THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1836.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIII, Issue 7788, 6 November 1886, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1836.

The landing of sailors at Varna from the two Russian men-of-war in that harbour may be regarded as the first step in the invasion of Bulgaria. True the number is small, but it is not on that account the less significant. On the contrary, it is rather the more so, as it is quite in keeping with Russia's policy of obtaining first of all a foothold in the country she wishes to possess, and then of using that as the means of making her position more secure as circumstances may favour or render necessary. Any attempt to disembark a large force at present would be attended with the risk of startling the Continental nations of Europe to such an extent as to compel their respective Governments to assume towards Russia a hostile attitude. No person knows this better than the politicians who are now directing the Muscovite policy, and hence this thing is done in the most unostentatious way. And m order the better to sustain the impression as to the apparent insignificance of its import, it is given out that these hundred men who have been landed consist simply of sailors who are returning to their families on furlough. What more natural than that these men, now they are in the vicinity, should wish to Bee and spend some short time with their friends. So will the artful diplomatists of Russia say, and so will they expect all other parties to think. But the untruthfulness of Russia is too well known for this pretence to find general acceptance. And, unfortunately for the credit of this plausible device, it is directly contradicted by the order for twelve additional gunboats to be despatched to Varna, and also by the approval which the Czar has given to General Kaulbars' opinion that the occupation of Varna is essential to the restoration of Russian influence in Bulgaria. These items of information indicate with sufficient clearness that the landing of the small force of one hundred men is but the initiation of a larger and more formidable invasion. Even if these men were landed on furlough, they are, all the same, landed as Russian sailors, each one of whom is intended to act the part of a Russian partisan, and all of whom will be under instructions to carry out some part of a design for the seizure of the town so soon as Russia has her gunboats in readiness to command its surrender under threat of bombardment. In short, all the circumstances point to the conclusion that Russia has selected Varna as the base of her military operations for the subjugation of Bulgaria. By getting hold of that position she not only obtains the best harbour of the country, but also the key which will place in her power the command of the Balkan range. That position she, accordingly, means to have; and, say what her apologists may to the contrary, the step she has just taken means that it is already hers, unless prevented by a power that is not as yet apparent. It is, however, hardly conceivable that Russia will be allowed to steal into Bulgaria after this fashion unopposed. The internal tranquillity of the Austrian and even of the German Empire would be endangered if the Courts of Vienna and Berlin were by their inactivity to become parties to the placing of the Danube completely under the control of Russia. Despite Bismarck's diplomatic consent to Russia's occupation of Bulgaria and ad- , vance towards the Bosphorus, it is stated on high authority that the conmiction forced on all thinking men in i Germany of every political party is, bhat" the distrust of Russia and the ; feeling of destructiveness of a Russian ' advance towards Constantinople are ieep - rooted and invincible." On equally high authority, too, it is said that Austria, though supposed to be under Bismarck's diplomatic control, . :an never be a passive spectator of an 1 jeeupation of Bulgaria; while in , Hungary the consolidation of Russia's : power on the Lower Danube is re- ( yarded as synonymous with danger to ' ihat Monarchy, which must be averted 1 3ven if war should be the ( result. 1 With such feelings prevailing through- j jut the two central Powers of j Continental Europe, there must be ( in obvious limit. set to the cynical < ndifference which seems just now to 1 sway the Cabinets of . Berlin and 1 Vienna. Still it cannot be denied that ' i decided impression prevails all over 1 Russia that of all the Powers of Europe , Britain is the only one opposed to the ] Czar's policy in Bulgaria. Even in •egard to Turkey the conviction has >btained such a hold on some Russian , liplomatists as to amount to an assur- , tnce that an arrangement could be , :ome to with her for the purchasing of ] he Sultan's suzerainty over Bulgaria md Roumelia. And there can be no i loubt that for some time past Russian nfluence has been so much in the j iscendant at Stamboul that her states- .j have confidently reckoned on for j

ing such an alliance with Turkey as to effectually neutralise any opposition which Britain might offer to Russia's designs on the Balkan Peninsula. Thus Russia deems the time opportune for effecting a quiet lodgment on Bulgarian soil, and expects that the listlessness of most: of the European Cabinets and the powerlessuess which that, entails on the others, will have the effect of disheartening the Bulgarians, and disposing them to submitto their seemingly inevitable fate. '• v -- , • •' - s A -j-

But apparently small incidents often spoil the best laid calculations ; and the advent of Sir William White as British Ambassador to the Court of the Sultan, is not unlikely to produce an entire change in the situation in Bulgaria. As an Eastern scholar and a diplomatist, this gentleman has an exceptionally high reputation, and it was admittedly due to his influence at Constantinople that the influence of Britain was dominant during the protracted negotiations which took place over the Roumelian revolution. And to his withdrawal under the last Gladstone administration was the recent ascendancy of Russian influence at Stamboul also attributable. His restoration to his old position is therefore symptomatic of a return to a vigorous policy on the part of the British Government; and the cordial reception said to have been given him at Constantinople is a sign that the Sultan will largely be guided by his advice as to the course which should be taken at this crisis in the history of the Ottoman Empire. Under his representations, His Supreme Highness will probably be convinced of the truth of Stambouloff's remark to the Turkish Commissioner at Sofia, that the fate of that empire is bound up with the security of Bulgaria against a Russian invasion. And, should this be the result of the presence at the Sultan's Court of an Ambassador from Britain who can hold his own against all the craft and bribery of the Muscovite diplomatists, we may expect soon to hear of the Turkish troops now stationed on the frontier being despatched to aid the Bulgarian forces in opposing the occupation of Varna by Russia. This, it is true, will not prevent the Czar from attempting to gain possession of the Balkans, for upon chat depends his realisation of a long cherished design. But, if an alliance between Turkey and Britain is secured, this will give confidence to the Bulgarians, and the aggressive mission which Russia has appointed to herself will more than task all her resources.