THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, APRIL 13, 1885.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXII, Issue 7301, 13 April 1885, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, APRIL 13, 1885.

Thb Russian Government, according to a statement of Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, have requested General KomarofFto furnish an.explanation of his conduct in attacking the Afghan troops; and, as a result, the panic which had affected the Exchange has somewhat abated. It is, perhaps, well that the excitement should have subsided, because it is desirable that the gravity of the situation, as also the measures it calls for, should as far as possible, be considered with becoming and resolute calmness. At the same time we must not close our eyes to the fact that the action taken by the Russian Government is precisely of that nature which is apt to throw both the British Government and the British public off their gaard. The demanding of an explanation from General Komaroff implies an indefinite delay; and, meanwhile, the effect produced on the minds of the Afghans and of all Asiatic tribes by English forbearance, may be highly detrimental to England's prestige, and correspondingly beneficial to that of Russia. Had the action of the Russian Government been to recall General KomarofT to St. Petersburgh, to give an account of his procedure, it would have conveyed the impression, both in England and in Asia, that his action was disapproved of, and would have, moreover, shown, in some measure, that the movements of Russia were under the control of the Oourt and not oi: the army. As the matter stands, however, the presumption is conveyed that the direction of events in Central Asia is really in the hands of the Russian generals, and that: the Oourt tacitly acquiesces in all that is done by them. Besides, it is difficult to see what other explanation of his action General* Komaroff can give than the one which he has already assigned for it, namely, that he considered the Afghans had made a hostile movement, and therefore thought himself justified in attacking them. It cannot for a moment be expected that the Russian Government will pronounce the movements of the Afghan troops as insufficient to warrant the commencement of hostilities. And, even if they did, this would be no reparation for the wanton violation of the agreement made with the British * Government, or for the destruction of life and property which has causelessly been inflicted on the Afghan forces.The plea of ignorance on the part of General Komaroffof the understanding which had been arrived at between the Russiian and English Governments cannot now be advanced by him without condemning himself. Even if his own Government had failed in promptly making him acquainted therewith, the fact that the British officers had, a week before the attack, twice pointed out to him that by continuing to advance he was violating the agreement in question, suffices completely to did pose of that excuse. Moreover, the demand on him for an explanation implies on the face of it that he must have acted contrary to ostensible instructions. It is also fairly construable into an admission that the advance he made despite the knowledge he had in his possession was the real cause of the fighting which took place; and goes to prove that the apology assigned by M. de Giers. for the attack, that the Russian officers were not then aware of the arrangement that no further advance of troops should be made on either side,, was a pure diplomatic invention. It is clear, therefore, that no additional light will be thrown on the causes of the attack to that we already have, and that the only object aimed at in demanding an explanation from General Kamaroff is simply to enable the Russian Government to escape from the dilemma in which it finds itself and to gain time for the secret furtherance of its plans. • '

The only additional explanation of his conduct which General Komaroil" will be able to give, if he speak truthfully and be correctly reported, is sure to be that he rather too rigidly carried out his instructions. That he received no instructions about the negotiations proceedingbetween England and Russia, must, as we have said, be dismissed as a fiction ; but, true to the instinct of his race, he gave less heed to the agreement of the two Governments, and more to the conditions attached to it by M. de Giers. This, of course, will never be admitted; but there is not a chief or prince in all Asia who will not put that construction on his action, no matter how craftily it may be concealed in the language of diplomacy. The question, therefore, as to what the Engliuh Government should do while General Komaroff's answer is being awaited, becomes a very serious one for the Empire. There is no reason that can now be urged with any plausi idleness why the Afghan troops should abstain from offensive opera* tions uhould they find themselves in a position to undertake them. And, as Russia, has virtually declared war againso their country by attacking their outposts, it is difficult to see how England can escape from the obligation to support them in the course they may take. The late Viceroy of India did, it is true, stipulate that the Ameer should be swayed by England's advice; but, now that the blood of his troops has been shed in an unjustifiable attack made by the Russians, his hold on these troops may depend on his regarding the attack as a declaration of war,

on the part of Russia. If such should prove to be the case, Britain will have no option but to follow the Afghan lead or accept the alternative of forfeiting, the confidence of all the Afghan tribes. At all events, it is evident that the action of England must be to some extent regulated by the change which has come over the situation by virtue pf the battle on the Kushk. So far as she is concerned, the compact between her and Russia has thereby been broken, and what she was not at liberty to do before she is free to do now. Her obvious course therefore is, until KomarofFs explanation is forthcoming, to take advantage of tl>.e interval to push forward her troops in the direction of Herat, and be prepared for the contingency which that explanation may create. It is now very evident that Russia is quietly massing a large force within striking distance of the Afghan frontier and Herat, for the purpose of asserting her claims to certain territory, wholly irrespective of what the frontier Commission may do, and, failing the effect of intimidation thus reckoned on, is preparing to assert these by force. The movements of her warships, too, disclose the intention o£ making a swift descent on the lines of British traffic the moment impending hostilities may from any cause be commenced. In these circircumstances it is surely not too much to take it for granted that the British Government will, without the slightest relaxation, take effective measures for placing their forces advantageously in the anticipated field of conflict and so disposing of their fleets as to guard the colonies and the commerce of England against the designs of the enemy. In so doing they will be heartily aided by every portion of the Empire. The conviction universally prevails that the upholding of the honour and influence or the mother country is essential to the well-being of every part of her vast Empire, and all that at this critical moment is desired, alike in England and in the colonies, is that the Imperial Government will refuse to yield by so much as a hair's breadth, to her wily antagonist.