to invade Volhynia and Podolia, while the third, combining its action with the German forces, would occupy Lithuania and Russian Poland, which latter would be declared independent at the very outset oi hostilities.

The divulgence of such a plan, or rather, the idea of it being formalised as the basis of the future Continental policy, would immediately arrest the attention of the authorities at ' St. Petersburg, und the prompt and enor-

mous massing of troops on the Austrian frontier would form their natural reply to it. The above announcement was made on the 25th of October, and the first cable notice from London of the massing of Russian troops was dated the 3rd of December. This would allow sufficient time to the Russian officers to have the concentration of troops to the extent contemplated well nigh completed by the latter date, though of course it must have proceeded so far before it arrested public attention. It may be contended that the Russian Government would never attach so much importance to a statement made in a foreign newspaper, as to go to the immense expense involved in, the massing of troops on so gigantic a scale. But the answer to this is that the probability of the scheme is what the authorities at St.* Petersburg would look to rather than the medium by which publicity was given to it and would, especially if the announcement received no official contradiction, at once outweigh all considerations of expense. And that such a project as the reconatitution of Poland was likely to enter into the calculations of Austrian and German statesmen as a barrier to Russian aggression, is a matter which the Court of St. Petersburg must have reckoned on, and the formation of the Triple Alliance would tend to prepare them for its recognition, as a factor in the policy to be henceforth pursued by the central Powers of Europe. The basis of the anticipated supremacy of Russia on the Continent has for a long period' been the disintegration of the Continental States, and the supposed irreconcilability of their seemingly conflicting interests. Of this the statesmen of Prussia, Austria and Italy could not fail to be aware. And,! though, the assertion by Prussia, of her right to be regarded as the leading Continental Power, for a time aggravated the antipathy previously existing, the subsequent consolidation of Germany under the headship of the Prussian monarch, followed successively by a close alliance with Austria j and Italy, has yet had the effect of removing all friction between these respective Powers and animated them with' a strong desire to combine for their defence against "their common foe. In fact Prince Bismarck, whose work this combination has been, must have strangely overlooked the lessons of history if he had failed to discover that it was incumbent on him not to repeat the mistake of Napoleon I. Had this undoubted warrior and statesman reconstructed Poland, as he had promised to do, his own fate, as well as the history of Europe, would have been very different from what they proved to be. Ho saw his blunder when it was too late, and warned the Continental States when combining for his overthrow that the I time would come when the aggressive extension of Russia would prove a menace to the safety of them all. This warning has, manifestly, not been lost sight of by Prince Bismarck. Underneath all his plans for apparently keeping Germany aloof from the complications of the Eastern question, and for encouraging Russia to pursue her own course with regard to that, there has been kept concealed a resolute design to place an effectual barrier between the central States of Europe and the colossal Power of the Muscovite. This could only be done effectually by creating a neutral territory, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and the practical form which, to all appearance, this conception is meant to take is the resuscitation of the Sarmatian or Polish Kingdom.

On the assumption that this is the future policy of the triple alliance, as there is abundant reason for believing it is, there is no difficulty in understanding how Austria has viewed with comparative indifference the massing of Russian troops all along her frontier. It is quite in keeping with well-arranged tactics not to manifest too much concern over such a movement on Russia's part, to avoid the odium that would attach to any attempt to interfere with the proceedings Russia may elect to take within her own boundaries, and rather to tempt her to act the part of the aggressor. Yet, though not resorting to responsive measures, Austria will not neglect to have her forces in readiness for the struggle that she is destined to face; while the consciousness that she will be supported with the whole strength of Germany, and, if need be, of Italy as well, enables her to await events with comparative calmness. One thing may be regarded as —that, once these Continental Powers which constitute the triple alliance have drawn their swords, they will not again sheathe them until the danger to their security, which Russia now constitutes, has been effectually removed by the carrying out of a policy on the lines here indicated.