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New Zealand Herald, Volume XXII, Issue 7302, 14 April 1885, Page 4

No army has a higher reputation than the British for the ability of its engineer and artillery officers, and we are so fortunate as to possess in our present Governor one of the ablest of such officers; while Major Oautley, also an accomplished veteran, has been commissioned to assist the colonies in the matter of their defences. ■ Thanks both to His Excellency and to Major' Oautley, we have beea shown what ought to be done, and what it is practicable to do for the protection of our New Zealand ports against an enemy's visit, if war should happen. That is, we have been instructed on the subject of the fortification—the proper sites for the construction of batteries, and tor the placing of submarine mines and torpedoes ; but perhaps we are still in need of their advice and criticism as to the means of manning such things. No doubt in such case military men will always, and naturally, say " When we recommend a system of fortifications, the men to use them were as matter of course included in the recommendation, were as much part and parcel of it as the material." Nevertheless, although this is so, we are still in the dark as to what His Excellency and Major Gautley may think of the arrangements talked about or begun for providing the men. Will they suffice 1 That is a point upon which it is of the greatest importance to ascertain their opinion. The fire from the big guns on the batteries, instead of stopping an enemy, will go astray unless the artilleryman are skilful. The knowledge of the harbour of Auckland being torpedoed or undermined would not alone suffice to prevent a hostile ship of war coming in, unless it was equally notorious that there were well skilled men for that sort of defence. Will the arrangements which the Ministry, with commendable promptitude, have taken in hand to meet such requirements really suit the purpose, or if not what eke ought to be done in addition or substitution 1 In Dunedin they are forming a company composed of men who have served in the Imperial regular forces, and it is an excellent idea, though we are not told to what branch o£ the service they belonged. If it is possible to draw together in Auckland a few score veteran artillerists, it would be a valuable acquisition just cow, for the small party of the Armed Constabulary, only twenty-five men, brought to this, as to each of the other ports, to learn big gun drill, will, cf course, need time for the instruction. As for torpedoes and sub-marine mines, these we would suppose to be matters of such very delicate management as to be only reliable when in charge of those regularly trained to the duty. But the eminent military authorities who are with us will decide what can be best done at the current moment to amend our unpreparedness 1 There is already a force of some 3000 volunteers. We do not underrate their value, but it would be as great a mistake to overrate it. They are auxiliaries —supplemental to a regular force, which they cannot be employed like or take the place of. To 'manoeuvre volunteers in bodies like regular troops would' produce confusion, which would be ruin in face of an enemy. And yet this.does not say that ' train them to movement in bodies is not proper, although they cannot get enough of it to make it second nature with them, as in the case of regulars. The part for which volunteers are fitted is as guerillas, " partisan" troops t and

in that way they are of great value, provided they are active men and good shots, and good shooting is acharac. teristic of oar Auckland volunteers, while in the old country many of the corps are eaid to excel in this way regi. ments of the line. The first great ia. petas to volunteer enrolments in Eng. land and the colonies was given hj Garibaldi's famous expedition and ex. traordinary success with this land of force. He landed on the shore* of Sicily with a few hundred men, w ho — though some of them had served with him in the desultory warfare between the South American Republics —had no regular organic tion or discipline, but who, nevertheless, overran the island in a few weeks, and then crossing to the mainland, did the same thing there—driving King Bomba from his throne, and handing over the entire Kingdom of Naples to Victor Emmanuel as an instalment of a united Italy. Well might the world gaze in wonder, and people began to ask why should there be so much trouble and expense to train and main, tain standing armies, when a brilliant guerilla chief, with a handful of irregu. lars, was able to conquer a kingdom I The circumstances were not toonarrowly looked into—the disaffection in Sicily, the contemptible condition of the so-called Neapolitan army, and the magical influence of Garibaldi's presence and name. The illusion was dispelled a few years after —in 1866— when Italy was the ally of Prussia against Austria. Then Garibaldi once more took the field with hie "Red Shirts," but this time they were encountered by a battalion of Tyrolese Yagers, notably among the best disciplined troops of one of the great European armies, and the effect was the immediate and complete dispereal of the irregulars. Everything in its own place. Guerillas have their service in war as well as regular troops, but the service is not the same. The hostilities now threatening may not, after all, happen just now, but we ought never be " caught napping" again, exhibiting the same want of preparation. The adoption of the Swiss plan of a military training for boys at school, and the creation of a Naval Reserve by working the fisheries, would provide us with an excellent militia and a naval force a few years hence. Meanwhile it is difficult to see how we can dispense with at least such an enrolment ae would furnish each chief port with a certain number of regular artillerymen and engineers.