IS ANOTHER MUTINY POSSIBLE IN INDIA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXII, Issue 7304, 16 April 1885, Page 6

IS ANOTHER MUTINY POSSIBLE IN INDIA.

Under the above heading; the London Morn, ing Post publishes a long article, supposed to be from the pen of Lord Lytton, ex-Viceroy of India. The following is a summary of the article . ■... . • .> The hostility of the three great European Powers— Germany, and France— towards England is compelling her to ask herself some very disagreeable Questions. Among them not one is more distasteful than the inquiry, as to whether a mutiny in India is or is not possible in the event of a Russian attaok on the forces guarding _ the Afghan frontier. In general, this question has been shirked by the English Press, and with a regard for the of the people of India which does them credit, the majority of English politicians have refused to refer to the matter at all. But it is a question which Europe is openly discussing, and whioh is talked of freely in this country by those who take any interest in Indian affairs.,.. Hence, in spite of the exceeding delicacy of the topic, we think the time has come when we should be subjected to a little closer examination in public, and at any rate the Russian view of the matter clearly appreciated by those who have any regard for the security of the Empire. We may say at once to those who asiert that India is quite safe and that an insurrection in favour of Russia is out of the question, that they are either grossly ignorant of what iB passing in Russia and the East, or else they assume an air of nonchalance for political reasons. If the chance of another rising were altogether remote, we would ask why the closing days of Lord Ripon's administration should have been marked by the adoption of certain measures for reorganising and strengthening the defences of a number of English garrison posts in the. Ganges Valley, completely free, by their geographical position, from any fear of a foreign attack. We are aware that the people of England are dominated by the' impression that India will never rise again so long as she treats her as she is treating her now but this, we may point out, is not the opinion of the highest and most unbiassed authorities in India, although for obvious reasons wo cannot tell the names of those who hold this view. ; At the outset we may make, the declaration that every Russian who has written of recent times on the Rußso-Indian question has expressed his belief in the certainty of an insurrection on the approach of a Russian force. ' It is curious to note that there does not exist a single dissension from ; this < view in Russia, although those who hold it' often quarrel on . other points. The cleverest and most influential ; Russian Generals— Lkobeloff, Grodekoff, Annenkoff, Petrusevitz, and Soboleffhave declared over and oyer again that Russia does not want to occupy and administer India. All she desires to do is to knock our rule over there, and be delivered thereby from our perpetual opposition ,to her expansion in Europe. In India there are 250,000,000 people ruled by 100, Englishmen. Even with reinforcements from England not more than 70,000 or 80,000 could :be placed on the Afghan frontier, without reduoing - the garrisons in India itself to at dangerous level. If Russia marched 100,000 men' to the frontier it would not be an easy matter for us to prevent them breaking through it, even though India remained loyal for the moment, • awaiting the issue of events ; while, if India broke out in revolt beforehand, the position of the 70,000 or 80,000 Englishmen on the frontier," with the country see thin in their rear, would be so perilous that 50,000 Russians attacking their front, and aided by the natives attacking their . communications with the sea, would be probably sufficient for the enterprise. In his famous plan of invasion, Skobeloff did not propose to permanently occupy India at all. What he sought to do wan to lodge a small force on the frontier that would keep our army tied to it, while his agents stirred up the country at the rear. .Then : mutinous Sepoys and; the troops of . the Indian jiowersj led. by Russian officers secretly sent' into India, would have matched towards the Indus, and the English frontier force, placed between two fires, would have been compelled, in his opinion,- to surrender. V Afterwards, so long as the English did not re-enter India, it Was a matter ,of indifference to : him what- the people did with ithemselves, V ' V It will be perceived that the enterprise proposed by Skobeloff was of - very modest proportions. < Beit it will be seen that SkobelofPs enterprise depended almost entirely for its success upon a sympathetic > rising in India. " Unless he' had - been"firmly persuaded that India woblid rise tin his approach, he would never have proposed attacking us in 1878 with such a. small force as 50,000 men. In his remarkable article in the Russ., General Skobeloff -proposer l using a larger 'force, 100,000 to 200,000 «:r a,, but T this :is not because-' he iB. less; sure , of, a, mutiny, but because Russia has now got-so close to India that she is able to march a much larger force thither, and he would have a larger force sent* so as to make absolutely sure of success. When Skobeloff prepared his project in 1878, a . more numerous army than 50,000 men- could not have been depatched to the -Indian frontier, owing to the distance from it of the Russian outposts and the incomplete condition of the lines of communication. - If he had been living to-day he would have recommended a larger force, and would have _. regarded the expedition, admittedly hazardous in 1878, as bound to secure success. His opinion of a mutiny, as expressed at r the time;, is 'well worth repeating. " Everybody k who has ever concerned t himself - with- the. question of the position of" the "'English'in India has declared it to be ' unsteady, ' that. is only maintained by absolute 'force of arms, that the English troops are only sufficient to keep the country quiet, and that the native soldiers are no fctobe- depended ' upon at all. Everybody who has concerned himself with the question of the possibility of invading India would declare that it iB only necessary to penetrate to a single point of the Indian frontier to bring about a general rising." His campaign he proposed, dividing into two periods — first, the . passage through Afghanistan to points close to our frontier, and then .a; period of > waiting, during which Russia would enter into relations with all the disaffected elements in India and convert them to her interests." ■ His expression "disaffected elements" is well worth noting. He does not speak of a universal rising being essential to the accomplishment of his. military plan, . although >' ; he believes it would occur, but says that • the co-operation of the disaffected elements would be sufficient. Now, nobody who knows anything of India at all can deny that ' considerable elements of a disaffected character do' exist in the country. ' The openly avowed hatred, if not actual treason, expressed *by the Indian native Press of lite should be sufficient to remind even the most easy-going' Englishman that the surface of India is not altogether free from ripples. <

In general the Russian army, which bat 4 few years ago Was thinking only of a renewal of . the Eastern ' conflict in the Balkan peninsula, now directs its gaze to the Afghan frontier as the theatre of the future decisive operations. It is there that- Russian military men believe that "the Eastern question will be fought out. Even if Russia is wrong in believing that - the people of India generally would rise on her approach, it is impossible to doubt that' the .. advance of an enemy would set seething those disaffected elements which every Englishman who olives in India admits to exist in the' country. The community of 250,000,000 furnishing those disaffeoted elements is so 'vast, and the. English force, of 100,000 keeping them down; relatively so small, that even, the most optimist Radical cannot bat recognise the possibility of* that' force having -deal with turbulent;-natives Overwhelmingly > superior in ; pcafifi 'of 'ntltobfert'; -Wo . have purposely avoided touching upon tho'qoestioii 'of the. fidelity of the-ladian princes' and the loyalty of the sepoys.' Each requires tooro. attention thai* we okn-'giva on this occasion. Bat we may tbmark that with several of the leading prints' Our relations are notoriously unsatisfactory giuit f fiowj' while ; the Maharajah of Cashmere/ -besides being - in disgrace -as a despot,-is more than suspected of - fentertaining pro-RuSsian proclivities. ' As regardr-the army, - We Way point out that our bast military 1 Authorities have: recommended -. that they ; should' not : bejplaced-face >to. face with : i the 1 f Rtaeianß,! and, - above - all jii the troops of princes should be with-, held from this ordeal. All told, the forces of the native pHnces, over whioh we exercise ho control," amount to 1050 gans of all sorts. 15,000 regular ' cavalry, 53,000 irregular, cavalry, 93,000 rfegrilar infantry, and 183,000 ; irregular infantry, or a total of 1050 guns and 348,000 fighting men. - It is this force that would be at our rear if Russia advanced tomorrow to attack us on the Afghan frontier, ! and it is hoped and believed by Russian 5 generals and statesmen that they would J

furnish disaffected elements of * chattel, that would rapidly bring about ctownf*? Can we really consider these hopes ddnsh* when i English writer# ihemselve/i men at admitted weight an satisfactory—refer to fcha army of the native princes of Indians comtitat lag a serious menace to the security of our rule»' Looking at the question of. another Indian Mutiny plainly, (therefore, one is compelled to admit that the condition of affairs is fa? from being such as would warrant our re. garding the Russian advance with calmness find confidence. There ,is no need of panics and we' would particularly urge that no measures should be undertaken to pro. voke the belief in the native mind that »• do not trust the people. •' Confidence begets confidence, and doubt commonly is th parent of treason. Our civilisation has bad a disintegrating effect upon India generally and unsettled, restless,. and discontented elements have been formed everywhere If the country could only be kept free from extraneous intrigue for an. other generation the . chances of a mutiny would become very remote; but with Russia pressing on as hard as she can, and England yielding before her, we can hardly hope for this desirable spell of rest. Rusiiai very belief in the possibility of exciting a mutiny, whether it be a delusion on her part or not, is luring her on. The enterprise seems so simple. Its success would be attended with such enormous results. The total collapse of England, the disappearance of the detested free trade, the, cessation of all opposition -to Russia's expansion in Turkey, 'Persia, Afghanistan, KaahgwiT and Corea— and a variety of other results, all to the advantage of Rossis, would spring, she -believes, from the sue. cesaful expulsion of the English from India. The more Russia believes in a mutiny, the greater her temptation becomes to attempt an early invasion, because, as we have demonstrated, a successfully fomented mutiny would involve the necessity of despatching only a small Russian attacking force, and Russia, therefore, is relieved of the compulsion of waiting patiently until her resources become fully developed in Central Asia. Her faith in a mutiny makes her ridi. cule the puerile notion of repelling her Advance by the «• moral" barrier of a United Afghanis tan. At the utmost the Ameer could only block the Russian advance with a few thousand ill. armed levies; while at the English rear would be 250,000,000 people seeching and pushing on mutinous troops to assist Russia in cutting her way through'the frontier. From a Russian ■ point of view an attack upon Indians so simple that generals like Skobeloff are raging to realise their plum Those plans may seem visionary to English statesmen, but are not to be disregarded ca that account since even ah attempt to put them into effect; —in other words, a regular war between Russia and England would be very awkward just now. ,