The New Zealand Herald. AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, FEB. 11, 1869.

New Zealand Herald, Volume VI, Issue 1630, 11 February 1869, Page 3

The New Zealand Herald.

AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, FEB. 11, 1869.

SPECTEJIUR AGENDO. OiTe every man Uiino ear, but few thy voice Take each man's censure, but ressrve thy judgment, This above all, —To thino own self be true And it must follow, as the night the day. Thon canst not then be false to any man."

The intelligence which we lately received from the seat of war on tlie West Coast, that Titokowaru had abandoned the Nukumaru pa iu spite of all our endeavours to so invest it as to make an engagement inevitable, points to the folly of the system on which all our wars with the natives have been waged. Military critics of no mean authority have pointed out the folly of attacking the enemy's pas —of going to the expense and. labor of bringing our guns and forces to bear upou and surround a given spot, from which, when the enemy finds it no longer tenable, he quietly betakes himself to some other position of equal strength and diffiI culty, before which, and with the same results, we again enter upon the tedious and expensive work of investment. Sometimes, it is true, the enemy remains within his fortifications, aud repels the attack, so long as he can do so, with serious loss to us, and little to himself, vacating it at the last moment by some bush path. Such a mode of warfare is not only barren of results but, to us, ruinous in the extreme. Every day's continuance of the war at the present rate of expenditure is a heavy loss to the colony, which it can ill bear, while the enemy does not feel it as such. Our flocks and herds supply his commissariat, and at most lie can transport thither the food he would otherwise have conisumed at home. The abandonment of sucli positions is no actual ioss to him. It is seldom they command a district or are the key to any particular pass from one part of the country to | another. They are simply camps, in which ihe can entrench himself, and, as occasion affords, sally forth aud drive away our cattle or destroy the property on abandoned farms, or at any rate remain to the exclusion of the European settlers, whom he would gladly drive iuto the sea, Now we must, if we are to subdue these rebels at anything short of a ruinous cost to ourselves, pursue a very different line of tactics. As Napoleon ignored the old fortresses of Europe, so long supposed to be the keys to this or that portion of European countries,, and refused to waste time and men in their reduction, but quietly passed them by, so would we recommend that if Titokowaru chose to entrench himself in any strong position, we should leave him to the enjoyment of it, so far as he could enjoy it while we were shelling him from a safe distance, the bulk of our forces being meanwhile engaged in ravaging his country, in destroying villages and crops, stores of food, and fishing stations, and in driving ofF all cattle belonging to natives or Europeans which could possibly come within his reach. By a persistent course of this kind we should bring the most powerful rebel tribe to submission in an incredibly short space of time. The Maori cannot now, as formerly, live on fern root, and if his crops and stores were destroyed he would offer no very lengthened opposition to our arms. We must bring him face to face with actual starvation, and shall then have little difficulty in inflicting such further chastisement upon him as will make those who are left come as suppliants for their lives, instead of, as heretofore, dictating the terms on which they will accept, not peace, but a cessation of active warfare. Native .cultivations and kiangas are not in such inaccessible or out-of-the-way positions but that such corps as our Eorest Bangers, acting in conjunction with trusty native allies, might find their way to and surprise them. The work of such expeditions should be sharp and sudden raids upon the enemy's stores. His growing crops and saved stores of grain or potatoes once destroyed, lie has not the means of replacing them, until another season, and famine is inevitable. Under our present system of fighting the natives have never yet really felt the horrors and inconveniences of war. In carrying out all these matters it would be far cheaper and better to rely more upon native assistance than we arc in the habit of doing. The late campaign upon the East Coast has taught us the value of our native allies, and how thoroughly they may be depended upon. The Times, in a late article, points out how little New Zealand needs the assistance of British troops, when it could so easily bring one half the natives to fight agaiust the other half. There is no tribe but has its native enemies whom we might use against it, offering as payment to our allies the land of the conquered and so much per head for every one of the enemy killed or captured.

We are glad to find the Government bold enough to challenge the Uriwera chiefs to come forward and openly declare which side they will take, for or against us, and trust that, on the answer being adverse, or, what is quite likely, on no notice being taken of the letter, that gome active measures will he taken to subdue them. The country of the Uriweras may be rugged and broken, but it is not impracticable to our native allies, the "Ngatiporoua. It is the Uriwera tribe tl • I,as ta':an the most active part in the late massacre at Poverty Bay, and the Government will be lull) justified, should ■ ' Uriwera chiefs refuse to declare themselves peacefully inclined, and to give up their arms as a guarantee of good faith, in slipping the Ngatiporous upon them, offering so much for every Uriwera brought in d«nd

or alive, doubling, if it be thought advisable., the price paid for the latter. The whole tribe is but 250 strong, and its submission would be cheaply purchased at a cost of some £10 per head, exclusive of the commissariat and pay of the Ngatiporous when engaged upon work which, with such inducements, would be made a short one. The time lias passed for half measures. These are cruel to the rebels themselves, but they are doubly cruel to our own innocent settlers whose lives are risked, whose, property has been destroyed, and whose means for the future are fast dwindling away iu the face of a protracted war. It is the height of folly, for the sake ot aliording an unappreciated clemency to savages who ruthlessly murder our women and children and destroy aud harrass our settlements, to plunge this young country into financial embarrassments, which will retard its prosperity for years. America has found this out at last. At the present moment the Indian tribes, encouraged by the maudlin sentimentality of American Exeter Ilall-ism, are waging a more savage, and general warfare on the white population than has occurred during the past century. In the new President, General Grant, America has, however, a man who will not permit such a state of anarchy and savagery long to exist. His first care will be to sweep away the American " Native Office," it we may judge from the following message which when President elect, and as General-in-Chief, he wrote to the Congress. " I would earnestly " renew my recommendation ot last year " that the control of tho Indians be trans- " ferred to the War Department. I call at- " tention to the recommendations of General " Sherman on the subject. It has my earnest " approval. It is unnecessary that the argu- " ment in favor of the transfer should "bo restated. The necessity for it becomes " stronger and more evident every day." What General Sherman's views of a native policy are we may gather from the following communication addressed by that officer to Geaeral Sheridan on the 14th of October last ; —" As to their extermination it is for " the Indians themselves to determine. We " do not want to exterminate or even fight " them. At best it is an inglorious war, not " apt to add much to our fame or personal " comfort, and for our country, to whom we " owe our first thoughts, it is one of danger and extreme labor, without one single

" compensating advantage. To accuse us of " inaugurating or wishing such a war is to " accuse us of a want of common sense and " for that regard for order and peace which " has ever characterised our regular army " in the settlement of Kausas and Colorado, " and any injustice and frauds hitherto " practised on the Indians, as charged, are " uot of our doing ; and I know the present " war does not result from any acts ot ours. " It was made and has been carried on by " tho Indians in spite of our entreaties, and '■ in spite of our warnings, and the only " question to us is whether we shall allow " the progress of our Western settlements " to be checked and leave the Indians free " to pursue their bloody career or accept " tlieir war aud fight them." He further informs Sheridan, say the papers from which we quote, " That he will say " or do nothing to restrain our troops from " doing what they deem proper on the spot, " aud will allow uo vague charges of cruelty " or inhumanity to tie their hands, but will " use all the powers confided in him to the " endthatthelndians —the enemiesofourrace " —shall never be able to make war again." In conclusion, lie says to Sheridan, " You " may now go ahead in your own way, and I " will back you with my whole authority, " and stand between you and any efforts that " may be attempted in your rear to restrain " your purpose or check your troops. I " believe that all the departments of our " Government, civil and military, are now " united in this conclusion, and I have no " fears but that Congress and the people " will always sustain us, provided we meet " with reasonable success." In this, as in many other matters, we may wisely take a lesson from our American cousins.