THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, MAY 3, 1880.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XVII, Issue 5759, 3 May 1880, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, MAY 3, 1880.

The charge openly made and generally believed in with regard to the Grand Jury in the Minister of Marine case, and the more recent allegations made with respect to attempts to tamper with the jury in the case of S. E. Hughes, have created profound distrust in the public mind with regard to the working of the Juries Act, in itself a sufficient reason for inquiry as to whether it is not possible so to amend it as to restore the confidence now so greatly shaken, because it would be little short of a calamity were public faith to be permanently impaired in that system of trial which it s the habit to regard with pride and satisfaction. It must be remembered that the proceedings which have taken place in the Police Court cannot be regarded as finally proving anything criminal against the defendant —the decision on this point has yet to be given in the superior court. The fact that this charge has been brought would however appear to indicate a belief that the means which exist are insufficient to maintain the purity of the jury system. We are in a position to say that there is a perhaps natural indisposition to facilitate the objects of those whose duty it is to compass the punishment of persons who attempt the offence of embracery. In a small community people are averse to giving information which will create them enemies, entail upon them the disagreeable necessity of appearing in a witness box, possibly cause a los 3 of business, and we have to add the influence which is brought to bear upon them to save an offender from getting into trouble. There is a good deal of human nature about this, but it is perilous to the public interests, because it baffles the object of the law designed for the protection of juries and the punishment of wrong-doing. It may have escaped observation that attempts to tamper with jurors may not only have an effect favourable to a prisoner, but also adverse to him, because the resentment begotten in the mind of a juror may render him, at the outset, hostile to the prisoner, and create in his mind a not unnatural presumption of his guilt. He would be very likely to ask why if there is a good defence there should be any attempts to influence the jury. The Juries Act, with the object of enabling a prisoner to exercise his right of challenge effectively, provides him with the opportunity of knowing the array, and from this, to some extent, arises the means of tampering with its members. It is evident that no change is possible in this direction. To prevent the array being known until the time of a prisoner's trial would effectually prevent its being tampered with, but would also prevent his obtaining the information necessary to guide him if he desired to challenge. It would be intolerable that an attempt to obtain a true deliverance from juries should be accomplished at the expense of prisoners. The evil created would be even greater than that removed. It may be said that we have on the one hand the oath taken by jurors to give a just verdict, and on the other the serious penalties attaching to the offence of tampering with them, and that these surely ought to be sufficient to ensure righteous verdicts. No doubt they ought. The public, however, have .probably a very decided opinion as to whether the first has always been sufficient, and with regard to the latter we have no hesitation in repeating what we have previously said, but not so succicntly, that it is rendered in a great measure inoperative by the indisposition of those possessing information to supply it. It is not enough to say that the Crown, like the prisoner, has the right of challenge, and can thus baffle any efforts that may be made to influence the jury in his favour, because the agents of the Crown are hampered by the disinclination to give them information from the reasons we have stated, and the moral cowardice which prefers the risk of an infamous wrong being inflicted to that of being dubbed an informer. The tamperers with a jury have all the field to themselves. If the agents of the Crown learn anything about their proceedings, it is only when public indignation has given strength to the conscience of some one whom there has been an attempt to influence, but too late to ensure a just verdict. The person tampering may be punished, but the verdict stands, and some one may be stamped with infamy instead of some one else paying the penalty of an offence.

Now, it seems to ns that a simple amendment of the Juries' Act is possible which would have the effect of rendering the offence of embracery almost impossible, and at all events ensure that an offender would obtain his deserts. Why should there not, in addition to the oath now taken by jurors, he questions answered on oath, and with respect to which a false answer would entail punishment for perjury, whether any attempt had been made to influence them. We put aside by anticipation, as frivolous, the objection that this would be an imputation on the jurors, because it would be a ridiculous Jsensitivene3s, and a reform, if good in itself, could not be restrained by any .figment of this kind. The adoption of the course we suggest would render the law against embracery operative, at the same time that it would strengthen our jury system together with public confidence in it. The juror being ordered to stand aside, because unable to take the oath, would set the police on the scent, and go far to ensure the.punishment of the offender. As the words of the oath would have to be very comprehensive, it would at first sight appear that a good many jurors might have to stand aside, and the proceedings of the Court be impeded by the necessity of summoning others. But even if that were so, it would be a mere feather in the scale compared with the advantage of surrounding trial by jury with another safe-guard. But there would be ho such result, because no one would dare to attempt to influence a jury, with the knowledge that

with, a trial for perjury staring him in the face, the juror must, La. accordance with his oath, confess the fact. "We firmly believe that some additional safeguard is necessary, we conceive that what we suggest ia possible, and would be successful, and seeking foj®some of remedying the great evil which exists, we have been unable to discover any other equally simple, and having so much to recommend it.